NATURAL CONDUCT

PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL ETHICS

By EDWIN BINGHAM COPELAND

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PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL ETHICS

By

EDWIN BINGHAM COPELAND

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PREFACE

It is a common and, unfortunately, well-grounded charge that the mastery of nature, which is the pride and characteristic of our culture, however it may enhance the material comfort of men, has contributed in a minor way to their real happiness. This charge does not rest chiefly on rosy dreams or recollections of the good old times, which, whatever they really were, would be unendurable if we had them back. It rests on the availability of science to cause misery as well as its opposite; on the belief, correct or not, that our progress creates wants about as fast as it satisfies them; and on the conviction that attention to material science has deprived men of mental peace and hope, by lessening their faith, without providing any substitute for faith as the guide and arbiter of morals and conduct.

Whether or not the charge is justified, it certainly is true that there is less happiness than there ought to be, and that the teachings of science are not used as they should be to promote happiness.

It is also true that our public education, the expense of which in time and money is almost as characteristic of our age as is the mastery of nature, pays utterly inadequate attention to the principles of conduct and to the nature and promotion of happiness. In the writer's belief, it is a still more disquieting fact that this neglect endangers the stability of our culture and the future of our race.

Defined as the science of conduct, ethics is so important that no man can escape interest in it, or need explain his devotion to it. The writer's interest in the subject is a family inheritance. It was intensified and directed in undergraduate days by Doctor Jordan's teaching of organic evolution. It is fifteen years since this interest was applied to a course of lectures to college students, presenting, as is done here, practical ethics as an application of biological science.

It is the writer's experience that students of high-school age and training can understand this presentation thoroughly enough to be profoundly influenced by it, in attitude toward life and in daily conduct. Unless ethics can have this effect, it is hard to see why it should be studied. Where it fails of this effect, it is usually because the ethics taught is not a science. It is because they have little relation to a science of conduct, in the modern sense, that the verbal encumbrances and many of the classic problems familiar in historic philosophy are wanting in this treatment of the subject.

In the course of years, the author has naturally become indebted to many men for suggestions, criticisms, and ideas. It would be impracticable to list them all; and some of those whose criticisms have been helpful have still disagreed so emphatically on other points that acknowledgment might have an unfair implication. The obligation to Doctor Jordan and to Professor E. N. Henderson is too great to be unmentioned; but even to them no responsibility is imputed.

E. B. C.

Chico, California
April 10, 1928

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Any subject can be studied most effectively if the student has from the beginning a general idea of what it is about and why it is worth studying. This chapter, therefore, besides being an introduction, touches upon a number of points which are more fully discussed in later chapters.

Ethics is a part of education. In some places, the teaching of ethics is almost the whole of public education. This has been common among peoples of primitive culture, who left other education to the family but taught this subject alike to all of the young people—or to all boys where the girls did not count. In the thoroughly modern educational system of Japan, ethics has a most prominent place, being taught from the primary schools to the technical colleges of the university. In our own schools less time is given to it, but this is not because anybody doubts the importance of the subject. We like to believe that the church and the family give the proper education in this field.

Improvement of humanity and of the conditions of living:

1. By selection

There are three general ways of improving mankind and the conditions of human life. The first and most basic is by the continuance, and perhaps eventually the control, of selection. We apply this method to the improvement of every domesticated animal and cultivated plant. And we make very imperfect use of our knowledge of nature, if this knowledge furnishes us no control over the selection of men. In recent years, a new branch of science called eugenics has been developing; it aims to perfect our knowledge of the possibilities and methods of selection, and finally to apply this knowledge to human affairs. The most important recent expression of eugenic thought has been in an appreciation of the permanent damage done by war. The millions killed and permanently incapacitated in the World War were all chosen men; while those unfit for the work of strong men were systematically reserved for

a chance to be the parents of the next generation. Selection, as the word indicates, depends upon the survival of a part of a given population, and this involves the removal or extermination of another part. In the long run, extermination is on a far greater scale than survival. Selection cannot operate on the whole of a population; but it can effect improvement if, generation after generation, each is succeeded by the descendants of the better part of itself. In Wisconsin, certain elements of the population deemed especially undesirable are kept from becoming parents. In ancient Sparta, the virility of the population was maintained, in spite of war, by rigorous killing of inferior children.

2. By organized and collective education

It is possible to elevate a whole population by uniform and systematic mass education, or by a more or less uniform general social uplift, under sufficiently strong and intelligent direction. This method of human improvement depends essentially for its success upon the strength of the state; for the part of the population most in need of education, or improvement otherwise, will not usually take part in it on its own initiative. The progress of Germany during the past half century is the best modern illustration of what can be accomplished in this manner. The modernization of Japan is another. The evil features of imperial German education do not invalidate the example, but they do emphasize the need of competent direction.

3. By the ethical education of the individual

The third method is by attention primarily to the ethical education of the individual. This is the proper field of ethics, in the modern use of the word. Because it would not be good practical ethics to ignore other methods of accomplishing the same general purpose, and because we are creatures and members of society, we must constantly correlate the thought and conduct of the individual with the interests and possibilities of the state and of society in general.

Definitions of ethics and philosophy

Ethics is the science which deals with conduct. It is properly used as a singular word, though retaining a plural

form, from the Greek word meaning customs. From the Latin word with the same meaning we have our word, morals. The two words are sometimes used interchangeably; but it is convenient to distinguish the principles of conduct as ethical in that they are understood, but as moral in that they are right, irrespective of knowledge of the reasons for them. Thus the conduct of a well-behaved child is moral; but it is not ethical until he understands why it is right. Ethics is commonly regarded as a part, and the most important part, of philosophy, defined as the science which encompasses all other sciences. All science is vain except for its effect, and all its effects are reached through the general channel of human behavior. Practical ethics should rest on the whole field of human knowledge. All knowledge should contribute to the control of conduct, and is useless unless it does so contribute. Of course no book or course of study can show this use of all knowledge, or of all that one man can have. The most that is possible is to use as much of the available knowledge as the time permits and to make this use of knowledge familiar.

Definition of morals

As a science treating of the behavior of living things, ethics is clearly one of the group of biological sciences, which includes also botany, bacteriology, physiology, zoölogy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics. It is only since this fact has been recognized that it has been possible to treat ethics as a science in the modern sense. Since it deals with the activity of living creatures, it is true of ethics as of other biological sciences that the conditions of life itself have to be satisfied, as a first concern, before there is any occasion or chance to study about what the creature does; without life, there can be no conduct. As all living things exhibit conduct, each of its own kind, ethics has common ground with the other sciences mentioned, and with history, which tells of the past activities of men. It has most in common with sociology, and with politics, with which it almost merges.

Importance of conduct

Conduct is unquestionably the most fundamentally important subject with which, as human beings, we ever have to deal. Ethics may therefore well be recognized as the most important part of education. Our conduct affects ourselves, our families, our neighbors, and, in a diminishing measure as the distance grows greater, the whole society of which we are a part. The things we do affect us for an indefinite time afterward, some of them for all our lives. Conversely, every one of us is subject to influence by the conduct of his neighbors. It is a matter of great concern to each of us whether these are good neighbors or bad neighbors, whether their conduct makes our lives better worth living or not so well worth living. Our part is to be good neighbors, and first we must know how to be.

Sanctions of conduct: law and reason

The principles according to which conduct is controlled and judged have two kinds of sanction, law and reason. In its conformity with law, and particularly with revealed law and with custom, conduct is regarded as moral; while under the control of competent reason, it is ethical. The distinction is not a sharp one. The study of ethics shows why law, as such, ought to be obeyed, so that obedience becomes both moral and ethical; and in rare instances disobedience likewise may be both. Neither is the classification complete; for some conduct, to be discussed particularly in chapter ix, is directly controlled by neither law nor reason; however, it is judged according to them.

Law, as the word has just been used, as the standard of morality, has three expressions, custom, revealed law, and the law of the state. In olden times these were usually all one, and this is still the case in many lands, notably those where Islam prevails. In lands with modern European culture, the three are quite distinct, although never in general conflict. Conformity to revealed law, as interpreted and taught by the church, is then regarded as particularly moral. This law is expected to be accepted by faith. In history and the world over, the laws which

are accepted on faith are more widely recognized, as to their validity, than are any laws of conduct which avowedly rest upon human wisdom. The laws which have their sanction in faith constitute a subject distinct from the science of ethics, a subject which in most countries is entrusted to the church for authority and to the church and homes for instruction. Both because of its moral content and because of its service as a social cement, faith has been an exceedingly important factor in human improvement.

In spite of its service, faith loses its intimate hold on mankind as centuries pass and the conditions of life change. Because of the service faith performs, it is vitally important that where faith wanes, competent reason be prepared to take its place, in the control of conduct. When faith is real, wisdom will re-enforce it, and would not replace it if it could. But when faith is weak and wisdom too imperfect and custom loses its force, as in the modern world it does along with faith, disorder will reign in spite of any statutory law. The graveyard of history is peopled by races once great in the world, who have come into this condition; and we would not join them.

The study of ethics is to prepare human wisdom for the competent control of conduct, for such control of conduct that no other race may be admonished by our fate. There is in general a complete agreement between the rules of conduct which are accepted on faith, and the rules of conduct which can be deduced by the processes of reason. There will accordingly be no general contradiction between such principles as we may arrive at in this study, and the principles of conduct which are given in the instruction of almost any church.

Conformity of religious and scientific teaching

This is not an accident, nor the result of forced agreement. So far as the principles of practical ethics have been reached by sound reasoning, and except as the basis of religion in revelation may have suffered perversion at the hands of men, the moral and ethical teachings must be

identical, as may be understood very easily. From the standpoint of religion, the proof is this: Man was created different from other living things in his endowment of intelligence. His highest duty is right living. It is unthinkable that the Creator endowed him with intelligence, and thereby distinguished him, without expecting him to use this gift for the proper performance of his duty, or withholding the power to use it well and accurately for this purpose; one recalls the buried talent. From the standpoint of rational ethics, the argument is that the prevalence of religion in general, and of single religions in particular, would have been impossible except as their teachings were conducive to the welfare and survival of the people who accepted them; that countless particular religions have disappeared because they could not meet this test in competition with others; and that religion in general and the prevalent several religions do survive because the principles they have taught have been the truest guides to right living that men have had.

During the nineteen centuries since the time of Jesus, there has been little or no improvement upon his teaching of morals. For twenty-one centuries after the time of Aristotle, there was no essential advance in the understanding of basic ethical principles. During all this time there was of course a vast increase in human knowledge. In the attempt to use this, there accumulated an enormous mass of philosophical literature. Some of this has permanent value, in spite of failure to observe Aristotle's axiom, that "The goodness of things is that which preserves them." More of it is without enduring interest, because devoted to attempts to use invalid substitute basic principles, or to discussion of matters which do not admit of use in the guidance of conduct. To avoid confusion by such discussion, certain philosophical points will here be assumed:

Assumptions:

1. The world about us is real

The evidence of our senses is generally correct. There are many men, some of whom are considered wise, who

maintain that the evidence of our senses can not be accepted; and that, since we have only the evidence of our senses to testify to the existence of the world about us, it may be more reasonable to suppose that the world is not real. To most common-sense men, this sounds foolish, and the assumption seems unnecessary. The doctrine that the world is not a real one can not be harmonized with any practical system of ethics; because if the world is illusory, so is conduct also—with the exception, according to some such notions, of our thoughts.

2. We are a part of nature

We are a part of nature, as unable as the stones to disregard the law of gravitation, as unable as a frog to produce young without parents; the fundamental principles of organic evolution are true; and, so far as these really are fundamental, they explain our conduct and our fate just as they do those of other living creatures. A code of ethics can be based on the survival value of conduct without this assumption. But the doctrine will be more easily and completely acceptable and its study more interesting, when it is understood that the laws of conduct apply to man in common with all other living things, and that the red man and the buffalo disappeared from the plains for the same reason. For these reasons, in spite of this assumption, a recapitulation of organic evolution follows this introduction. Born in nature as we are, we still have a power, which most creatures are almost or quite without, to choose what we will do.

3. The principles of conduct can be taught

The principles of conduct can be taught, and taught effectively. This assumption seems as unnecessary as the first one, and is made for the same reason—that men considered wise have denied it, some altogether, some in part. If the first assumption is incorrect, so is the third, for it is by the medium of our senses that ideas are imparted.

Supposed difficulty of ethics

People are used to thinking of ethics as an exceedingly difficult subject. There are a number of reasons for this belief, one of which is the vastness of the subject. It is true that the real use of all knowledge is ethical and that

most of us are limited in wisdom; but that does not make it any less worth while to understand the use of what knowledge each of us has. In mathematics, the fact that the understanding of conic sections and the application of this knowledge requires years of preparation does not interfere with the profitable study and use of arithmetic. In ethics the situation is much better. For, although every one ought indeed to learn more and use it better as long as one lives, still a high school student can in the course of a few months get such an understanding of the principles as will be of use in his daily life and make him a happier and better citizen.

Ethics *has been* a difficult and unsatisfactory subject of study, whenever presented without a foundation which could be thoroughly understood or else accepted confidently and implicitly. Faith has provided foundations of the latter type, and the church has used them for effective moral education. This kind of foundation is not available in our state-supported educational system nor are its typical graduates equipped to use it. They require, therefore, a foundation completely and absolutely understandable. This basic principle is that, under any possible set of conditions, the best conduct will be that which tends most effectively toward the permanence of life. As will be made clear later, it does not by any means follow that any one of us should value his individual life above everything else.

A real but remarkable reason for regarding ethics as difficult is that it is an unfamiliar subject. It is one of the strangest facts in our experience, that the principles of our conduct, which is so much more important than anything else in the world that other things are of any importance only because they are related to it, are themselves seldom a subject of conversation, and not often even the subject of serious and constructive thought. We do indeed worry and dispute enough about the details of our conduct. We try continually to settle the little questions which keep

coming up; and we repeat these attempts, day after day and year after year, without ever undertaking to establish the standards and principles which would make these little daily decisions unnecessary or exceedingly simple. We deal with the questions which concern us most vitally in the same way that athletic performances would have to be judged if we had no accepted standards of distance and weight.

Many people suppose that it is a peculiar difficulty in ethical education that, even though the facts and principles may be taught, the conduct of those who learn these things will not be affected by them. Other subjects taught and studied are not thus without effect. The educated engineer will build a bridge; but he would not dare to try to do so if he had not confidence in his education. And it is only as the student of ethics may mistrust his education that his conduct may fail to be controlled by it. He cannot be expected to be bound by what he does not thoroughly believe.

As to the effectiveness of study, ethics has one real advantage over morals. As a matter of morals, conduct is right or wrong. But ethics, as the science of conduct, deals with it in other aspects, as well as in this one. As the most important of these aspects, one learns in ethics to appraise conduct as wise or foolish. The fact is that right conduct is always wise, and that foolish acts are always wrong; but the aspect in which they are looked at may have great practical importance. It is very generally agreed that it is more admirable to do a thing because it is right than to do the same thing because it is expedient; but "expedient" must mean wise,—unless it is expedient to do what is foolish. On the other hand, there is the great realm of boyland, which some of us outgrow slowly and some never, where goodness as such is held in less esteem than courage and independence of adult opinion. It is precisely here that attention to the science of conduct is most worth while, because here are formed habits and

attitudes that last through life. The boy who is the best human material will take a mouse to school, or steal the ice cream from a girls' party, knowing he is bad by the standards of society, if he can thereby be the hero of his own crowd. But he will not do what he knows is foolish, or believes will be regarded as foolish; heroes are not made that way. By training people to recognize foolishness, education in sound ethics can therefore have great influence on conduct, where influence is most worth while, and where the teaching of morals as such is most difficult.

Real difficulties in ethics:

1. Harmonizing intent and result

There are of course real difficulties in deciding what conduct is right in specific cases; if this were not so, people would not disagree. At the same time that we undertake to establish the principles of conduct, we are undertaking to judge conduct, and to provide standards for such judgment. Two such standards are in universal use, and the two may not conform. Conduct is the act of the individual. It is generally held that the merit of the individual, as shown by any act, must in fairness be judged by the motive responsible for the act; that he does right if he tries to the best of his ability to do right, or does his duty as he sees it or follows his conscience—as the proposition is variously expressed. This would seem to be all that can be demanded of any man.

But the effect of the act is not limited to the individual. It is felt by his neighbors and by the community; and it is surely reasonable for them to judge it by the effects they feel. And the same act may assume very different characters, if judged for the individual by the motive, or for himself and others by the result. Goodness of will is not by itself an adequate basis for a system of ethics. If it were so, then a man would have only to be sufficiently ignorant in order to be, as lawyers defending criminals like to claim, blameless for whatever evil he may do.

It is a function of the study of ethics to harmonize these two criteria, the motive and the result, and, as far as possible, to provide that our acts shall be judged in the

same manner by both of these standards. The two will be harmonized when the motive has as its basis the understanding of the results. In other words, the motive and the result will furnish bases for the same judgment, when an act has the effect it is intended to have. The failure of an act to have the intended effect must be due to ignorance. With perfect knowledge, it would always be possible to foresee the full results of everything we do. While really perfect knowledge is not within our reach, it is the business of each of us to acquire and develop knowledge as perfect as he can, and to be guided at all times by the most perfect knowledge which he is able to command.

The ability to anticipate the result of acts is obtained by experience, instruction, and reflection. We are individually responsible for the use we make of experience, our readiness to receive instruction, the thinking we give to these and to our conduct, and, therefore, for the results of our acts. The tendency of ethical thought in America is clearly to be pragmatic—that is, to take account primarily of results in judging conduct. Certainly, one should try to do what is right; but beyond this, one should know what is the right thing to do.

2. Conflict of individual and social interests

After all the general thinking we may give to this subject, there will remain one real difficulty in determining whether a given act is right or wrong. This is in the weight which should be given to the respective interests of the individual, and of his family, the community, and the state. When the question takes this form, it must be settled upon its own particular merits, and by the best judgment, whether of the individual or of the family, or of society, which is available. The valid general rule is that the interests of the individual are subordinate to those of society. Except when the question of the propriety of an act takes this form, it can be settled positively, and by the application of general principles which every person can comprehend.

The difficulty of practical ethics as a subject of study

is, then, very largely apparent, and in comparatively small part real. It can be overcome to a great extent by the practice of discussing questions of this kind, and by habitually giving to them very serious consideration. Of the three methods of reaching a measure of wisdom, which have been mentioned—experience, instruction and thought—instruction is of the least ultimate value. It may point out the way to the acquisition of wisdom, and may supply a part of the raw materials; but wisdom itself is an achievement of its possessor.

The study of ethics should show a goal of effort

Each of us is like a man upon a voyage. If he knows his objective, he is likely to get there. If he does not know whither he is going, a million roads invite him away from the one he ought to take. Anybody can go to New York, if he tries; it is on the map in capital letters, and the roads are signed all along the way. But the thinking men of the world have striven through the ages to reach Utopia, and no man gets there, because no man knows where it is. It is the function of the study of ethics to show a clearly definable goal of effort, and to provide suggestions which may help one to find and keep the proper way.

This goal is said to be happiness

As to what this goal of effort is, men have named it in a variety of ways, but these all mean the same thing, just as a mountain is sometimes given a variety of names by the people on different sides of it. The common goal is happiness. Every faith and every philosophy has promised happiness as the reward of those who follow its injunctions. The chief command in the Old Testament is devotion to God; "Happy is the people whose God is the Lord!"[1] The Koran promises happiness, described in different terms in different places but always in some phase, to the true believer in Islam; "Now are the true believers happy."[2] In the opening verses of the Sermon on the Mount, we find a list of the attributes which Christian doctrine regards as most praiseworthy, and a variety

[1] Psalms 144: 15.

[2] Koran XXIII, first verse.

of phases of happiness promised to those who practice these virtues. To those most deserving of all, because they suffer persecution for the faith, is promised the Kingdom of Heaven. The greatest of philosophers, Aristotle, sums the matter up as something agreed upon before his time: "What is the highest of all the goods which are the objects of action? So far as name goes, there is a general agreement, for happiness both the refined few and the multitude call it."[1] It will be demonstrated later that, as far as any mental state can be an ultimate goal, happiness is a real and justifiable one. It will likewise be our business to determine the conditions of true happiness.

The real goal is perpetuation of life

At the same time that happiness is presented as the common goal of intelligent human effort, an emphatic caution is in order. It is very general experience that those who undertake the pursuit of happiness for its own sake fail to attain it. Sometimes it is a will-o'-the-wisp which constantly keeps its distance ahead; sometimes one attains the tangible thing he has been striving for, and finds it to be ashes in his mouth. Failure to attain it is usually because the attempt is not made with sufficient understanding. The real, ultimate goal is the permanence of life; not of my individual life, nor of yours, but of the life of our people. We are not usually conscious that this is our object, and do not usually need to be. It is like the electric current which courses around a bar of iron, and makes the bar a magnet. The force is in the current, but the magnet draws the specks of iron. Happiness is a normal and regular accompaniment and reward of conduct favorable to the survival of our race. If our conduct is right and wise, we can confidently expect to realize happiness from it. But if we seek it as the object of life, and are able to attain what we thus picture as our object, it will be a lifeless bar of iron when we grasp it.

[1] Nichomachian Ethics, Book I.

CHAPTER II

ORGANIC EVOLUTION

Every virile race of men hopes and tries to live forever. Each generation is ambitious to be followed by a succession of generations of descendants growing more numerous as time passes, and to insure a chance for these descendants to live. This ambition is the basic motive which underlies our conduct. As our earth is limited in size and power to support men, it is not possible for all races to grow more numerous; so they struggle in competition for the chance. In this struggle, some succeed and some fail. Their conduct determines which shall succeed, and live, and which shall fail, and die. Having better brains than other creatures, men can appreciate and understand their ambitions, and make plans to realize them. But, with or without any brains at all, every kind of living thing in the world is constantly engaged in exactly the same attempt—to grow numerous and live forever. We will appreciate this struggle among men more fully, and know better how to regulate our conduct so as to be likely to succeed in the struggle, if we first get a general idea of the broader struggle, seeing why and how all living things compete, and how and why some succeed and others fail.

More creatures are produced than can live

There are constantly being produced in the world a very much greater number of living things than can possibly live and in turn bear offspring. This is true as a general statement, and is specifically true of every one of the countless kinds of living things. Even though but one child is born at a time, and it takes two parents to accomplish this, still the rule holds good. And most creatures multiply at no such modest rate.

Examples: The Bacteria

Tremendous increase in numbers may come either from the bearing of very numerous progeny at one time, or from the rapid succession of generations. One bacterium

divides and produces only two; but there are bacteria which, under favorable conditions, can divide at intervals of not more than twenty minutes. If this rate of reproduction could continue, and the young bacteria could all survive, the multiplication in this way would utterly distance anything possible to any higher organisms, however many the latter may bear at once. In six hours and forty minutes, the descendants of one bacterium would number more than a million. Suppose that the bulk of the one bacterium is a cubic micron (one millionth of a meter); it will be just visible under the higher power of the common compound microscope. A million of them will have a bulk of one cubic tenth-millimeter, hardly visible to the naked eye. Within ten hours, the number would reach a billion, with a bulk of a cubic millimeter, the size of a large pinhead. This is not yet a formidable figure, in bulk. But, at the end of thirty hours they would number an octillion; and in forty-two hours and forty minutes—less than two days—their bulk would equal that of the earth. Obviously, the offspring of the bacteria are not all able to live, and as they die their offspring never have a chance to begin to live. The actual number in the world does not usually vary materially from one time to another.

Sequoia

From an estimate made on the ground by counting the great branches, the little branches, and the twigs of some of the California big trees, and counting the seeds in the cones, it is figured that one of these trees may produce in a year somewhere between one million and ten million seeds. If all of these could grow, the progeny in a single crop would be more numerous than all the big trees actually in the world. These trees live to be several thousand years old, so that one of them is the potential parent of several billion trees like itself.

Smaller plants

Many small trees fruit freely by the time they are six years old. The potential progeny of such a tree would cover the earth before the Sequoia could get started. The potential progeny of a single rice plant would cover the

earth, seas and all, standing as close together as they can grow, in the eighth generation. But the active little bacteria already discussed would reach the bulk of the earth before the rice seed could germinate.

Animals

The adult eel of the American rivers goes down to the sea, where the female lays from a million to perhaps sixteen million eggs, and then dies. The female codfish lays perhaps two and a half million eggs; or a large one may lay five times that many. Yet the number of eels and of codfish is about the same from year to year. The number of codfish would diminish, as the result of fishing by men, if man did not interfere again to give the young ones a chance. The mother salmon ascends the rivers, lays her huge crop of eggs, and dies. In nature the number of salmon might be constant; but, as we fish, the salmon might be exterminated in a generation of men, if we did not keep the number up by means of hatcheries.

Since all cannot live, there is competition

And so it is in varying degree throughout the whole realm of living things. The young are produced in such quantity that the survival of any large proportion of them is absolutely out of the question. Almost any single kind would completely cover the earth in a thousand years if its multiplication were unchecked. And every individual of every one of the kinds is trying in its own way to grow up and raise its own crop of offspring. Since the most of them cannot succeed, although all try, it follows that there must be competition for the opportunity. Throughout the world, there is a constant, uninterrupted, uninterruptable, and interminable struggle for the chance to live, and the figures which have just been presented should convey some idea of how slight a chance each individual has in this struggle. Some creatures have not more than one chance in a million; some have one in a thousand; and for limited times, under temporarily favorable conditions, some have even better than an even chance. In a struggle of this kind, which is everywhere and unceasing, it is perfectly obvious that *those will succeed which can,* and that

those which cannot succeed must die, and that most of the contestants will certainly die without issue.

Heredity: the conservative factor in evolution

We all know that the tendency of each living thing is to produce offspring like itself. Chickens produce chickens; black Orpingtons produce black chickens, and white Leghorns white chickens; and big chickens are expected from the eggs of big parents. We do not set the eggs from weak chickens, because we would expect to raise weak ones. It would be foolish to plant wheat from poor parent plants, because the crop must be expected to be like the source of the seed. The tendency of the offspring to resemble the parent, and of the parent to produce offspring like itself, is known as heredity. Heredity is the conservative factor in organic evolution. It tends to keep things as they are.

Variation: the progressive factor

Familiar as we are with the fact of heredity, we are also aware that the offspring is not exactly like the parent, and that no two of the offspring exactly resemble each other. We know that the offspring of horses, chickens, men, and corn will be creatures of these several kinds, but also that we can tell any two of a kind apart, if we know them well enough. There are twin brothers whom the most of us cannot tell apart, but their mother can. The failure of heredity to work perfectly, is variation.[1] Heredity and variation are facts of our experience. We do not believe in them; we know them; just as we also know, because we daily see it to be true, that more things are born than can live, and that, therefore, there is a struggle for the chance to live.

[1] The offspring are unlike each other and their individual parents for the other and distinct reason that, when sexually produced, they inherit from two parents and many ancestors. The differences caused in this manner may have great selective value, but always within a limited range, not transgressing the bounds of combination of the heritable characters. In real variation (sometimes called mutation), the elemental characters are themselves modified or produced, and, with time enough, there are no fixable limits to the possibility of change.

Unequal prospect of survival

The difference between one and another of any generation born must often result in there being a difference between the individuals in their prospect of being able to live. If a big tree produces a million seeds, each one a potential new plant, blind luck will kill a large part of them. But of those which are not disposed of in this way, and which have an essentially even chance so far as outside conditions go, the difference between one seed and another, and between one seedling and another if they start to grow, will almost inevitably be such that some of the seedlings are more likely to survive than others. This should be thoroughly understood; we are dealing now with conduct.

If we plant maize and measure the growth of the seedlings accurately enough, we may expect to find that no two grow at exactly the same rate. If these grow so close together that, for lack of room, the most of them cannot make adult plants and bear a new crop, then, leaving outside interference out of the question, those which grow most slowly will be first to be smothered and to die. And as the plants grow larger, and the competition for the limited space grows keener, those which grow next most slowly will die in their turn. And leaving other differences now out of account, it will be the individual plants which grow most rapidly from the start, which get the sunshine, which, using the sunshine, can develop strong roots and so increase their advantage, that finally survive. And only these, as many as are able to supply themselves properly with food from the soil and air, can finally ripen their seed. One hears that all men are born equal. This is not true of any living things. The most of equality that they can or should have is in the opportunity to develop and use their powers. Even though man may provide that the plants in a corn field do not crowd one another, there is no way of giving them a really even chance.

Natural selection

With the new crop of seed, heredity comes into play. The plants which grow slowly in a badly crowded field

never mature and never have descendants. Only the most rapid-growing plants can reach maturity and have descendants. And, from what we know of heredity, we must expect that these plants will transmit to their descendants the tendency to rapid growth; so that, under equally favorable conditions, the plants of the next crop will grow faster on the average. In each generation, the plants which grow most slowly will be killed, so that their tendency to grow relatively slowly cannot be inherited. The plants which would not have the right kind of heredity never come into existence. The ones which grow most rapidly, and only these, can survive, and pass on the attribute of rapid growth. There is thus, quite inevitably, year by year, a selection of the plants which tend to grow most thriftily. This selection is clearly perfectly natural, and is the process to which the name natural selection is given.

Under the conditions we have imagined, rapid growth was the characteristic selected, for the reason that this was the attribute which, under these conditions, gave the plant the best prospect of reaching maturity and producing seed. It is easy to imagine a set of conditions under which a very different result would be accomplished. For example, maize it not a very robust plant, and the wind may blow it down. If this happens, it is placed under such unfavorable conditions that it is unlikely to produce seed. If the plants are well spaced, so that there is no great competition for light, and if the wind blows as hard as it often does, then the plants which grow most rapidly and therefore catch the most wind are likely to be the first blown down, while those which do not grow so tall remain erect, and can produce seed. Then the tendency inherited by the next generation will be to grow not too rapidly. Under these conditions, natural selection will be of rather limited growth.

Selection is by fitness to conditions

We have imagined two sets of conditions, and have found that, in adaptation to these two, contrasting attributes would be selected. With time, almost any attribute

can be selected, any character within the range of variation. The important fact is that selection is not according to any general standard; there is in nature no attempt to work toward an ideal. But there is a constant tendency, by selection, to reach complete adaptation or fitness to the conditions under which the given crop grows and reproduces itself.

There is a wide range of different conditions over the face of the earth, and no living thing is fitted to all conditions. Man is adapted to a very wide range of conditions —for reasons which will be apparent later. And yet, there is perhaps no other single living creature which is not better fitted to its own conditions than we should be. The dog is surely better fit for a dog's life than we are. Not one of us could grow up and raise a family, living like a horse. Still less could we live in competition with rice. If human beings were stuck into the mud and expected to support themselves from mud, air, and water, the race of men would end at once. And not to go so far afield as the plants, we should be equally helpless if we tried to compete in the water with the fish. In a real sense, the fish is as perfect as we are, for it fits its conditions just about as well as we fit ours.

The origin of species

If maize from one parent plant were grown year after year under the two conditions we have imagined, and the seed never mixed, the result before many years would clearly be two kinds of corn, both different from the kind with which we began. Leaving imaginary cases for real ones, we know very many kinds of maize, more different than these imaginary ones would be, which have been developed by selecting variant individuals. In these cases, the selecting has been done by men, and is called artificial selection. This is in no wise different from natural selection, except in that the selecting agency is the will of man instead of shade, or wind, or some other agency of nature. The most of the forms of cultivated plants and domesticated animals were developed or evolved by artificial

selection, but some were found wild. We call these kinds of cultivated and domesticated creatures forms or varieties; they are not necessarily less distinct than the kinds of untamed, natural things, which we call species. The extreme forms of domesticated dogs, for example, are much more different than are the wild species of the dog genus.

We know by experience, and not by deduction alone, that new kinds of things are formed in nature, as well as in artificial selection, from old kinds. For example, a rust-fungus parasitic on Liberian coffee originated some twenty years ago in Java, very certainly from the rust living on Arabian coffee, which had previously been unable to damage Liberian coffee. Since we know that new kinds of things do originate and maintain themselves by selection on the basis of fitness to conditions, and since we can understand that with changing conditions there is inevitably selection in adaptation to the new conditions, and since we know of no other explanation of the appearance and maintenance of new kinds of creatures, we suppose that all of the countless kinds of living things we know must have originated in this manner.

Classification of living things

From this belief, we conclude further that the various kinds of living creatures are related, nearly or remotely. As to many "tame" creatures, we know this positively, knowing exactly what the relationship is. And when we find wild plants or animals enough alike to justify the same conclusion as to relationship, we do not hesitate to make it. So, when we find a number of species evidently nearly related, we group them into a genus. Likewise, we group related genera into a family, families into orders, and orders into classes, and these finally into the kingdoms of living things. We group practically all living things into three great groups or kingdoms, the animals, the plants, and the bacteria. A century ago, these groups, of whatever size, from genera to kingdoms, were defined on the sole basis of resemblance, things which looked alike being grouped together. We now group them chiefly on

the basis of relationship. That is, the members of each group are related in the same sense that we are related to our cousins, through a common ancestor.

The plants (or animals) of a species differ individually, but not in any constant way. They breed together freely. Their common ancestor lived a few thousand or a few hundred thousand years ago, as a general rule. The plants of related species differ in constant characters, and do not breed together, or do not do so freely. Their common ancestor lived a hundred thousand or a million years ago. Of course these figures are not fixed, but they give the general idea. A great many million years ago, there lived a common ancestor of all plants and animals; and this too had ancestors, probably not very different from some bacteria which still survive.

Succession of types

Before there were any creatures which could properly be regarded as plants or animals, it must have been the age of bacteria.[1] Since that remote era, there have been a succession of ages, which we name after the types of creatures which seem in turn to have been most conspicuous. Thus the coal age was a long period during which the characteristic vegetation was composed of trees the remains of which made our coal. Not a tree of any kind that lived then is living now. During the coal age, there were evolving plants which produced seeds, a better device than the older plants had for insuring the life of their progeny; and the seed plants had also better structures for carrying water from the roots to the leaves. These advantages made the progeny of the seed plants surer to get a start and the individual seed plants surer to reach maturity, and thus enabled them, in the course of time, to exterminate the older coal plants. We live in the age of seed plants.

Likewise of the animals, there was an age when the

[1] A less familiar but otherwise preferable name is Schizophytes. Strictly, bacteria compose the largest and best known group of Schizophytes, but not the most primitive group.

dominant animals of the world were something like the Hydra and the coral polyps of the present time. This was followed by an age of molluscs, and this in turn by an age of fishes. Creatures of all of these general types survive and are numerous and various, but no single species of fish has survived from the age of fishes to the present, and none of these have remained the dominant animals of the world. It is by the fossils that we know what animals lived in these several ages. After the fish age, there came a time when the most characteristic fossils formed were those of enormous reptiles, wherefore we know this as the age of reptiles. Some of these lizard-like things were more than thirty meters long. Some were water and swamp animals, some lived on the land, and there were even some which flew. As beasts of prey, some of the giant saurians were the most awful things that ever lived.

While the reptiles held possession of the world, the mammals were developing. The mammals took better care of their offspring, and were more resourceful in avoiding or escaping from trouble, and therefore had the same general advantages over the reptiles that the seed plants had over the plants of the coal age. As the mammals grew numerous, competition with them made a new set of conditions for the giant saurians, conditions for which the mammals were better fitted; and the saurians, terrific as they individually were, vanished from the face of the earth.

We live in the age of mammals; more particularly, this is the age of man. He peoples the earth. But he cannot live without the help of other creatures, so he peoples the earth also with those useful to him, making this also the age of cattle, horses, and dogs, of wheat, rice, and potatoes.

Man has made new conditions for other creatures

We know the conditions which man has made and modified far better than we do the conditions and changes in the more remote past. Moreover, the advent of man has made a disturbance more sudden and more serious for the other living things than did any single change in the

previous history of the world. Accordingly, things have been disappearing, as a result of competition with man, more rapidly than it is probable that they ever did under any previous competition. It is not many thousand years since the cave bear, the aurochs, the saber-toothed tiger, and the mammoth roamed western Europe. Not one of them can be found there now; nor, except the aurochs, have any of them anywhere any descendants. It did not take civilized man to exterminate these beasts. When we see the difference between highly civilized and barbarous men, and how completely helpless barbarous man is in competition with his civilized brother, we are likely to overlook the tremendous advantage of even the most savage known men over any of the beasts.

Death is the fate of the unfit

Life has been continuous since its beginning. Every living creature in the world has an unbroken ancestry. Yet death has been the fate of most of the kinds of living things of past time; comparatively few of them, however important they were some million years ago, have any descendants living now. Good conduct aims no more at preserving life than at avoiding death. For the full understanding of ethical principles, life and death must be appreciated equally. Since near illustrations are more forcible than remote ones, let us note a few of man's doings.

The Dinornis or moa was the biggest bird in the world a while ago, reaching a height of four meters or more. The Maoris of New Zealand have traditions of it, and soft parts have been found; but no white man ever saw one. The dodo of Mauritius endured the presence of aboriginal man, perhaps because he protected it; but it was extinct a century after the first Europeans landed there. Some three score years ago, the passenger pigeon flew across the United States in countless millions; people killed them for food, and for fun, and killed them off. Thirty years after the white men began to settle the great plains, the bison which had swarmed there were on the point of extinction.

Man does these things directly, and he does them indirectly and without knowing it. He cleans away the forests and exterminates trees to make room for his fields. When he kills the oaks, he makes life impossible for the parasites of the oak, for the plants which live on the forest floor and the animals living in the forest shelter, and even for the birds nesting in the trees and the lice on the birds. By destroying the forest, he changes the climate, and unmakes conditions of life for creatures he may not know exist.

At the same time that he kills off some things, he makes life possible for others. Wheat and maize replace the forest. The parasites of the trees are exterminated, but the parasites of the wheat and the weeds of the field find an opportunity to develop and multiply.

We describe and classify by structure

We usually think of form and structure when we think of a living thing. It is self-evident that the evolution of a creature and the evolution of its structures must have been one and the same process. Structures we can see and measure. We regard the dog, horse, cow, bird, lizard, and ourselves as members of one great group of animals, not including flies, clams, and worms, because all of our group have legs or hind legs the structures of which are essentially alike, the same bones being found in all. When we find that some of these same bones are present, though useless, inside the body of the whale and the python, we realize, because of the community of structure, that these and the other animals of the group must be related, that they must have inherited these structures from a common ancestor. We recognize the relationship again from another common structure, the spine. From the lowest fish up through the reptiles, and from some of the lower reptiles up through the birds and the mammals, we find these spines always of the same general structure, and in the same position, and always protecting the central nervous axis. Throughout this series, we find a gradual development of the anterior end of this nervous axis, as the brain,

and of its hard covering, the cranium. We find very largely the same bones in the cranium. The gradual increase in the size of the cranium and that of the structure it contains and protects have obviously gone on together. One is as much the product of evolution as the other.

Function determines survival

We have found that, by the way that things fit their environments, they survive in the struggle for existence; and fitness is a matter of behavior, rather than of structure, so far of course as structure and behavior are to be distinguished. On the one hand, structure without function could not have been acted upon by selection, and on the other, we cannot imagine a function without a structure to perform it. If there is any structure in any creature for which we can find no function, there must be one of two explanations: either it has lost its function, as our vermiform appendix is supposed to have done, and the muscles with which some men wiggle their ears without accomplishing any useful purpose; or else our failure to find a function is our own fault, and our lack of knowledge of the function is simply our ignorance. It is a presumptuous man who, because he does not know the function of an organ, says that it has none. Omniscience is a long way beyond us, and it takes no great modesty to recognize the fact.

Functions must show relationship

From the relation between structure and function, it follows that where we find a common structure, running from fish through reptile to man, there must, in a general way, be a common function, served by the structure.[1] And the function must present us the same kind of reason that the common structure does for believing that all of these creatures are blood relatives.

Man's brain shows his place in nature

There have been men within fifty years who could claim that the spinal column and the skull were indisputable

[1] There are of course not a few particular examples of the acquisition of supplementary, or eventually substitute, functions; as the cotyledon, in origin a green leaf, has in different plants half a dozen functions or groups of functions.

proofs of blood-relationship between man and the beasts, and that the spinal cord was just as good a proof, and the brain a more interesting one because the differences were greater but the course of evolution just as plain; who could recognize the identity of function of spine and cranium throughout the series, and of the nervous axis enclosed by the spine, and even of most parts of the brain; but who could still claim that one part of the brain, in one member of the series, man, had a function of its own, distinct, and not derived from that of the same structure in any other member of the series. Such inconsistency is a mental achievement not worth imitating. The structure in question is our cerebrum, with its well-corrugated gray cortex; its function is thought. Since we know this to be its function in man, and know no other function for it in the beasts, we shall consistently believe that this is its function in them too, performed of course only as well as its development in them makes possible. We have fine, large brains, with beautifully corrugated cerebrum, and think, comparatively speaking, expertly. The beasts have less-developed brains, and think only as such brains can think; but think in some measure and manner they certainly do.

From hair to toe, brain, brain-case, eye, and stomach, we are a part of nature. Modern medical investigation has used this fact freely and effectively, and from the study of the functions of the organs of the beasts has learned many things about our own organs, and how best to treat many of our bodily ills. As the functions of the brain are at least as important to us as those of the spleen, we should not refuse to follow the physician's method of studying its workings, and perhaps learning to correct its ills—as, indeed, the physician already does, for the brain as for other organs. As the brain has assumed control of the most of man's conspicuous conduct, bad conduct on our part is or reflects an ill of the brain, the failure of the brain to perform its function well.

Importance of man's place in nature

This discussion is carried to some length, for the purpose of fixing man's place in nature as firmly as any fact can be established in the mind. Man's reaction with other creatures is mutual. He has taken a dominant position in nature, but still cannot free himself from it. He has made over the grains and the flowers and the cattle; but is in turn a very different man because of their place in his environment. It is solely because man is a part of nature that the facts learned in the study of other creatures can be applied to man, whether in medicine or in ethics.

As a matter of custom, men speak of a "theory" of evolution. In the usual sense of the term, we are not dealing with a theory, but with a collection of facts. Chiropodist, philosopher, or man-with-a-hoe—any man can see clearly that *if* there be excessive overproduction there is competition, and premature death of the majority; that *if* there be variation, there is unequal prospect of life and of death, the fittest being most likely to live; that *if* there be heredity, an advantage secured perchance by variation in one generation is likely to become a characteristic of subsequent generations. The man with the hoe, at least, *knows* that in these matters there is no general *if*, that overproduction, variation, and heredity are realities. We will accordingly take them and use them as facts, more familiar in the aspect of structure than in that of function, because structure is static and easier to define, but just as truly facts in one aspect of nature as in the other. In them we have the basis of a rational ethical code as positive as the multiplication table or a mother's love, and just as entitled to our trust.

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT

Among the conclusions in the preceding chapter are: That all living creatures are related, inheriting life from common ancestors; that we usually recognize the relationship and estimate its nearness from a study of their structures, but that structure and function are so related that neither can be comprehended or understood without the other; that, accordingly, functions are just as much a product of evolution as structures are—or, more emphatically, that in reality natural selection is based on function, the structure being a necessary incident.

Conduct is a product of evolution

The functions performed by any living thing, taken all together, make up its behavior or conduct. Conduct is, therefore, like any structure or any particular function, a product of evolution.

The conduct of the various kinds of living things, different as it is, can always be understood, if we understand well enough the conditions to which that conduct is adapted. Each kind of creature and its own type of conduct have been selected and have lived on, if the conduct was such as to preserve the life of the creature. If conduct was unfavorable to survival, the creature manifesting it died, and its conduct could not be inherited.

Conduct which favors survival is good

We are ready now for the most fundamental definition in ethics, that of good conduct. As Aristotle said, the good of things is that which preserves them. In the everyday and correct use of words, nothing can be worse for a creature than what kills it; all conduct likely to result in that way is bad. The act which saves a creature's life is surely a good thing for it to do. A contrary proposition would not be reasonable at all; and practical ethics must agree with our common sense. Next to doing what will *surely* preserve life, the best thing to do is what will *probably* save it. Thus we arrive at the definition: Good

conduct is all conduct favorable or conducive to survival. All acts prejudicial to the prospect of survival are bad.

In these definitions, conduct is appraised entirely by its results. This agrees still with common sense, and is using the word *good* as we are used to using it. A boy goes swimming and is drowned. Of course he does not know he will be drowned, or he would not go swimming; but going swimming that time is just as bad for him as if he did know. Taking unnecessary chances is bad conduct. A boy rolls rocks down a hill, to see or hear them crash into the valley below. One of them kills a man. If the boy knew anybody was down there, he would not roll the rocks; but his ignorance does not make it a good thing to do. Carelessness and ignorance are bad, in themselves, because they result in bad conduct.

In order to understand, fully and implicitly, that this rule as to what conduct is good is a universal one, although good conduct may vary almost infinitely, according to the conditions it fits, we shall now become acquainted with the conduct of some of the lower living creatures.

Almost all living things fall into some one of three great groups—bacteria, plants, and animals. Among plants, there are two dominant groups, fungi and seed-plants. The great and conspicuous groups of animals are the insects and the vertebrates. Conduct has evolved independently in each of these great evolutionary lines.

The conduct of bacteria

To begin with the bacteria: These are one-celled creatures, which live under simple and, in general, uniform conditions. Under constant outside conditions, there is little occasion for movement; and when we think of conduct we usually think of movement, though there is of course conduct, such as our thinking, which the eye cannot detect. However, the conditions of the bacterium sometimes vary in a manner to which it must respond in one way to live, or in another way, or not at all to die. Many kinds of bacteria can live and be active only in the presence of free oxygen; these are called aerobic bacteria.

If motile aerobic bacteria are so placed that the supply of oxygen is hardly sufficient for their needs and there is more of it in one direction than in another, they respond to this difference by moving in the direction in which oxygen is most abundant. This is clearly good conduct. If they moved in the other direction, they would die. If they do not move, and conditions become a little worse, they will die. By moving toward more abundant oxygen, they insure their lives, for the time being. The bacteria which respond in this manner survive, and their descendants inherit this kind of responsiveness.

Reflexes: involuntary responses to external conditions

Such a response as this is an example of the great group of reflex actions or reflexes. A reflex can be defined as an involuntary response to any factor of the environment. Every living thing in the world exhibits reflex actions. They are so universal that the power to act in this manner is regarded as one of the fundamental properties of protoplasm itself. According to the method of response, and for no other reason, it is customary to classify reflexes as nervous and non-nervous. Non-nervous reflexes are exhibited by organisms which have no nerves—bacteria, plants, and the simpler animals.

All such movements have one important common feature, their appropriateness. This has been emphasized in the case of the movement of bacteria toward oxygen. It is likewise with all such reactions; if they are in the wrong direction, they are likely to be fatal, and so not to be inherited. Appropriate reactions are likely to be passed to descendants and fixed by heredity. Being appropriate, they are essentially good for the organisms which exhibit them.

Examples: curvature of roots

Reflexes vary exceedingly, in adaptation to the diversity of conditions under which different creatures live. The downward bending of roots is one of them worthy of study. In nature, the root must fasten the plant in place and absorb food from the soil. To do this, as plants in general are situated, the root must grow downward.

There is only one way in which the root can reliably do this, and that is by perceiving the direction in which gravity acts upon it. Accordingly, roots are provided with an organ, in the inner layer of cells of the root cap, which is specifically fitted to perceive the direction of action of gravity. The human ear has a limited power to tell what direction is downward, but the root tip is a much more perfect organ for this purpose; the greater need of the plant, in this respect, has resulted in the evolution of a better organ.

In a reflex act, there may be five stages: the excitation or stimulation of the sense organ; the transmission of the stimulus; the sensation; the conduction of the impulse; and the response. Some of these may be wanting. In the case of the curving of the root, the excitation is felt by the same cells which control the response. There are therefore but three really distinguishable phases of this reflex—perception, conduction of the impulse, and the execution of the response. The response is by a structure at some distance back of the tip, a millimeter or more in small, slow-growing roots, a centimeter or more in large ones growing rapidly. The method of response is that the upper side grows more rapidly than the nether, which causes the tip to swing downward. To accomplish the purpose, nature uses the handiest tool; in a young seedling, the part that curves may be the root, the hypocotyl or part of the stem below the cotyledons, or the petiole of the cotyledons, or the cotyledons themselves.

Reflexes miscarry under abnormal conditions

The adaptation of reflex conduct is to the conditions which usually exist. In nature, the root is the first part of the plant, after the seed, to be fastened in its place. The next step in the development of a seedling is the elevation of the first leaves. If these are the cotyledons, they are raised up by the hypocotyl, which is at first, as a rule, in a more or less horizontal position. It assumes the upright position by a reflex action, in which the nether half grows more rapidly than the upper. This accomplishes the pur-

pose in nature because the roots are fixed in their place, and such a curvature must therefore move the leaves, which are not fixed. In reflexes, there is no consideration of the result. Fasten the cotyledon of a seedling in place, and leave the roots free, and the plant responds to the stimulus of gravity just as it did before; the nether side of the hypocotyl grows more rapidly than the upper side; but instead of raising the cotyledons into the sunshine, it raises the roots into the air, and the plant is killed.

Reflexes are evolved to fit any constant conditions

Under particular but constant conditions, roots respond in other ways than the general and typical one. There are many climbing plants which have roots whose function is to attach the stems to their supports. The stimulus which is most likely to direct a root, growing free in the air, to something to which it may attach itself, is the light. If a stem, for instance, must attach itself to a tree to secure support, a root which grows in the direction typical of roots, downward, is likely never to find such a support. A root which grows away from the brightest light will inevitably grow toward a tree if one is close at hand. So roots which have this function are usually not at all sensitive to the stimulus of gravity, but are very sensitive to the stimulus of light.

If plants live for very many generations under any peculiar set of conditions, there is no near limit to their power of adaptation. The trees which grow in the mangrove swamp have roots where it is not safe to trust to the oxygen in the soil about them to supply the demand of respiration. So, certain of the roots of these trees have reversed the usual reflex response of roots; as a result of the absence of oxygen, they respond to the stimulus of gravity by growing straight up. Other roots of the same trees retain the normal root behavior, just as on many climbing vines some of the roots do not have the function of clinging to a support, but grow downward and eventually reach the soil, and behave as normal, typical roots.

Nervous reflexes, as has already been stated, differ

Nervous and non-nervous reflexes

from non-nervous reflexes only in that they are performed by the mediation of a nervous system. In result, the two may be indistinguishable. Take the case of the tadpole. In its direction of swimming, it is ordinarily quite independent of control by the light. If a lot of tadpoles are put into a glass vessel, part of which is dark and part light, they will distribute themselves without much regard to the illumination, unless it is very intense on one side; in the latter case, the most of them will gather in the dark part. Now let the supply of oxygen be cut off; and, just as its want reverses the geotropism[1] of certain mangrove roots, so it reverses the phototaxis[2] of the tadpole. As soon as the oxygen in the water where the tadpoles swim is insufficient for their respiration, they will gather in the part which is most illuminated. It is easy to understand why, in nature, such a response has been evolved. Light and oxygen go together in nature; darkness, and the absence of oxygen. So the tadpole, by this response to the light, not to the oxygen itself, secures the necessary supply of oxygen.

Oxygen itself seems to exercise no appreciable directive influence on the growth of the mangrove root or the movement of the tadpole. If the experiment with the tadpole is so set up that a little oxygen remains available in the dark part of the vessel, but none at all in the light part, every tadpole swims away from what little oxygen there is, and gets out into the light, where there is none. Just as under conditions which rarely or never occur in nature, the seedling of the plant would respond as in nature, and kill itself by carrying its roots into the air, so the tadpole,

[1] Geotropism: Response, by direction of curvature, to the direction in which gravity acts.

[2] Phototaxis: Response, by direction of free movement, to the direction of incidence of light.

The behavior of lower organisms, when carefully studied, has been found so complex that its accurate and concise description has required a dictionary-load of technical terms.

by a nervous reflex, responds by swimming into the light, and kills itself by leaving what oxygen is still available.

In the nervous reflex, there are usually five structures to perform the five parts of the action or response. These are: the sense organ; the sensory nerve; the nerve center, ganglion, or brain; the motor nerve; and the muscle. The tadpole perceives the absence of oxygen either on its surface or throughout its body, and sends this impression to its brain, but is not directed by it. It perceives the light with its eye, a sense organ. The optic nerve carries this impression to the tadpole's brain, whence the impulse goes out to the muscles, to swim, by movements which, under the control of the nerves, will carry it to the light. The nerves are structures which facilitate response, which make conduct quicker and easier; but which, except where the differentiation of organs is very far advanced, do not make possible kinds of conduct which would be impossible without them.

Nervous reflexes more highly developed

Nervous reflexes have admitted of much higher development than non-nervous ones. This has been for several reasons, among them greater quickness; but the greatest reason is that the nervous system has made possible a more distinct perception[1] of outside conditions. The more perfect the perception, the more accurate the response. With the advancing development of the nervous system, perception has grown more and more perfect.

Instincts: complex hereditary nervous reflexes

The great majority of conspicuous complex nervous reflexes are commonly spoken of as instincts. We can define instinct as hereditary, automatic response to any kind of stimulus. Instincts and nervous reflexes may be identical, but are not necessarily so. The instinct may be more complicated than any responses which are usually classed as mere reflexes; and, on the other hand, reflex is

[1] In this direction, the language used is at once that of general physiology and non-technical English, rather than that of technical psychology, which by "perception" might mean a function requiring a brain.

not necessarily an inherited response. Another distinction in common use is that volition *seems* to enter into instinctive acts, but not into reflexes. Breathing and sneezing are reflex acts. Imitation is one of the most universal instincts.[1] Instinct is found in all animals which have any considerable development of a nervous system. The mammals have feeding and mating instincts, and are especially under the control of instinct when very young. The behavior of birds is controlled very largely by instinct, and some of their instinctive performances would be very hard to imitate by the intelligence. Fishes are governed by instinct even more than birds are, and some of the instinctive behavior of fish is no less interesting than the most startling exhibits of bird instincts. The movements of salmon from the sea to the headwaters of particular rivers to lay their eggs, performed but once in a lifetime; the movements of eels in an opposite direction; the nest-building habits of many fishes, and their feeding habits, all seem the more wonderful the more thoroughly they are studied.

Instincts of insects

Among all animals, the most remarkable for their instinctive behavior are the insects. In this line of evolution, instinct has assumed almost entire control of conduct, and has developed complexity combined with certainty and quickness in a way not even approached among other living things.

The care of the solitary wasps for their offspring will serve for the illustration of insect "intelligence." Because this is so remarkable, it has received very careful study. It has been found that different kinds of wasps have each some other kind of insect which they use as food for their offspring. The wasp prepares a place—builds a house. It stores this with food, by going forth in search of the

[1] What is called imitation, here and in non-technical English, is split up into several instincts by specialists in animal psychology; the finer classification is not needed here, and would not affect the argument.

right kind of insect, sometimes adult, sometimes larva. It paralyzes this insect, so as to make resistance impossible, carries it home, and puts it away in storage, even sealing it up, after laying an egg in it or by it. And then it goes away, leaving the establishment to its fate. It is hard to believe, or to imagine, that the wasp knows that it is going to have a descendant in the house it prepares. Yet it provides that descendant with food of a kind which the wasp itself cannot use. How could the wasp *know* that the food which it secures and stores is the right kind for the larva which it provides for and leaves? No wasp ever stays to see what happens afterward, once the egg has been laid and provided with its food, and the place closed so that harm shall not come to it.

Each kind of these wasps has its own particular kind of prey, and, according to the kind of prey, conduct in securing it must be regulated. Some wasps prey upon insects which have one central nerve ganglion. The wasp stings this ganglion and paralyzes its victim by a single sting. Other wasps prey upon insects which must be stung in several places to produce paralysis; the stinging is done in the necessary places. To do these things intelligently, the wasp would have to have a better knowledge of the anatomy of other insects than college students usually get in years of study. It would take an exceedingly expert anatomist to paralyze an insect, without killing it, by an injection; but the wasps do this, with fair regularity.

Sometimes the stinging does not paralyze the victim. It was formerly supposed that the wasp always stings its prey in exactly the right place, and always paralyzes, without killing, it. More careful and thorough study has shown that the wasp is not quite unerring, that occasionally it stings the prey in the wrong place, that it sometimes kills its victim, and that, in some instances, its killing the victim does not result in decay, and so does not deprive the young wasp larva of the chance to live. This shows that even these very elaborate instincts vary. If they did not

vary, there would not only be no chance for them to become more perfect, but there would be no possibility of their adaptation to an eventual change in conditions. Since they do vary, there is a chance for selection to operate, and thus either make them more accurate, or modify them, so that, for example, another kind of insect may be preyed upon.

Intelligence, in contrast with instinct, makes use of experience

Intelligence differs from instinct primarily in its use of the experience of the individual. Experience involves the presumption of consciousness. Instinct does not preclude consciousness, but intelligence depends upon it. Insects seem able to profit by experience only in a most limited way, as they use features of the locality to find the way back to their nests. A person may drive a fly or mosquito away again and again; unless driven beyond the range of the stimulus of odor or color which attracts it, it will keep returning until killed. Insects are very slightly subject to education.

The perception of an outside condition or stimulus has been mentioned as a necessary feature of reflex action. As perceptions grow complete and perfect, and as they are retained by the brain and become matters of experience, they shade into what we call conceptions or concepts, ideas which are built up by the comparison of perceptions. Concepts can be regarded as generalities, in distinction to perceptions, as single instances or specific cases. There is no more a sharp line between perceptions (as mental functions) and conceptions than there is in nature between any other closely related functions or structures. The concept plays a very important part in the development and use of experience.

Intelligence involves choice or judgment

Intelligence consists essentially of the use of experience. Its function is to decide, on the basis of experience or of other knowledge, what response shall be made to given outside conditions. It is distinguished from instinct by the element of choice, and choice must be founded on judgment. Conduct may be under the control of either

one. Each has its advantages. Instinct has the great advantage of quickness. In nature, a second may be an important period of time; an insect may live or die, according to where it is during a particular tenth of a second. Instinct acts so quickly that we can hardly measure the time required. Intelligence is a comparatively time-consuming performance. Instinct has the further advantage that it is absolutely sure, so far as variation does not interfere with its perfection. Given any particular condition or set of conditions to which an organism is exposed, and let it be very probable that these fixed conditions will be the only ones to which the creature will be exposed, then instinct will meet them far more safely than will intelligence; but let the conditions vary, and instinct is left without any resource.

Instinct is characteristic of small animals

Since instinct is associated with quickness, we find that those animals have developed it highly which are conspicuous for the quickness of their movement. This statement is equally well made in the other direction, to wit, that animals with highly developed instinct have been selected for quickness. Instinct and quickness have been evolved together. Quickness is associated with small size. "Large bodies move slowly." Among vertebrates, instinct most largely controls the behavior of birds, the quickest of vertebrates, and of fishes, the lowest vertebrates, but also quick. But the highest development of instinct is not among vertebrates at all, but among the insects, a group of animals always characterized by small size and, if their movement subjects them to varied conditions, by marvelous quickness of motion.

Instinct characterizes groups rich in species

The disadvantage of instinct, as compared with intelligence, is obviously that it fits creatures for narrowly limited conditions. Since instincts are adaptations to narrowly limited and constant conditions, it follows that insects are not fitted to live under any such variety of conditions as many vertebrates can thrive under. The mammals are the animals most largely controlled by in-

telligence. The world is occupied by perhaps 2,400 species of mammals, and more than half of these are in the group of rodents, which differ from the more conspicuous mammals in living under more strictly limited conditions, in being relatively weak in intelligence and strong in instinct and of small size. Hardly more than a thousand kinds of other mammals, controlled in their adult behavior comparatively largely by intelligence, occupy the whole world. Our single species, man, has enough intelligence to fit itself to the various conditions of land life of the whole world.

While the world has not a great many large sets of conditions for animal life, so that it takes no great number of adaptable animals to people it, the number of narrowly limited sets of conditions is countless; and there has been time for some creature to take advantage of every lasting opportunity to make a living. There are some three hundred thousand known kinds of insects, and doubtless a greater number that we do not know, each kind fitted by instinct to a certain small and narrow set of conditions. If insects were controlled by intelligence, instead of by instinct, there might be no more species of them than of mammals. So groups characterized by the high development of instinct may be expected to be composed of small and quick creatures and of very numerous species. Fully four-fifths of all the species of vertebrates are birds or fishes.

Intelligence qualifies an animal for change

The advantage of intelligence over instinct is that it permits and accomplishes constant adaptation of the individual to new conditions, and so enables its possessor to live in a very complex or very changeable environment. It does this by making it possible for the individual to profit by experience. Countless insects must perish daily because they cannot be warned by individual experience. Under the constantly changing and exceedingly complex conditions of our lives, if we were cut off from experience as a guide of our conduct, we would surely perish almost at once.

Habit: reflex action based on experience

There is an indirect use of intelligence which does not sacrifice the ease and quickness characteristic of instinctive action. This is by the formation of habit, whereby responses can be made far more quickly than would be possible by the exercise of reflection and judgment. Habit differs from instinct in that it is the result of individual experience, instinct being the result of race experience. Habit cannot be inherited, while instinct must be. If we meet a given set of conditions in the same way day after day, we gradually cease to respond to them by the conscious use of the reasoning faculty; and at last our responses become automatic, and are then reflex rather than rational actions. Habit is exceedingly useful. It would be impossible for us to accomplish all the things that we do if many operations were not shortened, simplified, and made easy by the substitution of habit for intelligence. We eat by habit; we can talk over other things at the same time, because the eating has become so thoroughly a habit in its details, in addition to being instinctive as a general act, that it no longer demands our attention. Habit is exactly like instinct in that it fits one to certain conditions and to do certain things. It does not fit one to meet other conditions, or to do anything else, any more than instinct does. Instinct and habit have the same advantages, as far as the individual is concerned, and the same dangers. The various ways in which conduct is controlled, by instinct, reason, and habit, will be discussed more fully in a later chapter.

The brain the organ of intelligence

Intelligence is a function; and it is impossible for a function to be evolved except in association with a structure to perform it. The group of animals in which intelligence is highly developed have had of course to evolve structures for the performance of this function. Intelligence is impossible without a well-developed nervous system, and, probably, without a well-developed focus of this system. This focus in the vertebrates is the brain. One of the reasons for doubting the possibility of intelli-

gence on the part of many insects is that their nerve centers are scattered instead of collected into one dominant center. The brain is the organ of consciousness, of memory, of reason, and of volition. It has of necessity evolved as these functions were evolved. The more highly developed the brain, the more perfect the mental processes are able to be.

Reason related to youth and length of life

Resting as it does on a basis of experience, intelligence is associated with sufficient length of life to permit the accumulation of a fund of experience, which can provide material for comparison and thought. Accordingly, intelligent animals are long-lived, as compared with the run of animals controlled by instinct. The life of an insect is too short to permit the development of much intelligence.

Intelligence demands a period of immaturity and irresponsibility. The creature whose conduct is to be controlled, when it controls itself, by intelligence, must have an opportunity to become intelligent, to get material for intelligence, and to learn to use this material, before it can be trusted to itself. It must have a period of childhood and youth, during which it is taken care of and protected against dangers which it is not itself able to meet. The insect may mature by jumps, by sudden metamorphoses; the mammal must mature through infancy, childhood, and youth, shading into one another, before it can be trusted with the responsibility of an adult. If such responsibility is thrust upon it too soon, it dies. If the wild sow is killed, the little pigs are likely to die; instinct does not tell them enough, and intelligence is not ready for use. If the human child is orphaned and not cared for by other people, it is surer to perish, because it has less guidance by instinct and needs a longer and more thorough training before intelligence fits it to assume the responsibilities of manhood.

Intelligence and responsibility

Throughout the preceding paragraph, responsibility has been assumed as a consequence of intelligence. We make this assumption freely, because we realize that responsi-

bility is involved in the possession of the power of choice; but it is still worth while to note definitely that intelligence and responsibility are inseparable.

Intelligence related to size and to warm blood

Intelligence is related in several ways to the size of the animal. It depends upon the development of a fairly powerful brain, powerful in proportion to the intelligence it can exercise. This brain must have other structures to protect it, and the brain and protecting structures must have others to feed them, and all these structures must be protected in their turn. So, altogether, the animal which has to develop a considerable measure of intelligence will inevitably develop considerable size, such a size as no insect ever reaches. The period of infancy and youth provides time for the development of the necessary stature.

Warm blood is probably a condition of active intelligence. The most of the processes going on in our bodies are chemical in their nature, and there is no reason to doubt that this is true of mental processes also. The activity of chemical processes in general is a function of the temperature; as the temperature rises, so the rates of chemical reactions increase. The mental activity which the brain exhibits at a temperature of 37° C. (98° Fahrenheit) would be impossible at a comparable rate at a temperature of 15° or 20°.

The safety of an animal depends upon its being always ready for any emergency. It will not do for it to think quickly at one time and slowly at another, else it may be killed when it thinks slowly. Constant nervous and mental activity seem to demand a rather uniform and rather high temperature. Moreover, a temperature constantly far below that of the environment could not be maintained. Accordingly, all of the really intelligent animals have a quite uniform blood temperature, high enough to maintain the necessary degree of bodily and mental activity.

The movements of large animals are necessarily comparatively slow. For this reason, they are in danger, and against the dangers which result from slowness, the intel-

lect must in its turn be constantly ready to furnish protection.

Displacement of instinct by intelligence in evolution of mammals

As instinct controlled the behavior of the ancestors of the higher vertebrates and still controls a part of the behavior of all of these animals, there has, with the evolution of the intelligence, been a struggle for control between instinct and intelligence. With the development of the brain and of the necessary other structures of considerable size, instinct has furnished, on the whole, a poorer control of conduct than has intelligence. As there has been constant variation in the development of both instinct and reason (as animals vary in all other respects), there has been constant opportunity for the selection of the control which most constantly resulted in success and survival. Thus instinct has gradually given way, and intelligence has more and more assumed the ascendancy, at the same time that the brain became a better organ, and that the correlated changes in structure and stature were being evolved.

Surviving instincts

However, instinct has by no means vanished. In the highest animals below man, it plays a very important part in the conduct even of the adult. Man begins life under the entire control of his instincts, so far as he controls his own conduct at all. As he passes through infancy, childhood, and youth, the intellect develops, and the instincts, speaking comparatively, do not. In animals which depend upon instinct for the control of conduct, there is a constant development of instincts throughout the development of the individual. The instincts which control the adult insect are entirely different from those which control the behavior of the larva. The adult bird and the newly hatched chick are likewise controlled by altogether different instincts. In man, the most of the instincts which might control the adult are not developed, and in the absence of proper intellectual development, the adult is incompetent to take care of himself.

Still, the most vitally important conduct remains mostly

under instinctive control. Feeding instincts are preserved by the higher animals, even by man, more largely than any others which serve the individual; and the behavior associated with reproduction, and thus with the preservation of the race, is decidedly more instinctive and less subject to intellectual regulation, than is any other conduct of the adult human being. The master instinct in dominating the conduct of grown human beings, which successfully withstands almost any attempt at general interference or suppression by the intellect, is conjugal love.

Focus of selection on single structures and activities

From the time that the intellect began to assume a general control of conduct, intelligence naturally became the dominant factor in determining survival. When it became the critical factor in determining whether or not the individual could live and reproduce himself, it of course became that characteristic of the individual and race upon which selection was primarily focussed. Throughout organic life, any characteristic which assumes a dominant place in determining success subjects itself, in preference to all other individual or race characteristics, to the operation of natural selection. And the focussing of selection upon any character or set of characters will necessarily result in the rapid evolution, and will probably result in the material diversification, of the character or characters in question.

Thus, in the orchids, a peculiar floral structure has assumed an importance in determining reproduction which the floral structures do not have in most other plants; and the result has been a diversification of flowers in orchids, and the evolution of specialized floral structures, in a degree not approached in other plants. In the same way, the complete control of conduct by the instinct of insects has resulted in the constant and cumulative evolution of specialization in instincts, and thus placed the group, in this respect, far in advance of any other animals.

Selection of human intelligence

It is only in man that intelligence has supplanted instinct in the control of conduct to such an extent that the full

force of natural selection could be focussed on this single function. As soon as man's reason became the critical and dominant factor in determining his success, it was inevitable that his intelligence would develop with a rapidity which had never before been seen in nature. With every step in this evolution, the dominant place of the reason in determining success became more marked; wherefore, the evolution of intelligence was constantly accelerated. Very much as a ball will start slowly, rolling down a hill, but will gather speed as it goes; and just as it is known to be difficult for a man to save his first thousand dollars, but is supposed to be easy to grow rich after this start is made; so, once the intellectual development of man got a good start, once he had a clear-cut advantage in this respect over the rest of nature, it was inevitable that his mental evolution would progress with increasing rapidity, and that his ascendancy would continually become more and more complete.

CHAPTER IV

THE FEELINGS

To conclude this review of infra-human individual conduct, and to connect this with social and human conduct, we have still to consider the subjective conditions which influence or determine the responses to outside stimuli or conditions. To make clear what is meant by subjective conditions, we may recall the instance of tadpole behavior already discussed. The eye is stimulated by light; the optic nerve carries the stimulus to the brain; the brain perceives the stimulus, and determines what response, if any, shall be made. We may imagine the tadpole to be asleep; then it is not in a subjective condition to respond at all to the illumination. Or it may be comfortable, but tired; then it will probably move to a dark place and rest. Or it may be uncomfortable for want of oxygen; then it will move toward the source of light. The subjective condition determines these three different kinds of conduct under the same external conditions—the same, at least, as regards the stimulus in question. The way that the animal feels, then, is one of the factors controlling its conduct.

Non-nervous subjective conditions

In the case of the tadpole, we are dealing with a nervous reflex; but the influence of responses by other factors than the stimulus is very common among creatures without nerves. The influence of the want of oxygen upon the formation of upward-growing mangrove roots has already been noted. If a rice seed germinates normally, on moist soil, the first part to grow is the root, which becomes long enough to fasten the plant firmly in place before a leaf appears; but if the seed germinates under water, the leaf grows from the start faster than the root. The stalks of many flowers respond to gravity by growing straight up before the flower is pollinated, but reverse this response, and bend downward after fertilization. Even creatures as

lowly as the slime-molds show such behavior, moving toward moderate moisture and away from light during the most of their lives, but away from moisture and toward light when they are about to form spores.

Mental conditions and activity

Before we take up the particular feelings of higher animals, it will be worth while to see what we mean by a mental condition. It is customary to speak of mental states and mental activities as if the two were essentially different manifestations of mental behavior. As a matter of fact, there is no practical object in trying to draw a line between the two. We have no way of knowing anything about mental states except by the actions, any more than we know a dog to be alive except by its showing signs of life. Moreover, some measure of activity is supposed to be a constant function of living matter, and the brain is probably the most active of organic structures. It is improbable that the brain is ever in a fixed state, in which it remains for any appreciable time; it is more reasonable to assume that it is constantly acting, as long as life lasts, and is never in quite the same state in which it was a measurable time before.

For example, anger is frequently spoken of as a mental state, and yet the very idea of anger is inseparable from activity of the brain. When the brain acts in such a way as to create the feeling of anger, it always acts vigorously. As an effect of this very vigorous action in the so-called state of anger, the heart-beats increase in rapidity, the pressure of the blood in the arteries is increased, and the temperature of the blood is raised. If this "state" continues, and the anger is violent, the effect is shown in the heightened color of the face. It is not easy to believe that a state of the mind, passive in its nature if states and actions are really distinguishable, can be responsible for such pronounced expression.

When the brain perceives an outside condition, from the report brought by a nerve, the response may be prompt or deliberate, and direct or indirect. If the action is in-

direct and slow, whether finally it be instinctive or rational, the first evident effect may be a mental one, before there is action by any other part of the body; in this case, of course, the effect is evident to the individual alone. This mental effect is in general called a sensation. If it is not exceedingly emphatic, but endures long enough to permit full consciousness of it, the effect is more specifically called a feeling. If it is very pronounced, it is called an emotion. The difference between feelings and emotions is one of intensity.

Phases of mental activity

While we are dealing with psychological distinctions, it is convenient to dispose of another. In the psychological teaching of some time ago, but still familiar, it was common to classify mental activities as feeling, thinking, and willing. For our purposes, the sharp distinction of these phases of activity would be useless. If one of these phases is very strongly emphasized, it seems then to be quite distinct and clearly marked, and it may obscure either or both of the others. For instance, although ordinarily one can feel, think, and will simultaneously, acute fright (a feeling or emotion) deprives one for the moment of the power to think, and the instinct to flee is likely to submerge the will. It is likewise possible to will to do a thing so strongly that the intention takes entire possession of the mind; as men become so determined to accomplish their purpose in battle that they are oblivious even to such ordinarily acute pain as that of being shot. And it is possible to lose one's self in thought so completely that one fails to hear what would usually attract attention at once. Professors are credited with doing this habitually.

In general, however, it is the practice of the mind to do all of these things together and indiscriminately, and presumably to do all of them in very much the same way; and it is reasonable to suppose that all of them have been evolved together and have constituted one aggregate of mental activity. Knowledge is the product of experience and thought; when it is perfect, shading into wisdom, it

leaves nothing for the will to do. Complete knowledge of the effects of doing or not doing a thing will itself force a decision, without alternative or doubt, leaving no occasion for a distinct function of volition. This was clearly understood as long ago as the time of Socrates.

The appetites

The most primitive and universal feelings may be pain, and its opposite, pleasure or happiness; these will be discussed later. Next or equal to these in primitiveness, are the appetites, hunger, thirst, and sexual desire. Animals too primitive to have nerve centers or typical nerves are influenced by need of food and satiety with food in a manner surprisingly like that of higher animals. These feelings are instinctive, and the responses by most animals are also instinctive, the partial exceptions being among the comparatively few highest animals; and even among these, only in individuals of some maturity in age. The human baby is at first just as instinctive in its expression of hunger, and in its actions due to hunger, as is any other living thing.

The appropriateness of these powerful appetites to the end they serve, and the propriety of domination in their field by instinct rather than by reason, and by these instincts over others, might be clear without argument or illustration; still, there is no chance of making too familiar the invariable general appropriateness of really natural conduct; and the regulation of the appetites, and of other controls of conduct by them in emergency, provides a good opportunity to emphasize this. We shall confine the discussion to hunger, although thirst, while less often called upon, is even more imperative.

As to the relative mastery of hunger and the intelligence: In intelligent compliance with his physician's orders, man will endure hunger, if not too acute, willingly. In this case, his reason only amplifies familiar instinctive regulation in the form of loss of appetite. If too acute hunger must be endured, the physician does not trust the will power (reason) of the patient, but makes improper

food inaccessible; there has been no natural selection of any kind of control of conduct by the individual to meet this emergency, because it does not occur in nature. In nature any creature ill to the point in question would be unable to get food, and would probably die with or without it. Reason enables man to foresee, calculate future supplies of food, and endure considerable hunger, making a meager supply support life as long as it can. Here again, rational control would yield presently to the appetite, but social control can still keep the mastery and sometimes save lives. A group of men lost at sea can ration their food and make it last longer than any one man's share would last him by himself. Likewise, during a famine, a government can release food little by little, prolonging life with less of it than any man could limit himself to if more were within his reach. There has been no natural selection of individual control to meet this emergency, because in nature there would be no object in prolonging life in this manner. Without the same social help which enforces the endurance of hunger, the weakened individuals would finally die after suffering in vain. The individual reason or will can control the appetite just as long as there is in nature a probability that life can thus be saved, and no longer. This is our first meeting with the powers and advantages of social organization.

As to the relative mastery of hunger and what are called higher feelings or sentiments, whether or not these are intellectual: The properly trained man will endure a measure of hunger in order to comply with the standards of conduct agreed upon by society—rather than be in debt, or beg, or steal, for examples. How much he will endure depends upon his respect for these several standards. The limit may be placed by the reason; thus, he will not serve the interests of his creditors nor of society at large by starving himself until he is too weak to work. If reason does not limit his abstinence, instinct will. Acute enough hunger will drive a man to get food in ways from which

shame would restrain him while hunger is moderate. There has been no selection in adaptation to particular, shifting social standards, and it has been only moderately rigorous and not exceedingly long in adaptation to social standards in general. When life is really at stake, as commonly as this happens from starvation, instinct is still able to assert full control. And society ought not to be able to starve men to death.

As to the relative mastery of hunger and other primitive, firmly rooted instincts, we may take the maternal instinct as the strongest of the latter. In this case the struggle is more severe, and the result not so definable. Natural selection is always of the conduct good for the race; it is of conduct good for the individual only because the welfare of the race is that of the aggregate of the individuals. The mother will go hungry for the sake of her young; this is a common occurrence. The natural selection of conduct has been such that her too extreme hunger is not pitted against their lives. Either she must live in order that they may, or else she is removed from competition with them, in some other manner than by starvation. Death at the end of some natural period, whether a season or three score years and ten, is nature's provision that no creature shall compete with its own descendants for the chance to live.

The conclusion or summary of this discussion of hunger is that it is a subjective condition or feeling, which has great influence on conduct. It is instinctive, because the condition is itself a response to lack of sufficient food, and is inherited, to find expression whenever food is needed. It finds its outward expression by influencing either instinctive or rational conduct, but the rational element in control is suppressed by the instinctive when hunger grows acute. So far as the individual controls his own conduct, hunger influences or dominates it to just the extent which is in general most likely to insure survival. Under conditions peculiar to social life, new in an evolu-

tionary sense, in adaptation to which there has been no selection or imperfect selection of individual conduct, social control may save life by superseding any and all kinds of individual control of conduct.

Pain and its opposites

Pain and its opposites—pleasure, comfort, and happiness—are sensations or conditions of such outstanding importance in ethics that they will receive separate consideration in another place. They are mentioned here, because, although this is far from the most important aspect of them, they are in part feelings, as the term is here defined. For illustration, a creature in pain, because of injury or sickness, is likely to hide, instead of fleeing or fighting, when an enemy approaches, or to flee instead of fighting. This modification of conduct is likely to save life, because any cause of pain incapacitates the creature to some extent. Another common result of pain is to make one irritable, thus warding off danger due to intimacy.

Fear

When any animal, highly enough developed to exhibit such conduct as might be consciously protective, perceives, by seeing or otherwise, any object or phenomenon which is a frequent danger to its race, the immediate result of the perception is the feeling of fear. In the presence of serious danger encountered suddenly and unexpectedly, the fear amounts to an emotion, taking possession of the mind to the exclusion of other activities. Fear is fundamentally instinctive, and the conduct resulting from it is usually instinctive at first, even in adult man. To illustrate: Snakes have been the enemies of our ancestors during countless generations. If a man on a trail sees a snake where his foot is about to fall, fear masters him and, without thought or conscious volition, he jumps. A young boy starts to run, also; but a man is likely to collect his faculties after a good jump, and see if he needed to be scared. A rope will produce momentary fright as readily as a snake. The life-saving value of the quick, instinctive response is clear without argument. Moderate fear, induced by less imminent peril or peril to which one has time

for adaptation, makes one cautious and alert, resulting in careful, intelligent action, and is equally useful in the same way.

Fear of the unknown

No creature is acquainted with all of its possible enemies, and the things that are strange *may* be dangerous. No person or animal profits in the long run by taking unnecessary chances. Any creature which tampered with the unknown has always been more likely to suffer than to profit by doing so. Any creature which kept away from the unknown, or got away from it as promptly as it could, has always been more likely to survive than one which was needlessly curious about it. There has, therefore, been a selection of response, by fear, to the unknown, as well as to the known enemies; and many men and most of the higher animals are as frightened by anything which is conspicuous and strange as they are by the things they know to be dangerous. In the presence of unknown danger, terror is frequently more acute, and usually more lasting, than it is in the presence of familiar enemies.[1] This instinct of fear in the presence of what is not understood is the most characteristic feature of the behavior of primitive men in contact with those of the more civilized races.

The basis of primitive religion

Thoughtful men among primitive people inevitably become keenly conscious of the world of things about them which they do not understand. They fear all this unknown world; and as the fear is enduring, they have recourse to whatever suggests the possibility of averting the unknown danger. They people the woods, the rivers, and the mountains with spirits, which are usually conceived as hostile. They deify everything they see but cannot understand—sun, earth, sea, sky, wind—and, to miss no chances, add unknown gods to their labelled deities. All primitive religion has its foundation in the disposition to

[1] In this connection, one recalls the instance of Dr. Livingstone's servant from the heart of Africa, who became so agitated in his experience on an ocean steamer that he committed suicide.

placate these unknown spirits or forces of nature. This disposition, in turn, has its root in the instinctive fear of what is not understood.

Instinctive antipathy

Associated with the fear of the unknown, because evolved by selection along the same lines, is the feeling of antipathy for whatever is strange. This feeling, as an instinct, is probably universal among animals which can either flee or fight. For the sake of ease in handling them, we have bred various instincts out of our domesticated cattle, but the carabao of the Orient is much nearer its wild ancestor. It is used to its human neighbors, and a little Filipino boy can do as he pleases with it. When Americans were new in the Philippines, the carabao hated them, as strangers. Times enough, an American soldier waited in a tree for a Filipino child to take the carabao away. A Filipino in American clothes was likewise an object of fear, suspicion, and dislike, to the carabao.

The races of men instinctively dislike each other, until well enough acquainted for strangeness to wear off. In the United States, it is not the Southerner, with a negro problem on his hands, but the Northern white man, unused to negroes, who really dislikes the latter. Similarly, it is in California that the Chinaman is appreciated and liked, although California is responsible for his exclusion. Mere lack of acquaintance is responsible for the most of the hatred in the world. The unknown may be dangerous, and instinct guards us against taking chances. There is of course a rational dislike, based on experience, which is quite distinct from instinctive dislike.

Anger

While fear is appropriate to all animals likely to escape danger by flight, there are animals which may protect themselves more effectively by not attempting to escape. Their enemies are either less terrible than they may seem to be, or are less dangerous if fought than if fled from. In such cases, action under the influence of fear is less likely to result in survival than is standing the ground or assuming the aggressive. To meet these conditions, the

creatures which are most likely to survive in this manner have evolved another feeling, that of anger. Like fear, anger, when it is at all intense, is an acute enough mental disturbance to be called an emotion. The accuracy of selection, in evolving the most appropriate responses is well shown by the fact that among all the higher animals the males are more susceptible to anger than are the females. The male is stronger than the female, and therefore more likely to succeed in the strife which anger may provoke but fear would prevent; and if the action due to anger turns out to be fatal, the race suffers less loss in a male than it would in a female. When, however, survival depends upon fighting by the female, as when she has in charge her helpless offspring, then she is more easily angered and more dangerous than the male ever is.

Anger does more than dispose an animal or man to fight; it makes him fight more efficiently. The increase of pulse rate, blood pressure, and temperature make one stronger and quicker while the emotion lasts. In nature, fighting is not a game; it is a matter of life and death. The animal in a fight must do its best and do it at once, holding nothing in reserve. Anger does still more than increase the bodily strength and make it more immediately disposable; it helps very materially by obsessing the mind and preventing any distraction. Thought, or any other feeling than rage, may be a fatal handicap in a fight. Every boy knows that a football team is beaten when the players have any other idea than winning.

Social feelings

The feelings so far discussed, although evolved because of their value in insuring the survival of the race, still apply to the conduct of individuals as such, rather than as members of a group, and are therefore called egoistic or non-social feelings. Assuming now, what will be demonstrated in succeeding chapters, that man is a social animal, and must be a social creature to survive, we shall consider some feelings which have been evolved in adaptation to social life.

Affection

In order that people may live together, it is necessary that they like to live together better than to live apart, that is, that they like the presence of other people. And liking other people's presence is inseparable from liking other people themselves. This fondness for other individuals constitutes the group of instincts of affection, which find their strongest expression in the love of parents for their children, of the parents for each other, of the children for their parents, and, with increasing weakness, in the affection of more remote family relatives, and of friends and neighbors. It is the opposite of the feeling already described as racial antipathy. Affection is a feeling, as the term is used here, because it is a subjective condition influencing conduct; one lends his knife or his credit to a friend but not to an enemy. It is instinctive, because it is an inherited, selected response to contiguity, of blood or in space.

Any man in whom the feeling of affection is weak is an undesirable member of society because one of the strongest ties which should bind him to his social group in its time of need is wanting. Such a man may try to live by himself, in which case he is likely to perish, because man is not well fitted for solitary life. But if, for the mere sake of safety, this man remains with his fellowmen, he is still a disagreeable and unsatisfactory element in society; in which case, if he lives among primitive people, who make their dissatisfaction effective, he is likely to be disposed of. Since the unaffectionate are likely to be weeded out of any society, while the affectionate are prized, retained, and helped, and so selected for survival, the feelings of affection, broader than those of family life, have been selected and have been evolving as instincts, ever since man began to be a social creature.

Sympathy

Sympathy, as the word literally means, is feeling with others, sharing their feelings, responding with them to conditions which make them happy or unhappy. In primitive social life, if a man fails to be sympathetic, to agree

with the feelings of pleasure or pain shown by those about him, his failure to share their feelings is just as disagreeable as we find it when our neighbors refuse to share our feelings. When we are happy, it annoys us if our neighbors are morose; but when happy we are not dangerous, even if annoyed. When we are distinctly unhappy, lack of sympathy on the part of our neighbors may be dangerous to them unless we have good control of ourselves. Individual self-control has been developed in social life. In primitive society, therefore, failure to show sympathy was constantly and decidedly dangerous. Thus the most unsympathetic people were steadily weeded out, because they exposed themselves to danger, while the sympathetic man had a chance to live and raise sympathetic children. Sympathy is not something to be preached about with words which cannot be tied to facts. It is a real instinct, which, as worthy human beings, exhibiting the same traits which were good for our ancestors, it behooves us to feel and to exhibit.

Conscience

Conscience is probably an exclusively human attribute. It is one's sense of right and wrong, in the application of this sense to one's own conduct. If a man does what he knows he should not do, the disapproval of his fellows will give him an uncomfortable sense of shame; it is his own disapproval of it, and more particularly of his being blamable because he knew it was wrong, which gives him a guilty conscience—a very uncomfortable feeling. But it can operate before an act, and determine that the act shall be the right one; it is in this respect that it is like the feelings already discussed. A man finds money advertised as lost, and it depends upon subjective conditions whether he will keep or return it. Fear cannot influence his decision unless he is known to have found it. But his conscience may cause him to return it, although he wants the money badly and nobody knows he has it.

Conscience has a clear survival value, and has therefore been subject to selection. A man who does what he thinks

he should do, as conscience tends to make him, will merit and receive the good will of his fellows, and thereby escape danger from them, and be more likely to live. Like the other social feelings, it has a survival value for the race, independent of that for the individual; this will be explained in chapter vi. Having a survival value, it has been established by selection, and is to this extent like an instinct.

Being a distinctively human attribute, conscience has not been selected long enough to have the inherited strength of the older instincts. But it has also an intellectual basis, in that we can understand why we ought to do what is right, and why this is expedient, for us individually and as members of society. Moreover, it moves us to do not only what we fully understand to be right but also what we are merely told is right or accept on faith as right; thus it has a moral as well as an ethical value. For all of these reasons, it is, of all the feelings, the most subject to development by education, and can be qualified to exert a commanding influence on rational conduct.

Development and suppression of feelings

Up to this point, we have been occupied almost exclusively with the study of what conduct is and why it is as it is. It is not yet time to turn attention chiefly to questions of what it ought to be; but before closing the discussion of feelings we should note that it is to a considerable extent in our power to determine how much influence the various ones shall have on our conduct. We have found that all of them were established by selection, because they were good. However, the egoistic feelings were established because of goodness under conditions very different from those under which we now live. Their former goodness is no guaranty that they are good now. The social feelings, on the other hand, which are particularly appropriate to the life we lead now, are too new to have the natural force of fear and anger, still less, that of the appetites. It is obvious that, to conduct ourselves

as worthy members of society, we need to weaken some feelings and strengthen others.

To no small extent, nature does this for us, in that we naturally tend to outgrow the egoistic feelings as we grow older. Fear is especially appropriate to childhood, as a safeguard of the weak, and would lose force with age, regardless of society. But this is not true of anger, which develops with years in various animals, nor of the appetites; yet all of these lose some of their influence on the conduct of most older men. But we would make very poor use of our educative years if we did not individually strengthen those feelings which fit present conditions, by exercising them, and stifle those not fit to present conditions, by steadily and studiously resisting their expression.

Idealistic feelings

There are still other mental conditions influencing our conduct, more complex than those which have been discussed, which develop later in the life of the individual and must be more recent in the life of the race. These are in part rational, results of education, rather than hereditary. Among them are love of truth, love of justice, love of virtue, love of purity, the sentiment of mercy, and, finally perhaps, a sentiment of altruism. These are associated in origin with the development of ideals and need not be discussed independently of ideals.

Incentives

The foregoing list of feelings is not at all exhaustive, even with the restriction imposed by the definition given. There are many more or less distinguishable phases of the feelings named and discussed. There are a great many mental phenomena commonly called feelings which do not fall under the definition used here. And there are a considerable number which seem sometimes to be manifested in a way to fall under the definition and sometimes not. This is notably true of the group of activities and states already mentioned as pain and its opposites.

These have three generally distinguishable phases. First, they influence responses, and are then feelings as we use the term. Second, they are results of conduct, and we

judge the propriety of conduct most directly by seeing which of these it produces. Third, the mind anticipates the result, and conduct is determined by this expectation of the result; this anticipation is sometimes instinctive, sometimes rational. It is as they work in this way that the avoidance of pain and the winning of happiness are the mainsprings of conduct in general.

We have so far treated conduct as if it were entirely responsive, that is, as if creatures were always reacting to outside conditions. Whether or not this is the case in a final analysis, there is a great deal of conduct of which it is not evidently or directly true. Of course nobody does what is impossible under existing conditions. But men await only the opportunity to do many things, on their own initiative, which are not evidently provoked by stimuli from without. Nor is such behavior confined to men. And it may be instinctive or rational. Instinctive impulses of this kind differ from the egoistic feelings in that the instinct seems to be responsible for there being action, instead of merely for the choice among a number of possible actions. However, the resemblance is close enough to make this a proper place to discuss such conduct.

Pleasure in activity

The instinct to be active and the pleasure found in activity are the most basic of these phenomena. However common it is to long for a life of ease, every thinking man knows that the fruit of idleness is discontent, while that of activity is happiness. The natural explanation is that activity is essential to preservation, if the conditions of life are at all hard. At most times in the life of our race, only those who kept busy were likely to survive, wherefore the finding of pleasure in activity was steadily selected in preference to the taking of satisfaction from idleness.

In adult creatures, either the reason or the other instincts co-operate with this one to determine what the particular activity shall be, and in this way the activity is given a specific and direct purpose. In children and the young of the higher animals, activity is practiced for the

pleasure found in simply being active. In them this is the instinct of play, the value of which, in general development, and in specific preparation for the activities of later life, everybody understands.

Pleasure in competition

The enjoyment of competition is a phase of the finding of pleasure in being active. Whether the competition be with nature, as in the first ascent of a mountain or the breaking of a record, or with one's fellows, competition enhances the pleasure of being active very materially. It thus insures more perfectly the advantages which come from activity. But, more than this, life is a competitive performance, and habituation to it by the exercises of youth is very valuable preparation. Because the selective value of competitive exercise is unquestionable, we must, *à priori,* suppose pleasure in competition to be instinctive. Statistics have been published to show that good athletes are more likely than college students in general to be successful in life, and it has been argued that athletic exercises thereby demonstrate their value.

There is still a step in this series of instincts. Beside pleasure in activity and pleasure in competition, there is satisfaction in achievement. The desire to excel is as instinctive as the other incentives just discussed. This is the basis of ambition.

Shame

In the field of social instincts, the fear of shame is a deterrent, the opposite of an incentive, rather than a feeling modifying responses, although it can function in the latter manner also. Shame is the form of pain which results from the consciousness of the disapproval by others of what one has done. It has survival value for the individual, in two ways: As a deterrent, it restrains one from doing what will displease others; and, even after an improper act, it mitigates the offense.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

While ethics treats of the conduct of the individual man, still, in the usual sense of the word, it deals with conduct exclusively in its social aspects; with man, as a member of society. In order to understand the advantages of society, and the nature of social relations, it is worth while to have a thorough idea of the underlying principles of society in general, not merely of society as a human institution.

Of the five dominant kingdoms or subkingdoms of living things, there are two which depend characteristically upon enormous fecundity for success in occupying what they can of the world. These groups have not evolved very highly, either individually or socially. The green plants, the arthropods, and the vertebrates, on the other hand, have evolved steadily in both these respects. The necessity of social organization among higher beings is universally recognized, and is expressed by such familiar sayings as "In union there is strength," and "United we stand, divided we fall."

Bacteria

Going back to the simplest and most primitive organisms, we find the beginning of society in the union of individuals for mutual protection. Thus, even among those bacteria which may have lived before the first plants, there are many kinds which form chains or colonies. When the individual cell lives by itself, it is exposed to attack from all sides. When it lives joined to another cell, it is protected on one side. If many live together, forming a colony, each one is exposed to a comparatively slight extent.

Volvox

The common ancestors of plants and animals are generally agreed to be the flagellates. From these, possibly from the same ones from which plants are descended, there has evolved a very interesting group called the Vol-

vocineae. These used to be called animals; now they are commonly treated as plants; and they might about as well be called neither, but a minor kingdom of living things. The most primitive of them are always free and single cells, motile all their lives. Next above these are groups of a definite small number of cells, all alike. There is a practically complete series of these organisms, up to those forming spheres the size of a large pin-head, sometimes composed of more than fifty thousand cells. These spheres are hollow, or filled with a thin gelatinous substance, with a single layer of cells making up the surface. In most of these organisms, the cells are unconnected except by being against one another, and it is fully as reasonable to call each cell an individual and the whole group a colony as to call it a multicellular organism. Taking the former view, the individuals are protected, except on one side, by their union.

Advantages of social life

But they derive other advantages from their social organization. The colony is often slightly elongate, instead of quite spherical. Then one end keeps ahead as the colony swims; and the individual cells in this end have a better developed red spot, supposed to be a cell-organ sensitive to light. In these large colonies, only a small part of the cells are reproductive, the most of them being purely vegetative. The reproductive cells retreat from the surface of the colony into the interior, where they divide over and over, forming daughter colonies, which escape through holes in the surface when partly grown. Beside this kind of reproductive cells, there are others which divide repeatedly, and then the daughter cells separate, to unite each with another cell, and thus produce a cell from which a colony develops; such reproduction is sexual. In these larger Volvocineae, we have, beside protection of the individuals, the particular protection of the young cells, which develop in the interior of the old colonies. And we find still a third advantage of their social life in the division of labor, some cells being specialized for

reproduction, and even for reproduction in particular ways, while other individuals remain vegetative and protective. This division of labor makes the colony as a whole more efficient.

These advantages of social life—protection of the individuals, the special protection of the young, and greater efficiency due to division of labor—are universal "goods," the advantages attained by social life wherever, in any group of organisms, social life is at all well developed. They are attained, in ways characteristic of the several groups, by the higher green plants, the insects, and the vertebrates—among the last, especially by the mammals; and among minor groups, by the lichens, some of the sea-weeds, and the Coelenterates.

Plants

The protection of the offspring has been the dominant factor in the evolution of both plants and animals. In both groups, sex differentiation has been the most important single means to this end. This permits one parent to be specialized to give such protection. Going up through the plant series, we find in the green Algae or sea-weeds plants without distinction of sex; then plants in which the sexes look alike but differ in behavior; then those with evidently different sexes, but no protection for the daughter except a thick cell wall; and finally those in which the daughter is protected by an outgrowth of the mother plant, within which the growth of the daughter begins. In the group of the mosses and ferns, this protection progresses to the point where what is called a generation —although, in the usual use of the word, it is only half a generation—is passed under the protection of the mother plant. In the seed plants, this has gone still farther, not only the sexual generation but the embryonic stages of the following asexual generation being passed within the structures of the parent.

The family

The family is the first and most universal social organization. Its function is the protection of the offspring, permitting the latter, when they become independent, as

they ultimately must do, to enter the world equipped to the fullest possible extent to fight their way successfully. Infancy is always the most perilous part of the life cycle, and better protection of the young has insured success in every line of evolution. This is the chief advantage of the flowering plants over the ferns, of the ferns over the mosses, of the reptile over the fish, of the higher mammals over the marsupials, and of civilized man over the savage. With adequate care of the young, any race of creatures could always be expected to succeed.

Vertebrates

The vertebrates furnish the most familiar illustrations of the results of care of the young. Most fishes lay eggs in great numbers, but take no further care of them; and the same is in general true of the frogs. The higher reptiles lay comparatively few eggs, but these are provided with hard shells and placed where each egg is likely to incubate and hatch; and the young reptile develops far enough in the egg to be better able than most fish-spawn to take care of itself. Without needing to produce any such number of eggs as fish do, the reptiles, by virtue of better care and protection, were able to occupy the land area of the earth, until they met the competition of animals superior in the same respects, the mammals.

The first mammals were the marsupials, which bear their young very small and helpless, and carry them in a pouch while they are developing. While they met no competition with creatures more careful of the young, the marsupials spread all over the world. Then appeared the higher mammals, whose young develop much farther before birth. These did not spread to Australia, where, therefore, the marsupials survive in great variety. In all the rest of the world, the marsupials were practically exterminated. But for the better care of the young given by the higher mammals, North America would probably be better supplied with marsupials than Australia, for a great variety of them once inhabited this continent.

From the family composed of parents and offspring, it

is a short step to the family which contains blood relatives of less immediate consanguinity. The perpetuation of the family group, in that parents and offspring do not separate when the latter are mature or adult, will result directly in the development of larger groups. Some development of groups larger than the family has, in all lines of evolution, been concomitant with the evolution of sex. Thus, if a dioecious plant (a plant having, in common language, the male and female flowers on different individuals, like the holly and the yew), having protected the sexual generation and guarded the seeds until they are mature and ready to scatter, were then to have them scattered so widely that all relation ceases between the offspring, there would be no further generations because of the impossibility of fertilization.

Expansion of the family

The effect of such conditions in the case of maize, which is not dioecious, is well known. Whenever the plants are so scattered that pollination is imperfect, then, instead of ears well set with kernels, on which each parent plant would have a very large number of potential offspring, each ear is a sort of map of the field, with a kernel here and there. In this case, too loose social organization results in the bearing of too few progeny. If such conditions keep up, any race will become extinct. A maize field, then, is a sort of social structure decidedly larger than the family; a social structure, moreover, which is indispensable if the individual maize plants are to bear offspring, that is, if the race is to continue to exist.

Maize

Among animals, the commonest name for these larger social units is colony, a figure of speech carrying over to the lower animal world ideas obtained from human social organization. The evolution of the colony among the Volvocineae has just been traced. Each of these large colonies is a very efficient one for its own purposes, insuring the perpetuation of the race by adequate care of the young, not by the several parents, but by the whole colony.

Among the coelenterates, a group near the bottom of

Colonial Medusae

the evolutionary line leading from the protozoön to man, there is another interesting offshoot in which there has been evolved a line, running from some such simple form as Hydra, through the ordinary Medusae, to the colonial Medusae. In these, as in the Volvocineae, the individuals making up the colony remain intimately associated, but they are more highly specialized for the performance of particular functions.

Ants and termites

Among the arthropods, there are many lines of social evolution leading to the formation of colonies, or groups otherwise named, exceedingly numerous in individuals, and with these individuals specialized for the service of the group to an extent not approached among any other organisms. Even among human beings, with our highly organized states, each individual begins life without any general natural limitation except such as is imposed by sex, and is, in some measure, qualified to perform any function which the state may demand. In widely separated groups of insects, most notably among the ants and the termites, there have been evolved social organizations in which not merely two sexes, but at least three or four, and in some instances as many as six very distinct kinds of individuals are produced, each adapted to perform its particular function but useless for any other work. These may differ so widely, one from another, that if the different kinds of individuals are found separately, and their origin is unknown, they may not be suspected of being the same kind of creatures.

In such colonies, there are always produced individuals for reproduction, and it is no rare thing for these to have no other function whatever. Specialization for maternity has reached a point among the termites which is hardly believable except on the basis of personal observation. Beside this specialization for maternity, a colony includes at least two other kinds of individuals—the workers, whose function is to provide food for the colony; and the warriors, whose function is to protect the colony

against its enemies. And the specialization of the warrior is not limited to clothes and perhaps a little extra size, but is profound to the point where the creature looks quite unlike any other individual of the colony, and is absolutely useless for any other function than protection. In such colonies there may be more than one kind of workers, and of warriors; and there may still be appreciable specialization for at least one other purpose, paternity.

The pack, drove, or flock

Organizations larger than the family are found again among the mammals, as in the pack of wolves, where combination makes offense and attack more effective, thus better assuring the provision of the food of each individual. Combination serves also for defense. The herds of sheep and bison, creatures not killing prey, defend themselves better collectively than they could as individuals or families.

Competition within the race

It is a rather wide-spread idea that races become dominant by common action. As a rule, this does not happen in nature. It is true that they usually let each other alone; for if the individuals of any race made it their general practice to use the racial advantage to the detriment of the others of the race, these advantages would not serve long to guarantee the survival of any of them. As a rule, a lion does not fight a lion, a wolf a brother wolf, nor a hawk a hawk.

There are two conditions under which beasts of a kind fight each other. They will do so when food is very scarce. At such times, the survival of the race is endangered; and the struggle among its members for such food as they can secure is a provision that such as may survive the period of danger shall be the best and strongest of the race. They also fight for the opportunity to have offspring. Throughout the realm of intelligent creatures, but under the guidance of their instincts, animals fight for the opportunity to mate. This kind of fighting instinct also has its usefulness. For we know well that of all creatures more are born than can survive. The struggle for the chance

to bring young into the world is nature's provision that the latter shall have the best and strongest possible parents. It is one more phase of nature's general guaranty that weakness shall not be inherited, that the tone of every race shall be maintained and, when possible, raised.

Degeneration

When co-operation between the members of a race, as contrasted with competition, and for any other purpose than the direct insurance of the race welfare, goes farther than letting each other alone—when it goes to the point of permitting the weak or the unworthy to bear offspring in safety and without competition for the privilege with the strong and the best, the inevitable consequence is degeneration. This begins when selection ceases for any reason whatsoever. When a function is exempted from selection, it and the associated structure degenerate. We are all familiar with this phenomenon among cultivated plants. When a plant is taken into cultivation, it is removed from its previous struggle for existence. The choice of man determines its survival thenceforth, to the exclusion of the factors which determine its success in nature. Except in the qualities by which it serves us, and for which we select it, degeneration results from the cessation of selection as to other characters. When any kind of cultivated plant is left without our care, the weeds, which have grown capable in fighting their own way, overcome it. They can out-grow the cultivated plant, take its food away from it, and out-reproduce it, and they do these things unless we constantly interfere.

If the selection of the strongest and best is prevented among animals, it results in exactly the same way that it does among the plants. We have selected certain birds for our own use, and have made it our practice to permit only the large and slow individuals to become parents. We have done this steadily for many generations, in which those most capable in the sense of free nature have had no advantage over those which were in the same sense unfit. The result has been the development of races below

nature's standard of fitness. If chickens of any favorite strain are turned loose in the woods, none of them will be left next year.

We have done the same thing with all of our domesticated beasts, and the results are in every case the same. If, now, we see that the removal of selection for the qualities which favor survival in free nature results in the progressive loss of these qualities, among all plants and among all animals, wherever tested, it is fair to conclude that we are ourselves no exception to the rule. We know positively that the several structures of our bodies degenerate if they lose their functions; the vermiform appendix is one of numerous examples. But if we permit or encourage or foster conditions under which all have an essentially equal chance of posterity, we must expect a more general degeneration, and a resultant state unable to compete successfully with one in which the most capable exercise their natural advantage over the weaker and less worthy.

Education

The final advantage of social organization, a function of the family and of the larger units, but peculiar to the higher animals, is the opportunity for education. While the young are protected, their development will be less perfect than it might be, unless at the same time they are given such training as they are capable of receiving. Accordingly, the most successful groups and races are those which in this respect make the best use of the period of youth. In the measure in which reason takes the place of instinct, education is increasingly important and even essential.

Education by imitation

There is education through instinct, and education of the intellect. The most widespread education through instinct is based on the instinct of imitation. "Monkey see, monkey do" is no truer than "chicken see, chicken do," or "baby see, baby do." The tendency of every living thing is to do what it sees done. This is more conspicuously true of the young than of the adult, because among the

higher animals the behavior of the adult is likely to be less completely controlled by the fundamental instincts, and still more because imitation is less necessary on the part of the adult. But every higher animal is likely at all ages, unless objection is made by the will, or unless it sees done what it cannot do, to imitate whatever it sees. This instinct of imitation has been evolved for obvious reasons.

The most general reason is that what one does and gets off safely another may safely do. What one chicken does is thereupon presumably a safe thing for another chicken to do. If one in a flock perceives a danger, it flees for shelter, and the others imitate it and find shelter also, though, individually, they may have seen no danger. Imitation prevents endless experimenting, and experiments are dangerous. If each chicken of a flock were controlled by its individual and independent impulses, the different members would do many different things, and in this way would encounter a variety of perils, and some proportion of them would continually be getting killed. But, governed as they are by imitation, all do what they see one do without getting into trouble; but if the thing done by one works badly, the stronger instinct of fear deters the rest.

It may be noted here that safety is not all that is required of conduct, but that, beyond resulting in safety, conduct must in general be profitable. Otherwise it is wasteful, and no animal with the normal ability and normal needs of an animal has energy to waste. The wild chicken needs its activities, and we need ours, although our need is less constant and obvious. Under certain conditions, animals escape the need of activity; this happens, for example, to parasites. Of active animals, man is the only one that has acquired such dominion over his means of support that he has time and energy which do not have to be spent to the full in protecting himself, supplying himself with food, and taking care of his progeny. Degeneration is the invariable and familiar result of parasitic existence. Domestic animals which are not compelled to

be active become fat, and lose the power to be as active as their wild relatives must be or die. The degeneration of man as a result of inactivity appears in many different ways, and is familiar enough so that, if well considered, it is almost as good an example as the fatness of a well-kept pig, or the loss of functions by the tapeworm.

The instinct of imitation has notable social value as a cohesive force, tending to hold the individuals of a family or race together. Among gregarious animals, this instinct, making one do what it sees another do, holds the flock or drove together. And in the flock it gives each member the advantage of the collective power to observe and, to some extent, of the collective experience of the flock. In this connection, the same instinct may be used for the effective division of labor. A flock of swans or geese posts a sentinel while the others feed; if this one on guard detects signs of danger, the whole flock escapes by flight.

Education by play

Besides imitation, the instinct most important in the education of the young is that of play. The young of all higher animals have this instinct, and all instinctively play in ways which will train them for their work and responsibilities as adults. The kittens, pups, and cubs of beasts of prey always play at fighting. Even of those animals whose chief business in life is not fighting, the young are almost sure to make this game a part of their play, because they must be trained for defense and because at least the males are likely at some time to have to fight for the chance to mate. The instincts of imitation and play, together, make the young play at the things they see their parents do, and in this way they train themselves for the kind of work they are to inherit.

As an instinct, imitation is, so far as the individual is concerned, regardless of the object of the act imitated. The chicken scuttling because another one scuttled need have no idea what it flees from. And the gardener's child, using a stick as a tool to stir the ground, or inverting an empty can over a potted plant, or pulling the pansies up in

imitation of his father pulling weeds, is equally without intent to accomplish any purpose. Nevertheless, his play trains his muscles and his senses, and certainly prepares him to do the particular work he plays at.

Cumulative value of education

The opportunity for education is in obvious relation to the length of the period of infancy. It has already been noted that the higher animals, in order to develop their complex structures and their considerable size, must have a long period of infancy. This period provides the opportunity for education of a perfection necessarily beyond the reach of any lower animals. The opportunity to educate the young of the higher animals gives them a constantly increasing advantage in competition with lower forms of life. More particularly, it provides an almost mechanical means, in connection with the instinct of imitation, by which our habits are handed down from generation to generation, with very much the same results with which the hereditary instincts are handed down. In this way, habit gets some of the permanency and reliability of instinct, without its being hereditary and correspondingly inflexible. Its flexibility might be fatal to lower but is an advantage to higher animals. Instinctively acquired habit is not so sure as instinct itself. Therefore, it could never take the place of instinct, where sureness and accuracy are primarily demanded; but, in the course of time, and by selection, it can be substituted for instinct with real advantage, where adaptability is a prime requisite. Adaptability is essential to the widespread mammals. Accordingly, habit is of relatively great value as compared with instinct; the two having, as compared with the exercise of intelligence, the common advantages of greater quickness, greater certainty, and less effort.

Dependence of intelligence upon habit

The necessity of adaptation to constantly changing conditions carries with it the necessity that the young shall not inherit the parental adaptations. Instincts are inherited adaptations. Intelligence permits and guides adaptations. But intelligence left to itself would be arduous, and, unless

very highly developed, quite unsatisfactory; and, because it would be unsatisfactory until highly developed, it never could have gone through the stages of development. With the rise of the reason, then, there came dependence upon habit, and upon the conveyance or transmission of habit from generation to generation, through imitation and education. And just as natural selection has regulated the instincts by eliminating any that became detrimental, so it preserves or gets rid of habits, according to their appropriateness.

Natural selection of habits

A race which practices habits that are bad—a bad habit is one which endangers survival—will be exterminated, and the bad habit will go with it. A race with good habits —a good habit is one conducive to survival—will be preserved, by virtue of its good habits; and the good habits will be handed down by imitation and education, and so the race and habit will be preserved together. The opportunity to be adjusted anew by each generation has been indispensable in the evolution of such a nomad organism as man, able to spread over the whole face of the earth. And this adaptation, performed anew as far as happens to be necessary in each generation, is made possible by prolonged infancy.

Education and natural selection

Not merely the habits, but the other elements of education as well, and the whole plan of education, are subject to evolution or destruction, in the same manner and for the same reasons which have been explained with regard to instinct and habits. In the struggle between the races of men, the factors which determine success are very largely the products of education. Good education prepares a race to succeed, and the success of the race is the test, proof, and measure of the goodness of the education. Poor education prepares a race to fail, and this proves the poorness. But this is not all it does; by the failure of the race, the poor education is made to disappear. Natural selection is thus at work, testing and saving or destroying our human institutions, just as ruthlessly and just as care-

fully as it has always worked to make any living things more fit to live.

The highest development of education, its outstanding feature in the case of man, consists of course of the transmission from generation to generation of specific mental activities and of their products. This theme will be treated at length in the chapter on the school.

Summary

Among all the larger groups of living things, there has been social evolution. More perfect social relations are the one common characteristic of the higher members of the several groups; a higher plant or animal is a socially more perfect one. Education is the phase of social evolution peculiar to the highest animals. The evolution of education and that of the intellect have had to be correlated.

CHAPTER VI

HUMAN SOCIETY

I

Assuming that man originated from other creatures, we must in reason suppose that there was no exceedingly sharp change before which our ancestors were brutes and after which they were men. For the sake of definition, we may predicate that by the time they should be called men they had developed the power of speech farther than other creatures had ever done. The earliest men of whom we have any real knowledge used tools and fire. The use of fire and tools, however, cannot be supposed to have been discovered at one time, and it may have taken many scores of milleniums to acquire the use of fire. Man is not quite alone in the use of sticks and projectiles, but he may have discovered their use independently.

All living men are usually regarded as constituting a single species. This is defined, as is every other species of animal, by anatomical characters. Among the more distinctive of these, in the case of man, are relative development of the limbs, and of their extremities, the hands and feet, size and shape of the cranium, development of jaws and nose, and dentition. There have been races of men sufficiently different in the characters of the parts of the head, so that they are regarded as distinct, extinct species. There are also imperfectly known extinct creatures which may have been ancestors of men. Nobody familiar with the subject suspects that man is descended, for example, from any existing ape or monkey.

In each stage of his evolution man had to fit the conditions he lived under. At each stage he had to survive because then and there he was able to do so. The supremacy above other creatures, to which the line of his evolution was destined to lead him, was never a material asset while he was travelling this line. Moreover, his

fitness had at all times to be so perfect that the peculiarities of modern man would presumably unfit him for the life our remote ancestors lived. A Yankee might have made quite a hero at King Arthur's court, but he would have been a pitiable object transplanted fifty times as far back.

Primitive men had thick skulls, and this is true of some of what are regarded as the more primitive surviving races. This is probably due to selection, under conditions in which power to resist a blow on the head was necessary for survival. Beating people with clubs has gone out of fashion, and thick skulls are no longer selected. It is probably a distinct advantage, under our conditions, to have relatively thin ones; at any rate it is an unquestionable advantage not to have them harden too early in life.

Knowledge about primitive men

We have a number of sources of information about what men must have been and how they lived before they deliberately made any records. The oldest are the remains of men themselves—skulls and other bony parts. Then, there are his artefacts, the things he made—tools and weapons at first, and later a few works of art. There are incidental evidences of his activity, such as piles of shells where he used to eat. There are also the many savage races, now rapidly disappearing. As to the evidence from these, it should be remembered that in years they must have lived just as long as we have. It would be unsafe to conclude that our ancestors did what we see any one existing savage race do; but if we find that savages in general have customs in common, then it becomes probable that our ancestors had the same or similar customs. As to customs, we have really learned much about our own from the study of those of people we call primitive.

The most of the remains of ancient men are not exceedingly different from our own. The oldest skulls are notably thick, the forehead low, the jaw more massive, and the chin less prominent, the teeth somewhat different, and the brain cavity smaller. Except in the oldest, the differences are decidedly less marked, and our own species of

man, *Homo sapiens,* is itself very ancient. Even now, there is an occasional man with anatomical characters supposed to characterize one of the previous species. The most interesting thing about such instances is not so much that such structural features still crop out, as that these men usually act and behave exactly like their neighbors.

Our advantages are all social

From the very considerable evidence we have, judging it fairly, and as far as we may without the prejudice of pride, we must conclude that our advantages over the most primitive men of whom we have any knowledge are not so much congenital as they are in our opportunity. They are functions of our social evolution, and particularly of education. If we had none of the advantages of family and state and civilization, with which we are fortunate enough to be born, we should probably be very well satisfied if we got along as well as the men of the Stone Age did.

The human family

From the very beginning, man must have had a family organization. The length of human infancy absolutely demands this. Moreover, the family, consisting of the parents and their children, was fixed and lasting, while its members lived, or until the children were old enough to become heads of families in their turn. The family organization, and the length of infancy, furnished the opportunity for prolonged education, and this education was a principal factor in giving man the handicap over the beasts, which guaranteed his survival, his spread over the earth, and his dominion over other creatures. Man lived at first by the chase and on such vegetables as the country, without his assistance, produced. His intelligence must very early have made large groups of men unnecessary for his defense; and in securing his food in most places large groups would merely have constituted a difficulty. We must therefore believe that primitive man was content with the family organization, and that the family did not soon grow, at any rate beyond small groups, into the tribe.

A sparse population gave each family a better prospect of feeding itself than a dense population would have done. If men multiplied without scattering, they would presently require more food than any region could supply. This must have tended constantly to happen, with resultant strife between the men; the only way to escape this strife was by migration. So it is reasonable to suppose that a rather small population spread over the world as widely as their means of travel permitted. Wherever man first appeared, the chief center from which he spread during scores of thousands of years before history began was central Asia. There is good evidence that not one but a series of waves radiating from this source spread as far as the shores of Europe, Africa, and South America. The fact that primitive man spread well over the world before he developed any social organization beyond the family is shown not only by the absence of any common type of social organization larger than this among isolated peoples, but still more clearly by the general absence, among the most primitive known people, of any other considerable social organization at all.

It is necessary thoroughly to appreciate the extreme antiquity of the family of the type described and the fact that for countless generations this was man's whole social organization, and that during this time he acquired dominion over the world. The duration of time permitted the establishment even of instincts adapting man to his family life. The family served man too long and too well, lightly to be questioned as to its enduring value. As will appear in the chapter devoted to the family, there have been known a variety of other types of family than ours, but no one of these has proved good on a wide scale or for a long time.

Intellectual progress preceded social

When man has had only nature to struggle with for his chance to live, his success has been sure. Under such conditions, nothing except migration is likely to change his habits or be a real incentive to invention. It was when

man came into competition with man that selection could operate effectively to improve him. In this competition, a better brain was the greatest asset a man could have, and selection was accordingly focussed on the intellect. The effect was rapid intellectual evolution. The absence of large co-operative societies may have put a special premium on the intellectual ability of the individual; for there is no state which does not help its members to survive, and enable some of them to survive with less exercise of the intellect than would be required to preserve them without the support of society.

At least throughout the northern hemisphere, there is no general difference in mental ability between the members of one native race and another, such as would be expected if any considerable part of the evolution of the intellect had been local. It may therefore be concluded that the evolution of the intellect to approximately the present stage had been accomplished before the dispersal of these peoples. But we have found that the dispersal took place while the family was still the only social organization. So we come to the conclusion that the intellect, practically as we know it, is older than any human society except the family.

Domestication of animals

Some domestication of animals took place very long ago. The dog, at least, has been associated with man as long as we have any way of knowing about it. Their bones are found together in gravel deposits, and the dog was the cave man's companion in France and Spain. From this association, the dog is the chief gainer. So far as this association was not accidental in origin, the element of volition in it may have been contributed by the dog, fully as well as by man. The intentional domestication of animals was perhaps the next really great step in human progress after the mastery of fire.

Cultivation of plants

The cultivation of plants was a much more important innovation than the domestication of animals. It must have occurred subsequently to the human occupation of America;

for no food plant was taken from Asia to America while the latter continent was being peopled. It was probably no sudden and complete discovery; care not to exterminate wild sources of food, and then some care of them where they naturally grew, may well have preceded the planting of them in prepared places. Any of these practices would tend to make a region able to support more men. Any agriculture has this effect, and in some lands the whole effort now is to produce subsistence for as many men as possible. In the history of human culture, however, this effect has been less important than the fastening of men to localities and the prevention of their constant wandering and scattering.

Agriculture seems to have begun independently in a number of regions, perhaps in a large number. Rice, wheat, maize, and some other grains, and several root crops, and, among fruits, at least the banana, are probably all plants associated with the beginnings of agriculture somewhere in the world. With each beginning of agriculture, there was some possibility of a start of civilization. In comparatively few places, considerable, or great, progress ensued. Among these are the valleys of the Euphrates and the Nile, the chief sources of our civilization, so like one another that the same principles apply equally to both.

Irrigation

We sometimes think of irrigation as a mark of up-to-date agriculture. The fact is that, wherever in the world an independent spark of civilization has even smoldered well, this happened after water was applied artificially to the land. Wherever we have positive knowledge about the change in status of men from wanderers to settlers, permanently established in their place, this happened in places we would look at as quite unfitted for easy living. The earliest seats of civilization which we can locate by the records of history or by the remains of cities, or even of houses—that is, the earliest places we can fix upon as the residence of settled men—are all in places ill-suited to support men unless water is applied by irrigation. This

might be at least partly because buildings are preserved longest in dry lands. But there is no mistaking the fact that our civilization began in such places.

Explanations: 1. Necessity and immunity

There are two possible explanations of the correlation between irrigation and the beginnings of civilization; probably there is truth in both. We may suppose that pressure of population, or inability to get along with their fellows in more comfortable places, drove some men to live where most of them did not care to; for example, in country so arid that it would not support men dependably without the growing of crops, nor produce crops dependably without artificial provision of water. In such places, the men did not at first arouse the envy or jealousy of other men, and so were permitted to dwell in one place and at peace. Dwelling thus, and raising crops which, as any crops will, would support a larger population than the resources of uncultivated nature will maintain, the incentive to wander was removed; and the family, no longer scattering as the number increased, had of necessity to grow into the community. If then its prosperity was sufficient to tempt inroads, its numbers and organization qualified it to protect itself.

In this connection, it is of interest to note that the two flourishing seats of culture which the Spaniards found in America (not, however, the earliest in America), Mexico and Peru, were both located where agriculture required irrigation; while neighboring country, much richer in natural vegetation, was in both cases inhabited by people much poorer and more savage and less organized socially.

The basis of this idea as to the beginning of civilization is the proposition that necessity is the mother of invention. As far as it goes, the idea is a sound one. Men and other creatures usually manage to do what they have to do in order to survive; otherwise, they disappear and escape our notice. If we bear it in mind that the effective beginnings of civilization took place less than ten thousand years ago, or about that time, when the individual intellect

of man was approximately as we know it, the ingenuity displayed by the adoption of irrigation will surprise nobody. There are Egyptian records giving us some details of the establishment of irrigation works which demonstrate intellectual ability we might well be very proud of today. This idea is not at all new. Thucydides is explicit and positive in ascribing the higher development of Attic culture, as compared to that of the rest of Greece, to the fact that Attica was relatively arid, unproductive, and by nature unattractive, and not tempting to marauders.

But this explanation is only a partial one. There is much practice of agriculture in the tropics, even now, which has never given rise to real civilization, and never would, although the agriculturists may have as good brains as anybody. The Bagobo of Mindanao lives practically altogether by agriculture. He has a good head; is even quite artistic. But he farms a spot for perhaps three years, and then moves. Prehistoric man raised the grains, and probably some other crops, for thousands of years, and over a vast area, before civilization began to develop. The important thing was not the mere raising of crops, but permanent settlement, which agriculture made possible, but did not necessarily compel.

2. Willing immobilization

This was the decisive thing about irrigation—that it required a fixed, immovable investment of a great deal of labor. A man's heart is where his treasure is. When men brought water to the land, they gave that land such a value as land had never had before, and they *would* not abandon such an investment. They had immobilized their capital, and thereby immobilized themselves. It is true, incidentally, that irrigated agriculture will support a dense population. This made it possible for the more numerous children to stay with their parents, during a long series of generations, and for custom to develop and become fixed, with enduring community life. Until population becomes excessively dense, irrigated agriculture also supports men with more ease and certainty than other ways of living.

The stability of early civilization was an almost pure function of the immobilization of capital and men. There may have been a germination of civilization in many places, but the hardier product of Egyptian and Chaldean economic conditions has supplanted competitors in most parts of the world. This source of our own intellectual culture is very familiar. But there is a still better example of the operation of the same principle which we have strangely overlooked. The preparation of rice land, including irrigation, requires even more investment of labor than did the irrigation of Egypt. Rice may be as old a crop as wheat, both dating back unknown thousands of years. And the civilization founded on rice culture has proved even more stable than that of Egypt. China has an incomparably longer unbroken history than any other land, and during much of this time has been the most highly civilized part of the world.

Nomad life

Before there was any agriculture, man was a nomad, in the sense that he had no fixed place of living. With the domestication of animals, conditions were created for the different and more advanced type of nomad life which has played a part in history, and has developed its own type of civilization. In this pastoral life, a much denser population can be supported than is possible by the chase, and inheritable property gives rise to community life, without the necessity of a fixed location for the community. By virtue of its less rigid social structure, nomad life places different demands on the individual. It may possibly select more strictly for intellectual capacity. In general, it does produce better warriors; nomad races have repeatedly conquered more civilized and more numerous sedentary people. And yet, the civilization which endured and spread has steadily been the one strongest socially.

Spread of society

Isolated, unorganized men cannot compete against those living in communities, nor can a pastoral culture compete, in the long run, with one based on the raising of crops. When the people of the Euphrates valley settled down

and developed a state or states, the nomads immediately around them, whether or not they knew it, had two alternatives. One was to settle down and form states themselves, using the example of their settled neighbors, and so be able to compete on equal terms. The other alternative, sure to be enforced when the population of the valley overflowed the valley, was that the organized community would drive the less socially organized men back before it, or kill or absorb them if they refused to be driven. Settled culture, of one kind or another, has spread until it occupies the land area of the world, with three general exceptions; these are the deserts and the polar regions, where plants grow too poorly to encourage settlement, and the tropical jungles, where they grow too luxuriantly for easy agriculture; and the last of these regions is fast being occupied.

The recent extension of history back into what used to be prehistoric times has made this description of the origin of our civilization something more than a guess. Also, from legends reduced to history while they were still reasonably fresh and reliable, we know that the native civilization of Peru originated in this manner and spread in this way—by the conquest of land occupied by less organized peoples. All over the world, the history of colonization has described the driving out of more nomadic people by people more disposed to settle down, raise crops, and build towns. The cultures of Crete, Phoenicia, and Greece spread around the Mediterranean in this way. Throughout Malaya, the Negritos were driven to the hills, and in most islands exterminated, and at least one wave of invaders was driven after them, each time by a people better trained and more disposed to settle down and make use of fixed locations.

Settled life, wealth, and culture

Aside from the limited and uncertain possessions which nomads may carry or move about, settled existence in one place is essential to the development of property and of the idea of property as a durable and dependable asset.

Property presently grows into wealth, and a limited measure of wealth is prerequisite to leisure; and freedom from the constant struggle for food is necessary, both for the conscious pursuit of knowledge, and for the giving of any education better than isolated man could give his child in the ways of isolated man. When man learned to live from a fixed, limited area of land, he created the condition for the association of men in groups, where they could educate each other and share in the education of the young, and could ultimately specialize for the purpose of education. At the same time, he created the opportunity for the accumulation of wealth. These opportunities supported each other and built each other up. Together, in turn, they were both an incentive and a means to the further development of civilization, in a variety of ways.

Language

The most important of these ways was by the invention of written language. Such communication as underlies the education of every civilized people is impossible and unthinkable without the help of written language. The beginnings of writing, aside from the purely pictorial, took place independently in several parts of the world, shortly after the adoption of settled community life. Our chief use of written language is probably for communication. It might have been invented for this use. It may as well have been devised for the making of records, and have grown directly out of men's new understanding of the nature of property. It remained for a long time a very wonderful accomplishment, restricted to a very small part of the people, who made every use of it, for their own purposes, of which it is susceptible.

While written language is a product, and thereafter an indispensable feature, of civilization, spoken language seems to have reached a structural perfection which has never been improved, prior to the beginning of settled life. The Homeric poems were given the exact form we know, very early in the reliable history of Athens; but their essential composition antedates any Hellenic writing.

When the Hellenic migrations ceased, the language must have been practically as perfect as it ever became. The same seems to be true of the Vedas and the Sanskrit language. Tagalog and Malagasy, spoken in Luzon and Madagascar, at the extremes of the Malayan world, are much alike, and the most perfect of the Malayan languages; their distribution makes it appear that they are the oldest of these tongues. No great modern European language is as perfect structurally as Greek, or Latin, or Gothic; and the newest, English, is the least perfect. Language has of course been enriched by a vast increase in the number of words, as new objects had to have names and new activities had to be described. Its structure has been greatly changed, always in a way to make it easier to use and easier to learn to use.

Decay of spoken language

But things are not sure to be done best when done most easily. There are boys who find even English grammar inconvenient. In its perfect use, language clearly conveys the exact meaning of the speaker. It is very often easier to express an idea approximately than to express it accurately; there are boys who find it easier to be dirty than to be clean. Still, it is better to be clean, even with some effort; and better to be accurate than to be slovenly in the use of language. And the most perfect language, structurally, is the one in which ideas are surest to find exact expression.

This proposition is more fundamental than may at first appear. For the real basis of careless or inaccurate expression is usually carelessness or inaccuracy of thought. What carelessness in grammar really betrays is mental slovenliness. It works both ways: careful thought finds expression in good language; and care in the use of language is conducive to accurate thinking. The structural perfection of the Greek language is entitled to much of the credit for Greek mental achievement. The perfection of spoken language before writing was invented is correlated with the fact, already developed, that the human

intellect was as perfect as it is now, before the evolution of civilization began.

Acceleration of civilization

As settled life, wealth, leisure, education, and written language worked together, improving each other, and producing new blessings; and in the same way that man's slight original intellectual advantage over any other creatures made him compound that advantage generation by generation, until it became incomparably great; so civilization, once under way, had an impetus which gave it inevitable dominance, and guaranteed its own constant, and as far as we can say, unlimited progress. Each year, now, may see more advance of civilization, than a thousand years did ten or fifteen thousand years ago. Civilization is a social function. Selection for survival has for a long time been based on social efficiency more than on individual superiority.

Competition

Until one people settled down and developed a community, nobody else had to do this. This is the case with every important step, in evolution and in civilization. It is unnecessary until it is taken; but, when it is taken, it becomes necessary as far as its influence can be felt. Competition has always been the goad, compelling progress, among men as among other creatures. Remove the goad and progress slows down and ceases. This happens regularly, on a small and on a large scale. A man exceptionally capable in this respect becomes rich. His descendants presumably inherit the ability, but they do not have to exercise it, competing for wealth; and, unless society adopts rules to conserve it in their hands, his grandchildren are not unlikely to be poor.

Stagnation

It is likewise with states and their characteristic cultures. In many places in the world, civilizations have been for some time without competition, and have never gone on advancing under such conditions. The most familiar example is China, which attained something like her present civilization when most of the races of the world were still savage, and thereby gained such an advantage

over her neighbors that they could not compete and stimulate further progress. Shut off during the most of her history from contact with peoples who might have furnished competition, the Chinese have stood still as no other people with anything like a civilization have ever been able to do. China has been overrun at least three times by nomads, but they had no enduring effect on Chinese culture.

India has a less extreme record of the same kind. Japan long ago borrowed the civilization of China. Then she was effectively isolated for a thousand years, and stood practically still. Now, again in contact with the world, she has recognized the necessity of assimilating every advantage which western culture may have to give her, as the alternative of possible extinction in connection with the West. Egypt stood still for full two thousand years, the most of the time above the reach of competition.

II

History of our civilization

In the history of our civilization, the torch has been handed from one people to another, as they came into competition. Beginning in Egypt and Babylonia, it was carried west by the Cretans and then by the Phoenicians. When Babylon was grown old and decadent, when her wealth offered the people of the hills the greatest inducement in the world to come and seize it, and her example showed them how to organize, first Assyria and then Media and Persia succeeded in grasping the opportunity. Assyria contributed to human progress little more than the slight military superiority which made her temporarily powerful.

Persia

Persia entered the arena of world affairs without customs or industries correlated with settled civilization on the plane Babylon had reached. Contact with peoples new to her, at first with peoples from whom the Persians needed to learn almost everything except bad habits, opened their eyes to the possibility of growth. The period

of Persian conquest was one of human awakening. Cities were destroyed, and the world may, for a brief time, have become poorer in material wealth; but it grew rich in effort and in impetus. In their warring, the Persians took but also propagated culture, as Alexander did a little later.

Greece

Entering history at about the same time as the Medes and the Persians, the cities of Greece were growing, and absorbing the remnant of Cretan culture, and borrowing from Phoenicia and Egypt. Civilization developed faster in Greece than it has done anywhere else except by pure borrowing. One reason is that competition was keener and more varied than it has ever been elsewhere. This was not so much between Greek and foreign races or cultures as between the many Greek cities themselves; and even more effective than this, in its results, was the individual competition between citizens. Beside the struggle for wealth and power, familiar everywhere now, the Greeks were remarkable for competition, in various ways, for glory. The great "games," known to us primarily as athletic contests, had other important features. And within the cities, notably in Athens, public prizes were regularly given for oratory, the writing of tragedies, and so on. Public office was open to the citizens in general, had to be earned, and could only be held while it was still earned. The eagerness of Athens for knowledge of the world is well attested by the granting of a special reward to Herodotus, a foreigner, for reading a part of his history in public there.

The conflict with Persia must be credited with bringing out the best spirit and ability which was latent in Greek personality. The effort by which two Greek cities and a village threw back the huge Persian empire would have been altogether superhuman, without the stimulus of death as the clear alternative. And then this spirit was carried into the flowering of Athenian culture. The inflorescence was brilliant for a century, and then gradually

faded. The current burned the wire out. Greece destroyed herself by the fierceness of internal martial competition. But, before she wore out, Athens laid the foundation for all of the later civilization native to Europe, and, in various directions, reached a perfection never since attained. Ours is indeed the age of expanding knowledge. But no modern city or state or nation can compare at all with ancient Athens as the seat of advancing wisdom.

The decay of Greece, largely as the result of competition, was remarkable only in its completeness. Competition is in its nature destructive as well as stimulating. Every old and fatted state in the ancestry of our civilization was destroyed in the course of the same competition which gave the succeeding culture its place. Civilization has truly "advanced on stepping-stones of its dead self." Before modern Japan, no stagnant state in history was ever helped to borrow a more effective culture instead of being overwhelmed by it.

The state

It has already been necessary, repeatedly, to use the word "state," to refer to a definite group, usually of a very great number of families. A later chapter will be devoted to this subject. But, since it is in political entities and by their activities that social organization takes most definite form, we have here to consider in outline the nature of the state, its general functions, and some of the conditions that determine its survival. Intermediate between the family and the state has stood the patriarchy, a union of relatives, larger than the modern or more primitive family, under the head of the common ancestor or a competent elder. Abraham set up a patriarchy. The tribe is a larger and looser organization, the members of which have, at least in theory, a common origin, but which has reached such age and size that the degree of relationship of its constituent families is no longer known.

Leaving the patriarchy and the tribe out of account, we will still use the word "state" with a double meaning, in the sense of the organized population of any country,

of whatever size, and more particularly for their formal and general organization, that is, for their government. Organization of this kind is called political organization, a term derived from the Greek word for city. The use of this word with its present meaning is not so much due to the fact that the first states really were cities as because the Greek cities were independent states; and, like so much of our knowledge, the science of government, as we know it, goes back to Athens.

From the same root, we have the word politician, meaning a man who devotes himself to the affairs of government. Politician and statesman have therefore the same original meaning. Citizen and civics, words of Latin derivation, also recall the times when cities and states were identical.

Where real civilization was developing, the usual course of political evolution has been the establishment of independent existence by cities. In the course of time, these units are invariably superseded by larger ones. This has been a plain case of the survival of what is able to survive. The test has usually been by war, in which the larger unit is most likely to be victorious. The transition took place in various ways: by natural growth, producing homogeneous nations; by coalition, as has been common for mutual defense; or by conquest. The same causes which made states, in the modern sense, replace cities has made the states grow larger. Any one American colony was unsafe, but one state made up of thirteen colonies could endure.

Functions of the state:

1. Defense

It is by no means in armed conflict alone that size is of advantage to the state. Still, since, as we have already learned, "the good of things is that which preserves them," the state's most important function may fairly be deemed to be the prevention of conquest. A government has no basic interests except those of its people, but the fate of the people and their government is usually so intimately tied together that they succeed or fail together. There-

fore governments are really subject to selection, and it is no mere figure of speech, to say that they struggle for existence. The defense of a state is not necessarily by armed resistance; for, even if this is successful, it may involve avoidable suffering, damage, and final weakness. At the beginning of this century, Russia was carrying on a policy in eastern Asia which seemed calculated and certain to lead finally to an attack on Japan; if this was the actual situation, Japan was clearly justified, as a pure means of eventual defense, in precipitating war while she still had a prospect of being successful.

Also, the occasion for defense in arms can often be prevented by the evident power to defend. To be entirely successful in this respect, a state must at all times be so evidently capable of defending itself that it never will be obliged to exercise its ability. Weakness is in itself a temptation to strong neighbors, and if a weak state is wealthy, it is not to be expected that this temptation always will be resisted. Weakness is therefore so likely to be a cause of failure that it is proper to regard it as bad in itself. It never beseemed a people to maintain a state which could not defend them.

2. Self-support

The state, as an organization, maintains itself by the exercise of a group of what may be called its nutritive functions. These include the collection of the money and the enlistment of the services required to run its machinery, the making and enforcement of the necessary laws and regulations, and, eventually, the submission to the people of the evidence that their collective affairs are well managed.

3. Maintenance of peace and justice

Related to the nutritive functions of the state, and essential for the performance of these, are the maintenance of internal peace and the assurance of mutual justice in the dealings among the citizens of the state. In an ideal state, governmental machinery for the maintenance of internal peace would be unnecessary, and the accepted principles of justice would be observed without

governmental mandate or judgment. In actual states, however, men are not all agreed as to what constitutes justice, and not nearly all men are wise enough to deal justly at all times without the threat of punishment by the state if they fail to do so. And the uniform perfection of humanity has not nearly reached the point where any state is without men who require the sanction of the law to compel them to do as the people as a whole agree to be proper. For these reasons every state, beside having laws, must maintain courts of law and a police force. Some states have, and others have not, reached the point where an army, in distinction to a mere police force, is unnecessary for the maintenance of domestic order.

4. Economic development

Another function of the state is its economic development. This has the double purpose of promoting the economic welfare of the individual citizens and of increasing the wealth of the state as a whole, in order that it may better perform its other functions. For the sake of economic development, states maintain offices, bureaus, or departments of agriculture, industry, and commerce. For the same general purpose, they construct and maintain roads, canals, postal, telephone, and telegraph systems, harbors, irrigation systems, and other works and institutions too expensive for individuals to undertake, and intended for the service of the people as a whole, rather than for the use of individuals or minor groups.

5. Social improvement

The state has also the function of developing the efficiency of its citizens. For this purpose, it maintains schools and colleges, hospitals, public parks, museums, and libraries. By these means, it educates its citizens to a measure of efficiency, and qualifies them for a degree of happiness, both of which would be beyond the reach of individuals or families working alone. By the same means, it should constantly train its citizens to appreciate the advantages which they secure through their membership in society in general, and in their particular states in particular. In this way, it strengthens itself more effec-

tively than it can do by the most successful economic development. While social efficiency is the primary object of this activity of the state, it very properly seeks also to improve the individual efficiency of its citizens. However much a state may suffer from the gratification of individual ambitions, it can gain only by the improvement of individual efficiency—so long as the greater importance of social efficiency is duly observed.

Martial success not enough

From this outline of the functions of a state, we see at once that the historical opinion that a state succeeds merely because it wages successful warfare is not a safe judgment today, if it ever was so. Some states, as the empire of Alexander, and the Mongol Khanate of Temujin and his immediate successors, have devoted themselves entirely to aggressive warfare, with only such attention to domestic concerns as was directly requisite to the support of their armies. In both cases the result of exclusive attention to one function—and this never properly a main one—was the prompt collapse of the empire and the eventual disappearance of its people as factors in history. In their best years, the Roman empire and the Moslem caliphate attended to all of the functions as completely as these were then recognized; both of these endured, at least in name, through a great many centuries. However history usually may have been written, no state ought to be regarded as successful merely because it slaughters those who are not its citizens.

Correlations of war and peaceful achievement

While conquest must never be the whole purpose of a state, and is not usually at all a proper function, the fact must be recognized that when people make it the aim of their government, success in conquest is for the time being real success. It usually depends upon the same factors which would accomplish success in other functions of government if the state directed its energies in these better directions. This is exemplified by the rapid internal development of Athens after the Persian war; by the intellectual and economic progress of some of the king-

doms which succeeded the empire of Alexander; by the remarkable progress of the same kinds, following the period of Rome's aggressive warfare; and by the phenomenal flowering of culture immediately after the Moslem expansion. Modern history is full of similar examples. The intellectual activity associated with the Thirty Years' War in Germany, and with the American and French Revolutions, are familiar illustrations.

From this relation between martial achievement and intellectual achievement, it is frequently argued that warfare is itself conducive to progress in other fields. To a limited extent this is probably true. For it is certainly a fact that men or nations rarely, if ever, accomplish all that they might; and in the measure in which war tears men loose from the incubus of dead custom and precedent, releases their activities and inspires them to such exertion as they would not undertake without it, and reveals powers of which they would not otherwise suspect themselves, it unquestionably has an invigorating effect on other kinds of activity. But, lest we have too much respect for this possible good effect of war, it must be noted that much of the argument can be reversed; the same intellectual vigor which Athens and the American colonies and France in their revolutionary days showed in other fields of activity is a very good explanation of the military achievements of these states. Beyond this, the intellectual career of great aggressive military states has usually been a brief one, and for this fact the waste of war is fairly held responsible.

Factors in the success of states: Patriotism

Foremost among the factors responsible for the success of states, there has always and unquestionably been the power of the state to enlist the enthusiastic devotion of its citizens. In conquest, in defense, and in the arts and institutions of peace, this fact stands out through all history. No state which does not command the complete devotion of its people can have any other or compensating advantage which will avail it in competition with states

whose people are thoroughly subject to the social, political call. If its individuals stick to their own affairs, because they are too rich or too proud to fight, or too "good" for politics, the state is just as surely doomed as when they run away from the enemy in battle. This merely repeats the thesis, now familiar: our hope of survival is as members of our society, our state. The only man who can be preserved by his individual power or ability, without the help of society, is a savage.

Minor factors

Factors in success which are secondary in importance, and are likely to be consequences of enthusiastic patriotism, are the thoroughly efficient political organization of the state, and the personal efficiency of its citizens. All of these factors are closely correlated; for illustration, the state which does not provide for the efficiency of its people is to that extent not a good and efficient organization. A possible fourth factor is the number of individuals, the size of the state. The little city of Plataea was destroyed, in spite of glorious service to the general cause of Greece, for no other reason than that it could not defend itself against a bigger neighbor. There are in history a sad number of such cases. However, a very large political unit is unnecessary for the performance of domestic functions. And the small states which were fit to last, in other respects than size, have usually been able to grow and to keep out of trouble while they were growing. What cannot grow is therein unfit to survive.

Form of government

The study of history seems to lead to the conclusion that the particular form of political organization is of minor importance. Conquering peoples have usually been led by monarchs of conspicuous ability; their ability to compel the devoted service of their people was always an important factor in their success. But Roman citizens were devoted to the state, rather than to any leader; such patriotism is less ardent, and Rome grew to great power more slowly than the empires of Cyrus, Alexander, Temujin, and Napoleon. Saracen power, founded on devotion

to an enduring idea instead of to any single leader or even institution, could spread slowly for centuries, and still endures after thirteen centuries.

Dominant peoples, on one scale or another, have had every form of government of which we have any knowledge. Rome grew great as a republic. Carthage rivaled Rome, governed by a group of the richest citizens. Other great states have had absolute monarchs. From the most complete socialism of which we have any history, to the most complete absolutism of one-man power, governments have been able to succeed if sanely managed, always provided that they commanded the proper devotion of their own people.

Motives of the citizen: Protection

The advantages of society to its members have been sketched already, and the particular advantages of political organization need only brief treatment. These advantages may, by good luck, or the previous natural selection of favorable conditions, be obtained by men who never think about or appreciate them; but they are of course more certain to be obtained by men who know what they may expect from the state, and so conduct themselves as to have a right to expect all the blessings it can give. The most general of these is protection. The state protects its members, in their lives and in their property. For the sake of, and in return for, this protection, each citizen must give to the state whatever support it has to have from him. It is the individual need of protection which brings men together for mutual defense.

The desire for wealth is associated with that for the protection of property. Throughout the ages men have joined to make war when wealth was the stake. It was no small part of the incentive of those united in the Arab conquests. Hunger for booty brought the Vandals to the sack of Rome and the Mongols to the pillage of Asia. But the desire for quick wealth or quick power never enlisted for any state the support that could make it endure.

Peace

People support their state for the sake of peace and tranquillity, which is somewhat different from mere protection. This incentive is supposed to appeal especially to decadent races; certainly it is best appreciated by elderly individuals. Some years ago, England was charged with being decadent, and therefore desirous of peace at any cost, but this was disproved. Wealth is a peace-disposing agent; it may sap the energy of men and of nations, making peace and ease their chief desires. As a chief motive of support of the state, the desires for wealth and for peace are both unsafe.

Desire to survive

The desire for protection is only the negative side of the desire to survive. With enduring peace and prosperity, it is only a question of time when any land will become overpopulated. There grow to be more inhabitants than the means of support will feed. Then the people must either cease to increase in number, or else find more land. And no race has ever voluntarily ceased to increase in number. When such an alternative presents itself, the people go forth in search of land, and they get land where and as they can. The power of other people may restrain them, but the rights of other people will not. This is a cold, hard, unappealing proposition; but the succession of races, before and ever since history began, has been determined, essentially, by this fact. When any race refuses to recognize this fact because it is distasteful—as it always is to those who, having what they need for the present, want only to be let alone—it is time for it to make its will and leave everything to charity. The whole Western World was in contact with reality a decade ago, and may well not forget.

Society prevents just this kind of struggle between its own members; by co-operation in it, they struggle more effectively to survive. But social organization which prejudiced, instead of improving, the general prospect of survival would be without the basic reason for the existence of any society at all.

Beliefs

People may support their state because of beliefs, whether or not what they believe is true. If they believe it strongly and unanimously enough, it makes no difference for immediate purposes whether it is true or false. The Christian world holds that its religious beliefs are right, and that the Moslem beliefs are an imposture; but whatever may be the quality of the Moslem beliefs, when Moslems were enthused by them no Christian power was capable of effective resistance. It was only as Moslem enthusiasm died out that the wave of Saracen conquest spent itself. Emotions bind people together more securely than do opinions. A single emotion dominating a whole people can make them collectively efficient, almost without limit; but the wonderful development of Greek intellect produced no common action at all.

Patriotism is an emotion of the kind in question. It is the common love of all of a people for their country. When patriotism lives up to this definition, when all of the people do really share it, strongly enough so that other emotions or ambitions will not interfere with its expression, they and their state are safe. Without patriotism, a nation is doomed.

Ambition

Men desire honor, glory, the praises of their fellows; and the state is the arena whereon they strive for these. The love of glory is emotional. Emotions grow together and thrive together, rather than in the company of ideas. The strife for glory is keenest where patriotism is most potent; where patriotism is dead, there is no glory to strive for.

"Social" benefits

It is because the word social has a particular, as well as a general sense, that the statement that men support society or their state for the sake of the resulting social advantages has a real meaning. Even in the most imperfect society men have always found satisfaction in association and mutual service. The most universal particular social advantage has been in the opportunity for education. Its educational system is one of the most characteristic fea-

tures of every modern state. Its double purpose is the direct promotion of the happiness and welfare of the present citizens, and the insurance of the welfare of the state, by the training in capacity and efficiency of those who will succeed the present citizens.

Education has attained such dominant importance in determining a people's prospect of survival that we are not likely to be mistaken in judging the success of a state by the efficiency of its educational system. From the standpoint of the adult citizens, the service they receive from the state in enabling them to give their children a better prospect of success in life than they possibly could give individually is one of the greatest advantages their citizenship entails.

Happiness

All of the advantages accruing to the individual from his status as a member of society and of the state are phases or conditions of happiness. The consciousness of safety and peace and the confidence that these will last are good grounds for happiness, just as danger and fear are thoroughly uncomfortable feelings. Wealth enough to insure the satisfaction of reasonable wants, and a decent prospect of success for the children, is an almost universal condition of happiness. So far as men work for this measure of wealth, they serve their fellows, at the same time that they insure their own happiness.

The beliefs which have driven men to work and to any kind of sacrifice have invariably promised happiness as the reward. Sometimes this has been an immediate reward; the followers of Temujin expected immediate wealth, and the satisfaction of their daily sensual wants. The men who bore the green banner of Mohammed to India and to Spain were promised happiness now and through eternity so perfect that prose could not picture it. Every worthy emotion is accompanied by a thrill of happiness. The thrill of patriotism is a sort of luxury—it leaves the patriot so pleased with himself. Happiness is the accompaniment of honor and glory, and of every

promising effort to attain these. The happiness a really patriotic people find in the service of their country is so keen, in connection with the mutual appreciation of this service, that the danger of individual death does not deter men from competing for it. And finally, the surer prospect of survival which the state furnishes to its citizens is the soundest of all the foundations of happiness.

III

Leadership

It is a familiar fact that honor, glory, and the respectful admiration of one's fellows are sources of happiness. Man is notoriously ambitious for power; the desire for unnecessary wealth is merely one of the directions given by organized society to this ambition. Men would not be ambitious, nor would power or glory be sources of sane happiness, if, in the history of the race, eminence had not been favorable to survival. In social life, this is not always the case; the conditions under which death loves a shining mark are unfortunately common. The sons of Alexander and the grandsons of Mohammed were killed because of family eminence, as were even the daughters of the last Tsar of Russia. We hear whole races of men condemned for shiftlessness, when the fact is that the accumulation of any property would only place their lives in danger. However, the instinctive desire for eminence is sure proof that in general eminence has been good for its possessor's prospect of survival.

Slavery

There was certainly a distinction of leaders and other people among the groups and tribes of men long before the beginning of settled life. Likewise older than civilization, less universally present than the leaders who were at the top of the primitive social scale, was a slave class at the bottom. In savage warfare, the vanquished, so far as they do not escape by flight, may be killed or enslaved. Slavery was not always an evil, either for the slaves, for whom the original alternative was death, or for the masters. If it had been bad in general for the latter, it could

not have prevailed as extensively and long as it did. It was always subject to abuse, did result, in countless historic instances, in the eventual degeneration of the masters, and, in quite modern times, has been abolished in almost all civilized lands.

Division of labor

The increase in collective efficiency, by division of labor and the consequent specialization for the performance of single kinds of work, is the most universal advantage of social life. Settled community life provided the opportunity for much more complete specialization than nomad life had done; and the progress of civilization has been a succession of steps along the same road. Looking back as far as the light permits into the dawn of our own cultural history, we can see, in the communities along the Euphrates, a considerable number of divisions of the people, each with its own type of service to its community, its particular occupation.

From almost a millenium before the time of Khammurabi, the first great king of Babylon and contemporary with Abraham, there are written records showing the specialization of occupations in the city-states of Lagash and Kish. First in importance, in the regard of men if not in fact, were the rulers and priests. These were clear-cut classes, with grades within them, a sort of king at the top, followed by officials of various rank. In the city there were skilled artisans and common laborers. The distinction between these was already maintained by guilds, which maintained the quality of their members by proper training. Among the artisan groups were already boat-builders, furniture makers, carpenters, curriers, jewelers, potters, workers of metal and of stone. There were even groups of women with other than domestic occupations—weavers, gate-tenders, herders of stock, and hair-dressers are listed. The largest body of the people were the tillers of the soil. There were boatmen, who seem also to have been subject to detail for the care of the irrigation canals. Wealth and trade in its materials had already developed a merchant

class. And all of these were members of the state. Below them were slaves, about which little is reported; one record states that a slave and an ass had the same value. In and about these states, sometimes a part of them, were the tenders and masters of droves and flocks, sometimes settled, sometimes as free as the Bedouins of today.

Although these records are nearly five thousand years old, the conditions they describe are very far from primitive. They show us how quick men were to take advantage of all of the opportunities presented by settled life, and to respond to these opportunities with appropriate customs and institutions. In harmony with other records and observations, in every part of the world, they support the very important conclusion that with the division of labor society has tended to become stratified.

Classes in society

According to our political theories, men are born equal, and the tendency of social theory is in the same direction. Since men are certainly not born equal in capacity, such theories must be construed as meaning that they are entitled to equal opportunity. The social development of many peoples has now reached the point where the practice corresponding to such theory will, in most respects and on the whole, produce the most efficient state. In history, however, this has not been true except on a very small scale, until very recently. The Athenian and Roman democracy and republic rested on an economic foundation of slavery; and in Rome, government and its opportunities were restricted to a minority, the patricians. Even in American history, there are respects, such as the diplomatic service, in which the theory of complete equality has not worked perfectly.

Men always seek to give their own sons the best possible prospect of success; that is the chief aim of the efforts of all men, under the rather easy living conditions of present times, and has always been so, if living was easy enough to spare any energy from the struggle for daily maintenance. Men who had power, and prized it,

naturally wanted to bequeath it to their sons and descendants; this is still true, power being represented now by wealth. In the early stages of society, those in power used their power to insure their children succession to it. The more numerous people without power may not have objected to this, but could not prevent it if they did. Thus there developed in every nascent state a ruling class, or class in power. The explanation of the appearance of each social class, clearly or ill defined, is the same: men whose occupation gave them an advantage over any other group of men have sought so to organize society that the advantage should be hereditary.

The degree of consolidation of stratified social structure has depended upon local conditions. War is favorable to it. The soldiers have to be supported by those providing their food, but their occupation gives them power over the husbandmen and cultivators of their own race, as well as over their enemies, whereby the warriors are likely to manage to make themselves a superior class, living on the workers even in time of peace. Within the soldiery, the leaders always constitute themselves a particularly privileged class, the rulers. Another condition sure to result in stratification is the presence together of a conquered people and their conquerors: if the former are not enslaved, they are at any rate placed definitely at the bottom of the social scale.[1]

These factors worked together in India to produce the system of caste, the most rigid and enduring social stratification the world has seen. Opposite conditions prevailed in China, where a quite homogeneous population gave its character to the culture developed; this character was fixed under conditions of peaceful industry, and the industry itself was very uniform. Rice-growing and weaving are still the foundation of Chinese life, reaching even to the ceremonial duties of the rulers. Chinese culture is

[1] 1 Kings 9:21.

the freest in the world of social stratification. Other civilizations have been intermediate in this respect between the extremes of India and China.

Knowledge as power

For the supreme place in the social scale, those whose place depended upon personal prowess, generalship, or the natural capacity to command a following had always a rival in those whose power depended upon superior knowledge. When these formed an enduring class, it was by restricting education to their own families, forming a hereditary priesthood. Very often, the rulers by might and the rulers by wisdom struggled for supremacy, the man of might having the advantage in time of war, and the man of wisdom in time of peace. On the whole, the status of the priesthood is the more secure, for wisdom outlives valor. David and Solomon named their priests; but after them, it was commoner for the priests to select kings. However tyrannous a priesthood may be, its rule is likely to be more willingly borne than that of any other superior class.

Wealth as power

Wealth can buy the service of other men, and has therefore always been a source of power. A class having power uses it to amass wealth and thus insure its power. But wealth comes to be respected as a source of power, and finally for itself. Inherited authority and knowledge restricted to a class are out of the reach of other classes; but the opportunity to get wealth cannot be so strictly hedged about. As an attribute of superior classes, it has therefore furnished a possible means by which men might rise in the social scale. As some men rise in the scale by becoming rich, and others born high become impoverished and unable to live as beseems their rank, wealth has a tendency to break up the stratification established on other grounds. A stratification based chiefly on wealth may follow, but never becomes so rigidly established.

Breaking down of class

In spite of the human disposition to accept what men are accustomed to as right, and of the care that ruling classes take to educate the whole people to believe that the

classification of society is proper, it is still something that the majority have usually endured only because they could not help themselves. A stratification founded on wealth is the less willingly endured, because its lack of rigidity keeps reminding men that it has no divine sanction. A slave may be content, never thinking that he might be anything else. But the man whose old neighbor has grown rich and powerful feels injured by the new difference in status. The development of human freedom in the modern world has been a gradual outgrowing of the old respect for class, without which respect class can hardly endure. And universal education, made possible by the disappearance of class restrictions, in turn makes the firm stratification of society impossible.

Class ethics

The classification of society is important in ethics, because conduct must be judged with due consideration of the conditions under which it takes place; the conditions have in the past been different, according to the social class of the agent. Power and education carry their responsibilities—*noblesse oblige*. If a subordinate class must be agreeable and pleasing to its superiors or be exposed to their unbridled wrath, it cannot be expected to tell disagreeable truth. The man in the gutter has no sense of ethics. Aristotle kept emphasizing the fact that what conduct was good in a man depended upon his status; that docility was the virtue of slaves, but that courage was a virtue restricted to freemen; in a slave, it is rather a vice.

The theory of the equality of men involves the corollary that the same conduct is seemly on the part of all, and that all are alike responsible for the goodness of their conduct. Perhaps the best thing about this theory is that it deprives all men of the commonest excuse for bad conduct—that they knew no better, or that this was what was to be expected of them. *Noblesse oblige* still; but no man may now deny this obligation as his own, without renouncing equality and claiming inferiority.

CHAPTER VII

DUTY AND HAPPINESS

The preceding chapters, and especially the last one, have described the essential general conditions under which we live—the arena in which our conduct is enacted—and have sketched the general line of evolution of conduct, leading up to and making possible the conduct of civilized man. We are now ready for a somewhat more careful study of the two great general incentives or motives of our conduct, duty and happiness.

Summary

It must now be plain that the individual man, existing on any plane higher than that of the unsocial brute, depends upon society for life, for every phase of opportunity, for everything that makes life worth while; that, in the course of a vast number of generations, man has evolved socially until he is qualified to live in society, and not without society. We value such wealth as we have; the accumulation of this wealth would have been impossible without society, and a large part of the things which constitute this wealth would not do so if society did not give them their value. We value our family and friends, for us the most important part of our society. As we ourselves would not find life endurable or possible without society, so neither would our parents and ancestors have done so. And if life had not been endurable for them, it is clear enough that we could never have begun to exist. Everything that we are, or have, even our hopes, we *owe* absolutely to the social organization of human beings.

Observe now the use of the word "owe"; without italics, it might have been read without notice. Up to this point, we have not discussed obligation, beyond showing that it must accompany intelligence, and that we have some instinctive sense of it, in the conscience. As a matter of morals, we all understand that debts should be paid, and our next task is to establish an ethical foundation for this fact.

Social survival depends upon sense of duty

Let us imagine for a moment that man has no sense of duty, no idea that debts ought to be paid; that for co-operation on one side no return of any kind is to be expected; that, if one man saves another's life, no obligation rests upon the one who has received the service. A creature controlled to the extent that man is by the intellect, able as man is to look ahead to the consequences of his actions, will certainly not co-operate, under the conditions just imagined. But social life is in its essence co-operation. It is not mere living together, and perhaps being in each other's way. It is entirely because our efforts are more effective in co-operation than otherwise that social life has become a condition of our existence. Our lives are almost wholly made up of mutual service, service which, experience tells us, is in general sure to be repaid. Business consists entirely of the exchange of labor and its fruits. In business we appreciate this nature of our activity. But we do many things which are as truly social service, without being conscious of the fact.

To the extent that mutual service is unconscious, a sense of obligation is not necessary for its direct performance. But a part of our unconscious service is habitual or imitative, performed because it pays in our own experience, or in that of those immediately around us, just as truly as though we took constant thought of its profit. On the whole, men think, and plan, and serve one another in the confidence that there will be a return of service. Without our common sense of obligation, we could not have this confidence, mutual service would tend to cease, and society would disintegrate.

If then social organization is indispensable for civilized man, and if the sense of obligation, the acknowledgment of debt, and the recognition of the duty of repayment are indispensable for social organization, it follows clearly and directly that a sense of duty is indispensable for our existence. And, if this sense is indispensable for our existence, it must be just as real, just as natural, and just as right

in every sense, as any of the other conditions necessary for life. The sense of duty is not something that men have imagined, an idea which has been concocted for the particular benefit of any man or class, or merely to make things more agreeable, or to persuade other people to do what we might want of them; it is a sense based in nature, without which we could not live, and without which, on the part of our parents and ancestors, we could never have been born.

Duty demands our entire powers

It is a big debt that has just been sketched as owing to society from the individual, so big that no efforts which any of us may make will be in danger of overpaying it. If society claims from us only what we owe to it, repayment will require all that we can possibly give. Really, the debt is immeasurable and constantly accrues. We contribute to it, as well as pay. And each man's life work, honestly and faithfully done, is at once his payment and his contribution.

Family obligations guaranteed by instinct

Duty to and within the family is relatively easy to comprehend fully, and we have inherited instincts which practically guarantee the repayment of these debts. The debt of children to their parents is repaid, on the one hand, by such service as the children have an opportunity to render to the parents and to their brothers and sisters, and, on the other, by the debt which they establish in the other direction, by rearing children in their turn. The family relation is a very old one, antedating by a very long time the appearance of man. Accordingly, there are instincts moving the parents to bear children and care for them during their years of infancy. These instincts of affection can be strengthened by practice and education; and this improvement of them is especially serviceable, and needed, in the period after the puberty of the children. During this period, while families now hold together, but those of our very remote ancestors did not, particular care should be taken to avoid any disposition to be quarrelsome. In preparation for such a time of tension, as well as for life in

society in general, children should at all times suppress their tempers; in this respect, they can do much more for themselves than their parents can do for them.

Insurance of payment to society

The debt which we owe to society at large and to the state is a far newer one in the evolution of the race, and the payment of this debt is, accordingly, not guaranteed by instinct or sentiments which are nearly so deeply inbred as the love of man for his family. In order to insure the payment of the individual's debt to society, men have had to resort to education, and to making laws, and are still obliged to enforce these laws. It is true that there is a sentiment of liking for one's own race, greater than the general fellow-feeling among men, and that there is a feeling, in part instinctive and in part the result of imitation, education, and habit, of patriotism; but neither of these has the force of family affection; while the debt we owe to society, now represented chiefly by the state, is almost, if not quite, as great as that which we owe to the family. For, if society had not helped our parents and ancestors to live, we should just as certainly not be here as if these individual members of the family had failed.

Means of satisfying obligation to society

As the state is the typical social organization—and it is chiefly upon this formal organization that society depends for the enforcement of its claims against the individual—and as the state tends, by the multiplication of laws, to assume charge of all social functions, we shall cover the subject almost completely in treating the state as representing society, in its relations to the individual and the family.

With life

In the early stages of social and political evolution, life was much less secure than it is now, and the things we cherish because they make life enjoyable were mostly unknown. Under such conditions, the protection of life was practically the whole function of the state, and risk or sacrifice of life was the normal individual contribution to the welfare of the state. The offering of life is still regarded as the most typical demonstration of patriotism,

and is not rarely regarded as itself constituting patriotism. The fact is, however, that the disposition to pay the debt with life if such payment be demanded does not by any means absolve us from the obligation to make payment in such other ways as the state may require. In the present state of society, it is not a frequent occurrence for the life of the citizen to be demanded. But there are demands of the state upon its citizens which must be met every year, every month, and every day; and both patriotism and the general obligation to society require constant minor personal sacrifices, just as insistently as in time of crisis they demand the offering of life itself.

It may be noted in this connection that, regardless of our personal feelings, nature finally claims the life of the last of us in the interest of the racial welfare. It can hardly be doubted that humanity might have been evolved with a very much longer span of individual life, if too much age in the population had not been a disadvantage to the race. Medical and sanitary science is increasing the average term of life, and the prospect of living longer than our ancestors did is very pleasing to us. Decrease of mortality among the young would always be desirable; but it is only when the support of life is rather easy that the race can benefit by dragging out the years of those already old and infirm. In a considerable number of instances, people living under notably hard conditions have recognized this fact and acted on it.

While our individual lives are, and should be, limited in duration, the race lives on, by a succession of generations, somewhat sharply marked in the family, but not at all distinguishable in the state. Every race and state depends upon its families for its perpetuation. The greatest single duty of the citizens is always to raise worthy successors. Worthy successors are more than mere human beings. They must be educated, in school by the state, but at home by the family; and they must educate themselves.

The demand that the race be maintained is most em-

phatically not for the mere sake of "cannon-fodder." The greatest obligation we owe is surely for the privilege of living, and the only possible adequate payment we can make is by passing the debt along to descendants. Our forbears did not devote themselves to providing us a chance to live, only to have death end the line with us, and we are not as good men as they were if our death does end it. If it had been as cannon-fodder that society used our ancestors, we should not be here. It was by effective life that our parents earned the place we have; and it is not for death, but for life, in a series of generations without an end in sight, that we live and serve during our turn.

By taxes

We owe it to the state to contribute to its wealth, both directly and indirectly. In time of crisis, the state needs wealth as much as it does men; and in time of peace, its service to us, as its component parts, requires that the state have direct control of wealth. The measure of wealth which the state controls, in distinction, in part, to that which individuals keep in their own hands, is one of the valid measures of the civilization of a state. An impoverished state cannot maintain what is regarded in these days as a decently high standard of civilization. It cannot construct the roads, harbors, and buildings which are necessary for the activities we regard as indispensable features of civilized life. It cannot maintain the schools and universities which must supplement the efforts of the family in education. As the state tends to assume complete charge of the functions of society in general, encroaching even on those of the family, its cost naturally increases. Without including the extraordinary expense of war, the *per capita* cost of government in the United States has doubled within the lives of people still young. The wealth of the state must practically always come from the citizens, and their disposition to contribute this wealth is an essential expression of patriotism.

By participation in public affairs

In the really modern state, whatever its form of government, it is the business of the individual, so far as his

knowledge and ability qualify him for such service, to participate in the affairs of the state. When the state has educated our parents, and created and maintained such conditions that our families are cultured ones, and when it educates us, we owe it to the state to return this and its other service to us, by using our education, with whatever native intellectual ability and personal force we possess, in the public interest. If we are better educated or more able than our neighbors, we are thereby better qualified to shape the affairs of state; and our ability to serve is the only final valid measure of our duty. No man performs his full duty unless he does the best that he can.

The stimulus of ambition is a natural guaranty that this obligation will not be altogether ignored, but it needs to be strengthened and at the same time regulated by education. There is a common form of miseducation that indisposes the educated man to participate actively in public work, which brings him into contact with his less fortunate brothers. The result is that men who ought to be the most useful citizens often hold themselves aloof from public service. The next result is, of course, that men less fit to do so control the state, and perpetuate or make worse the conditions objected to. None of us is too good for politics. So far as any man is qualified for public service, it is his duty, rather than his privilege, to perform it. If we think men less worthy than ourselves are absorbing public life, we have no duty more manifest than to displace them from the positions we think they ought not to hold. This will involve competition, and should do so; we may not honestly blame others for assuming the obligations that we shirk.

By mutual help

The individual serves society and the state by co-operation with his fellows, by doing what he can to make life more successful and fuller of happiness for those with whom he comes into contact. By aiding and helping our fellow-man, we serve the state as a whole, because we make him a better, more efficient citizen. We rightly ex-

pect the same kind of service from him, and it is our duty to keep creating and paying such debts. This is our general obligation to society, of which patriotism is a particular phase. As social organization makes more effective the efforts of the individual in every minor field, so it does in the paramount, inclusive field of mutual service; and the typical organization for this purpose is the state, the claimant of patriotism. The part, however, can never be as great as the whole, and duty to the state must never overshadow social obligation in general.

Extra-political organization

Beside forming the various groups comprehended under the state, man is prone to organize in other directions. He has become a very social creature, and the family and state do not usually satisfy his desire for social organization. So we have organizations of almost every conceivable kind, secret and public, exclusive and ambitious for size—lodges, clubs, fraternities, circles, centers, unions, leagues, alliances, etc., *ad infinitum*. If we use the word state to include all generally necessary human organization beyond the family, then other organizations may, each in its own way, serve the same purposes and contribute to the efficiency of the state, or perform service which the state ought to but does not perform. In either of these cases, their work is good; otherwise, it is not.

An organization may serve the purposes of the state by direct promotion of any one or more of its proper functions, or by furnishing practice in the forms of state, or in both of these ways. An organization doing such work is entitled, in proper measure, to the allegiance and support of its members, for the same reasons that entitle the state to these. Unless an organization serves the general purposes of society, it ought not to exist; either it does things which ought not to be done, in which case the state may properly abolish it, or it is a mere waste of time and effort. Every organization should have a real and well-defined, however comprehensive, aim. It

should keep this aim in view, and avoid the assumption of independent aims. It will then be easy to decide whether or not it is worth while; and, if it is worth while, to estimate the amount of effort which should be devoted to it.

Sociology underlies ethics

In the work of Aristotle, the Politics is a sequel to the Ethics. Reversing his order, we have prepared for a consideration of the conduct of the individual, by establishing, as a basis, an understanding and appreciation of the social nature and organization of men. Without such an appreciation of the urgent necessity and the naturalness of human organization, any conception of the reality of duty is impossible; because duty depends upon society, in the sense that it must have an object, and this object is society or its members. If we imagine man outside of society, and without dependence upon society or obligation to society, there can be no system of ethics applicable to his condition and to ours. His pursuit of happiness must be by means which would not lead us to the same goal. Goodness of conduct is not at all the same thing for such a man and for us. Since we are dependent for happiness and for existence upon the social state, any understanding of our ethics must rest upon an understanding of the basic facts of sociology and politics.

Ethics depends upon society in another way—the sense of duty has to be educated, and receives its education, formally and informally, from society. In spite of the facts that we have in the instinctive conscience an innate impulse to act as we think we should and that a sentiment in favor of specific right conduct has developed or evolved among all peoples, in a manner presently to be explained in the discussion of ideals, we do not in practice depend so much upon the conscience and the common sentiment, naturally or informally acquired, as upon appropriate formal education, to make voluntary conduct conform to accepted standards. And it is the gravest defect of our public educational system, that it is not devised to perform this function more perfectly.

Nature does not rely upon sense of duty or conscience

Neither does nature depend for results upon any kind of a sense of obligation, instinctive or otherwise. Appreciation of duty is too new in the world to be deeply enough seated in our consciousness. When other impulses longer in our blood seem to conflict with conscience, we are quite certain to follow them and ignore it, unless it is well reinforced by an educated sense of duty. Duty has got deeply enough into our systems so that we find happiness in paying our evident debts, and in general in following its call. But it must be very perfectly educated before the unhappiness we find when we ignore this call becomes keen and certain enough to be by itself a sufficient guaranty that the call of duty will always be obeyed. And—let it be noted well—even then it is the certainty of resulting unhappiness if we err which really keeps us from ignoring the call of duty.

Happiness

This takes us back again to the universal incentive of conscious action, to the aim of effort which the people of the ancient world and the moderns have alike agreed upon as the real goal of human endeavor. Men have agreed that this is happiness. Again, in the preceding chapter, in considering the motives which impel the individual to serve the state, we found that all of these can be comprehended under the general term, happiness.

Happiness may be in anticipation

Whether or not a man will perform a voluntary act depends upon the results he expects from it. The results the expectation of which decides him to do or not do the thing in question lie essentially in his own feelings. If he expects the result to please him, he does it; if he believes that the result would make him unhappy, he abstains. Experience, or thought based on experience, tells him what result may be expected. The result effective in making him act or not act being mental, it can be anticipated mentally; it is its effectiveness in anticipation which really determines his conduct. Intelligent conduct is always based on happiness in anticipation, or prevented by pain in anticipation.

A boy at work and hungry hears the dinner bell. Experience may tell him what it means; or he may have been told by others; or he may have to be ordered in by a verbal call. However it may be the first time, the result makes him happy. The next time he hears it, he goes in voluntarily, eagerly, knowing that the result will be a happy one. But he does not have to wait until he eats to be happy. Going in makes him happy. And the keenest pleasure is in hearing the bell. Intelligent decision is based on the happiness, or relative absence of pain, involved in the decision itself. We often hear a man say that he hates to do the thing he does or decides to do; either he is simply foolish, or else he would hate still worse not to do it. In the latter case, what decides him is relative absence of pain.

People vary greatly in their power to anticipate happiness from objective results a considerable time ahead, and to be guided by this anticipation. Among the lower animals, conscious far-sightedness may be presumed never to be found. Even among enlightened human beings, trained to take advantage of the happiness found in anticipating future good, it requires careful self-control to appreciate sensations remote in the future, happiness to be realized after an indefinite time, and to weigh these properly against the pleasures of the moment or of the immediate future. We cannot help being controlled by our present feelings. But we can make present happiness out of the assurance of future good conditions, and thus let the intelligent preparation of such conditions be the determining principle of our conduct. This is the whole function of intelligence—to know what the future ought to be and how to make it so, and to keep conduct steadily and reliably subject to this end. Beasts wait until they are hungry to exert themselves. Children and savages stuff themselves when food is at hand. Men and women are happiest in providing that the next generation shall be happy.

Pain: the penalty for doing wrong

Nature bred our feelings just as it did our skeletons, making them appropriate to the purposes served. Our actions are controlled by our feelings, in such a way that present or prospective discontent or discomfort will deter us from doing a thing, or, if it is good, from leaving it undone. With the sensations and emotions of discontent and discomfort are associated disgust, anger, hatred, and fear. None of these are pleasant; all can be grouped under the general head of pain. Pain is nature's penalty for doing what we ought not to do. If we are hungry we suffer. We ought not to go hungry, for it is dangerous to our dependent children and unborn descendants. Figuratively speaking, nature is rather indifferent about us, individually, but very careful of the welfare of our descendants. We feel pain if we cut or bruise ourselves, because the abuse of our bodies is bad. If it had been in general good for men to be cut and bruised, our senses would have been evolved in such a manner that the result of such experience would be pleasant. In general, men hate what they ought to hate. They hate what has done them, or, in the light of sufficient race experience, may do them an injury. Cats are in danger from dogs, so they hate and fear dogs. Our ancestors were in danger from snakes, which, therefore, we hate and fear. Fear is exceedingly uncomfortable, and drives us away from danger. It is the form of pain which is nature's typical warning, nature's means of saving the individual, and through him insuring the race.

Good prospects are pleasant

On the other hand, we like comfort and contentment. We are contented under conditions which are good for us, and discontented otherwise. Nature has appropriately endowed us with a sense of contentment when our conditions promise well for success, in our own lives and those of our descendants. We cannot be contented, however comfortably we may be situated, if conditions are such that we may not expect descendants. A man alone on an island, with plenty of good food, all that he can

read, the most beautiful surroundings, and the constant assurance that with him it dies, will not be contented. In this extreme case, instinct is strong enough to make ultimate good appeal more forcibly than immediate comfort.

We take pleasure in every sensation associated with conditions good for ourselves and our race. The satisfaction of hunger is pleasant, because we need strong bodies for the work we have to do, and we have to eat to keep them strong; we do not need to appreciate the food value of what we eat. Hunger is a much safer controller of our conduct than reason would be, in this case. We take pleasure in accomplishment, and in activity, which naturally leads to accomplishment, because accomplishment, reasonably well directed, promises success, and always has done so.

In contrast with hatred, we have the sensation of love, and the associated one of friendship, from both of which we derive constant and dependable happiness. These bind us together for the accomplishment of things which ought to be done, for mutual social service, of the family and of the state. Because friendship and love are indispensable for the welfare of the race, nature has made us certain of happiness in their realization. Finally, in contrast with fear, nature has given us hope. This is the anticipation of things which ought to be, or which we believe ought to be. We hope to become wise and wealthy, and the heads of families. We hope that our friends will succeed, and that our state will grow and remain great and strong. And in the hope itself, whether or not it will ever be realized, we find constant pleasure.

Components of happiness

All of these sensations—contentment, comfort, pleasure, friendship, love, and hope—are constituents of happiness. And nature has put her seal of approval in the form of happiness upon them because the conditions which produce these sensations are those which have been favorable to the survival of the race, and only for this reason. Happiness is the general name for nature's endorsement of the

propriety of conduct. It is the natural result and accompaniment of good conduct, and is therefore a natural and entirely proper goal of effort. We can and do achieve it by doing those things upon which nature has placed the seal of her approval by making the components of happiness their results. The conduct which nature has endorsed through countless generations surely comprehends the things we ought to do, *under the same conditions.* Therefore, we are justified, on the basis of sound logic, as we were morally but not ethically justified by the statements of prophets and philosophers, in accepting happiness as a goal of effort, and in exerting ourselves constantly, and with all the energy and intelligence we can command, to achieve it.

Happiness and duty

We inherit the capacity for pleasure, love, and most of the other components of happiness already enumerated, from a time antedating social life except on a family scale. In this respect, that we live in society, our conditions of life differ from those under which these components of happiness were established as such. In specific accommodation to social life, there has developed one new standard of the propriety of conduct—its conformity to the dictates of the sense of duty. Conduct good according to this standard is not denied the reward nature gives to all good conduct. We have no name for the particular phase of happiness associated with the performance of duty; sometimes this alone is distinguished as real happiness, and pleasure is used as a comprehensive term for all of what we have been calling components of happiness.

Regardless of the choice of words, the same logic which was used to demonstrate the propriety of the pursuit of happiness proves with the same force that the sane happiness of the wise man living in society is to be sought and found in the full performance of duty.

CHAPTER VIII

IDEALS

We have sufficiently established two bases for the judgment of conduct, as good or bad, or as wise or foolish. First, and universally, it is good and wise if it is conducive to survival. Secondly, and in general, it is proper if it is conducive to happiness, because happiness is naturally associated with conduct conducive to survival.

In practice, however, we never give thought to the first of these tests in deciding what we will do, or in judging conduct, our own or that of other people. Most of our actions are too trivial to have any evident relation to the prospect of survival; they may well have such a relation, but it is too remote to be seen. And the amount of thought that would be required in judging conduct by this standard would demand more time for one act than we devote to doing many useful acts.

It is like measuring land, or wood, or cloth. The most widely used ultimate standard for such measurements is the equatorial circumference of the earth, but nobody ever tries to measure directly by this standard. One forty-millionth of this distance is called a *meter,* and actual measurements are made with rules or scales, marked off in divisions of this unit, which is about 39.37 inches in English units. So in the judgment of conduct, whether performed or contemplated, we do not consciously test it by its contribution to the prospect of survival; but, instead of this, we appraise it by a variety of standards, such as honor, cleanness, courageousness, temperateness, and conformity to custom. Our business in this chapter is to test these standards in everyday use, by seeing what relation they bear to the survival test; just as the meter is tested by its relation to the circumference of the earth, and one official meter unit, stored in Paris for many years, was replaced by another when found not exactly correct.

Happiness not a satisfactory standard

The effect of conduct in causing happiness is in use as a standard, especially in deciding what shall be done; but experience shows that it is very unsatisfactory. The men whose chief conscious motive in conduct is to be happy rarely succeed. The direct explanation is usually that they aim at their personal, individual happiness, without proper consideration of the welfare of society, and discover too late that man cannot be happy unless those about him are so. Instinctive conduct, promising happiness instinctively, is mostly an inheritance from days before we became dependent upon society and is very likely to miss its mark under present conditions. Selfishness has been growing more unprofitable and disastrous for many thousand years, but selfish instincts, promising personal happiness, still lead us astray. For as long a time as men have records of their experience, they have been agreed that happiness is much surer to result from conformity to accepted social standards of conduct than from its direct and conscious pursuit.

These standards are our ideals. In their study, we shall take up, first, their origin; second, their development or evolution; and, third, the approximation of conduct to ideals.

Supposed intuitive ideals

It is commonly believed that men naturally strive toward excellence or perfection. Based on this, there is the further quite common belief that the instinctive striving toward excellence is dependent upon "instinctive knowledge" or understanding of what constitutes excellence. Since a knowledge of what constitutes excellence would be knowledge of what are proper ideals, it is accordingly believed by many people that men come into the world in possession of an understanding of ideals, of what is right and what is wrong, of what conduct is good and what is bad. Supposed knowledge of this kind, that is, knowledge possessed without its acquisition by experience, instruction, or reflection, is called intuitive. Very many people believe that they have intuitive ideals.

If men were indeed born with an understanding that a certain list of things or acts are right, and a certain other list wrong, then it would be fair to expect them to be bound by this understanding. If men in general had this intuitive understanding, it would be reasonable to expect them to be bound in common by it, and a system of ethics could be built on this foundation; this has been attempted more than once. But the fact is that nobody, even one who believes that he has intuitive ideals, believes that all men have at birth an equal endowment of this kind. And nobody can become well acquainted with many very diverse groups among the people of the earth, and learn what these different peoples, in large goups and small groups, ranging from savage people to the most enlightened, believe to be proper conduct, and fail to recognize the fact that mankind as a whole is really not born with any considerable amount of common knowledge or understanding of this or any other kind.

There is no good evidence that men are born with any knowledge or understanding at all. Instinct serves some of the ideals, as is only natural, in view of the fact that instinct and reason often move us to do the same thing. But our understanding of them is entirely the result of education. It is for this reason that men similarly educated can fairly be held responsible for conduct conforming to the same ethical principles. If we were dependent upon intuition for our ideas of right and wrong, and men claimed conflicting intuitions, as they actually do differ in opinions on these subjects, the harmony necessary for successful social life would be impossible. Men can be made to *know* alike, but attempts to make them believe alike have made much mischief and grief.

Service of ideals by instinct

The belief that man instinctively strives to excel is correct. We witness this effort constantly in the instinctive play of kittens, puppies, and children. It is by excelling that some creatures survive, while the greater number which do not so succeed cease to exist. Effort certainly

makes any creature more likely to excel. It would therefore be very strange if there were not a general instinct of this kind. And this instinct continues to serve and animate us in the pursuit of intellectual ideals. It is the foundation of ambition. Like other instincts still present in grown men, it is well to keep this one under the control of the reason. This is not meant to condemn it; in some men it needs to be developed, and in others held in check.

Emulation

There is another reason for the effort of men to excel. In the discussion of feelings, we have found that men enjoy the approval of those about them. For this general reason, and more specifically because the reputation of possessing good qualities would always be an advantage in securing a mate, there is no question that men have always wanted good reputations; and the only reliable way to get such reputations is to earn them.

As men who exerted themselves to be excellent were obviously in all times more likely to attain or approach excellence than were those who made no such effort, and as excellence always involved the prospect of survival, so those who tried to conform to ideals, whether instinctively or intelligently, have always had, by virtue of the attempt, an advantage over those who neglected such exertion. In the course of enough time—and there has been a great deal—this advantage on the part of those striving for excellence would make them the fathers of the people of the world. For this reason, the effort to excel, the struggle toward perfection, tended always to become universal among men. Even today, just as in all past human time, those who may neglect to participate in such a struggle handicap themselves and lessen the probability that they will ever be fortunate enough to have descendants. So ideals, or standards of excellence, and the struggle to attain them, had to be and are practically universal.

Origin of particular ideals

The foregoing explanation accounts for the origin of ideals in general, and for the tendency of conduct to conform to them. Any recognized feature of excellence is a

particular ideal. The ideals particularly served by instincts are naturally the oldest, antedating social life. The most of our ideals are correlated with social life, and are not specifically served by instincts, nor at all associated with instinct in their origin. They are expressions of custom, as a rule. A comparatively few of the newest ideals originated in religious teaching.

Non-social ideals:

Strength, health, beauty, cunning

Before the organization of human society, bodily strength was certainly advantageous to its possessor, both for the preservation of his own life and that of his children, and as an attraction in securing a wife. Because of these advantages, strength was naturally one of the first ideals. Health is conducive to strength, as well as to long life and personal attractiveness, and was of course another early ideal. Strength and health are not always recognized as ethical ideals, but they are clearly entitled to an important place in the list. Beside involving the danger of death, poor health is a poor foundation for mental efficiency. Personal beauty, in both men and women, is also a primitive ideal. Beside its value as an attraction in mating, it is associated with good health and with agreeable personality. Strength in men and beauty in women may lead to conceit, and thus become injurious in social life; in non-social life, this was hardly a danger.

As the intellect became the chief factor in selection long before the beginning of social life, mental ability was naturally a prominent early ideal. Without the restraints society places on its expression, it was likely to show itself in the form of trickery and what we call low cunning. A good brain is the finest human character, and the best asset any man can have. It can be used to recognize, appraise, and guide and drive the struggle to attain any of the ideals. Intellectual improvement is possible by proper exercise just as certainly as bodily strength. If the personal intellect is less important in determining survival than it once was, because society now saves some incompetent individuals, the proper training of the brain for life in society

will still confer an advantage as certain as was the advantage of the keenest thinker in the days prior to social life. No ideal has kept its place more securely than this one, as a real factor in survival, though there have been a series of changes in the use of the intellect most conducive to survival. Its best use now is in the service of society.

The Greeks have left us a very perfect record of their respect for these primitive ideals. The *Iliad* is a book about heroes, endowed with the attributes most esteemed by a frank race, just settling down to form towns after a prehistoric wandering life. Achilles is the man of might. He is insubordinate, sulky, irritable, revengeful, subject to "god-like wrath," without any social virtue except the narrow one of affection for his chum; but he is a man of might, and therefore the outstanding hero. Odysseus, the hero of the *Odyssey,* and no minor hero in the *Iliad,* is the man of brains. He must be a fighter too, to be a hero, but as an ideal he represents brains. To exhibit this character, he has to be better than Achilles; he is not insubordinate, but holds the army together, even when it has been getting away from the commander. But his wisdom is wariness, trickery, and skilful deceit. Beauty has no hero, though the fine panoply of Achilles is fully described; it is left for the heroine, Helen. She leaves her husband to run away with a stranger, and brings no end of mischief to her own people, as well as to their enemies; but she is the most beautiful woman in the world and that suffices for the heroine. There is also one man in the *Iliad* who has no good in him; he is not even respectful to heroes; and he is specifically described as the ugliest-looking man in the whole army—peak-headed, straggly-haired, hump-backed, stoop-shouldered, the antithesis of the ideal of beauty, as befitted the knave.

Industry

There is one ideal of pre-social origin which has hardly lost in esteem in comparison with the social ideals—industry. In the very beginning of human life, man must have had to keep busy to protect himself and find subsistence

for himself and his family. Whatever advantage in brain and hands he had over non-human competitors was likely to be compensated by the greater care demanded by his family, because of the long period of infancy and youth. If he had advantage to spare, so that children could be raised with greater certainty, it was only a question of number of generations, when the number of men made it again hard to find food, and required all the industry men could exert. As only the industrious were likely to survive, industry tended to become universal; and it is presumably the oldest human custom, aside from living in families. Being so old and universal and advantageous, it is well served by instinct; it takes some education to make a man enjoy idleness except for rest.

The survival of this pre-social ideal, undiminished in respect, is easily understood from the fact that it continues good for the individual and also good for society. The products of industry are good for the individual and for society. Industry is particularly good, among the ideals, because it is the one ideal we are constantly called upon to observe. The opportunity for the observance of other ideals comes naturally in the course of the observance of this one.

The ideals are a cohesive system, likely to be together, whether in their observance or in their neglect; that is, a man good in one respect is more likely to be good in others than is a man bad in the one. An honest man is usually truthful, just, etc.; a dishonest man is likely also to be untruthful, uncharitable, unjust, etc. This brings us to a second reason for the constant observance of the ideal of industry, the first being that it is needed to prevent the danger of want. This second reason, following from the first, is that when one fails in industry, other bad conduct is likely to result. Sayings in every language express this idea. Satan always finds something for idle hands to do.

Virtue

Conduct in accord with the ideals is virtuous. Conduct in accord with any particular ideal is virtuous in that

respect. Thus, there is a virtue corresponding to each ideal. The ideal is the standard, conformity to which in practice is the virtue. Strength is an ideal; making one's self strong and strengthening one's state are virtuous conduct.

Thrift

Since it is originally for the sake of its products that industry is good, the care and conservation of these products, so far as they do not have to be used up at once, must also be good. The primitive forager who saved what he could from one day's lucky haul, and so had a store to support his family when luck failed, might well save their lives by his thrift. The thrifty man was a better prospective husband, and the thrifty girl a better prospective wife, than the thriftless ones. A reputation for thrift, as well as the fact of thriftiness, therefore improved one's prospect of survival, and thrift had to become an ideal.

After man became social, thrift continued to be good for both the individual and for his society, for the same reasons that industry so remained, so that it has had a chance to keep its status as an important ideal. How completely it keeps this status depends upon conditions. When and where the population is dense in proportion to the means of subsistence, industry and thrift are very highly esteemed ideals. If society becomes wealthy, so that these virtues are not urgently required to make life safe, men lose respect for them. They usually retain the ideals, but cease to conform to them in their conduct. To illustrate these conditions—strenuous living and easy living—and their results, we have only to compare our way of living with that of our grandparents, or of the Chinese.

In a society stratified by the unequal division of wealth, industry and thrift are more necessary for the poor, and their practice is likely to become a characteristic of the poorer classes. If the more prosperous class, to emphasize the class distinction, discard these as ideals of their own class, they handicap themselves to an extent that is quite

sure, finally, to prove fatal. The workers constantly inherit the earth.

Activity

Instinctive activity has already been discussed. It is important as a contributor to health and strength, and has some value independent of these. As an ideal of grown men and women, it becomes merged in industry. However, if conditions permit industry to lose respect, the bad results of this loss can be postponed by the observance of an independent ideal of activity. Likewise, if industry in specialized social life exercises only a part of a man's functions, activity, as recreation, can prevent deterioration in others. It is wise for men who work at desks to play golf and go hunting. It would be equally good conduct for men whose industry is in muscular exercise to find recreation in mental wrestling; but education has not made the most of these men wise enough to prefer thought to merriment. In young people, before industry makes its demands fully felt, activity is a temporarily important ideal.

Cleanness

Because of its relation to health and beauty, cleanness is an important primitive ideal. In social life, this importance is very materially increased. An example from the lower world will show why this is so. At the end of the last century there was no known serious disease of coconuts. With much more extensive planting, damage by diseases has become great. Similarly among men, congested social life and free communication produce perfect condition for the spread of disease. A large part of the communicable diseases of men depend for their spread upon the uncleanness of men, in person or in habits. So, as men become more social, cleanness becomes more essential for their survival.

Bravery

Bravery is related to strength. Without strength, too much bravery is likely to be fatal; but with strength, cowardice would take away its advantages. As far back as we can trace human ideals, bravery was one of them. The scientist who deliberately risks his life investigating

the curative properties of radium or in finding out how to prevent yellow fever is surely as brave as the Spartan at Thermopylae or the Roman at the bridge, and serves society at least as effectively. On the whole, however, bravery is a less important ideal than it once was. Bravery is likely to show itself in aggression, which is not commonly wanted in society and is repressed by society when it would succeed without society. And when self-sacrifice is really demanded by society, a highly developed sense of duty, or zeal of another kind, may make a satisfactory substitute for bravery.

Non-social ideals: Summary

It has been shown for the ideals so far discussed, in general, and, as completely as seems necessary, in particular, that they are standards of conduct, conformity to which was favorable to survival while the family was still the largest social group of men. Because of their long period of value, they are more or less served by instincts. Some of them, as industry and cleanness, have retained their importance in social life. Some, as mental ability, have been modified. And some, as bodily strength and bravery, have lost much of their importance. Some have probably disappeared; ferocity, combined with strength and some sagacity, may be good for its possessor in the absence of social restraints. The ideals which have lost in importance survive as the ideals of young people, rather than of their elders.

Customs

What men do in common is their custom. It has already been made clear that primitive man had to be industrious, in order to live, and that the benefits of industry made the best workers the parents of the population of the world. Thus, because it was good conduct and, as such, preserved those who practiced it, industry became customary. The origin of every general or enduring custom can be explained similarly. It is inconceivable that a practice should become and remain customary for any other reason than that it preserves those who practice it.

It is not necessary for the evolution of a custom that

its benefits be appreciated. Solomon's model of industry, the ant, probably has no idea why it does or should keep doing something. The custom of industry among men, too, may well be older than any idea of the general advantages of it. It seems to be true of customs in general that they are established in practice before most of those who follow them give thought to the reasons for doing so. As the practice becomes established, conformity to it is recognized as good, and an ideal, with which the conduct of the individual is expected to conform, is likewise established.

Social ideals

When men became social, they had to behave in such ways that they could live together in harmony and effectively. New customs had to be developed, and new ideals, as patterns for compliance with the customs. And from that time to ours, the most important feature of history, if we could have it so written, has been the gradual improvement in our adaptation to social life. It is not necessary, nor worth while to attempt, to list all even of our own customs, and of the corresponding ideals. The explanation of their goodness—that conformity with them improved the prospect of survival—is the same for all. It will therefore suffice here to mention a few of the most familiar.

Truth

If each family lived for and by itself, at enmity with other families in general, and hoping to survive in competition instead of co-operation with others, there would be no merit in truthfulness. It is because social efficiency depends upon co-operation and co-operation cannot be effective unless the participants can believe one another, that truthfulness became necessary with social life; and, being necessary, became customary, so that veracity became an ideal. Its essential element is dependability. When Germany treated one of her treaties as a scrap of paper, the effect was to treat every other nation in the world as an enemy. It is the same in public and in private. The untruthful individual is an enemy of society; it is weaker,

and all of its members suffer thereby, when any one of them cannot be depended upon, and without veracity there can be no safe dependence.

Honesty, justice

Other phases of dependability are represented by the ideals of honesty and justice. Honesty is shown by dependability in complying with obligations, without trickery or evasion. Justice is the ideal of complete compensation, according to which each member of society gives to society and the other members all that he should and receives all that he is entitled to. A chief function of the organization of society, as the state, at peace, has usually been the insurance of mutual justice. The utility of these ideals in social life is obvious; for, without the expectation of justice, men will not voluntarily become or remain members of a state. The basic function of law is to guarantee this expectation.

Helpfulness

Mutual help is the general foundation of society. The ideal of community service, or at least of the avoidance of mutual injury, is insisted upon in primitive society more rigorously, and with more immediate necessity, than it is where civilization has brought safety in its wake. Twenty-five years ago, when the members of a Bagobo community were summoned to clear a new field for one of the members, or to erect the framework of a house, they came, all and cheerfully; and it excited the whole community when one Igorot threw a rock into another man's rice paddy. A decade of exposure to civilization taught them to look to the power of the state for justice, instead of following their native ideal of co-operation. It is a compliment to our politics, but not to our ethics, that our state is expected to force such conduct as men of primitive culture exhibit voluntarily.

Conformity

Since a custom cannot become prevalent and endure except because it is good, compliance with custom is presumably good, whether or not the reasons for its goodness are understood. The instinct of imitation tends to insure uniformity. Also, people dislike peculiar behavior by

their neighbors, and the common disposition to please helps to keep society uniform. Thus there naturally develops an ideal of conformity, which, when the element of time is considered, takes the form of an ideal of conservatism. In unity there is certainly strength; and no ideal except that of mutual helpfulness contributes more to the strength and durability of society than does the ideal of conformity or conservatism. Here again, political strength may be expected to force conformity, and trust to this method may result in a weakening of moral and ethical ideals.[1]

A more complete enumeration and discussion of the social ideals related to customs is unnecessary, because the same ground will be covered again in the discussion of proper conduct, when the same principles are studied in their application as virtues.

Moral codes

As time passed in social life, as the knowledge of men became more ample and their wisdom more complex, and wealth provided leisure for reflection, they became specifically conscious of their virtues and ideals, and the number of these grew until uniform conformity became impossible without their definition and codification. To meet this need, codes were provided. These were most implicitly accepted and securely retained if embodied in religion. We are acquainted with a number of such codes of very early origin, but are most familiar with the Jewish, as given at length in the Pentateuch and epitomized in the Ten Commandments.

Ethical codes

For a reason explained in the first chapter, the conduct enjoined by these moral codes, and the ideals the conduct is patterned after, are substantially the same as the conduct and ideals men arrive at when they study the reasons

[1] It will be shown presently that temperance is a supreme ideal guarding us against such conservatism as would unfit us to hold our place in a changing world. At this point, the fact intentionally emphasized is that deviation from custom by the individual is bad conduct incomparably oftener than it is good.

for the goodness of conduct. In the development of our civilization, the first people to attempt to define and explain the principles of conduct were the Greeks. At practically the same time, in the generation before Socrates, Confucius in China and Gautama (Buddha) in India gave very full directions for proper conduct, which were extensively accepted without the claim of divine authority.

Confucius

Confucius placed particular emphasis on the goodness of custom, insisting that the same conduct which had preserved the ancestors and already made the Chinese a great people would continue to preserve them in posterity. He described the ancestral customs in detail, and the study of his writings has ever since remained the most essential part of Chinese education. How well this extreme conservatism works, when based on the solid foundation of rice culture, is attested by the high place China has held throughout history, and the number of the Chinese people.

Socrates

The business of a Greek philosopher, so far as it concerned the conduct of men, was to draw up and justify his own code of ideals. Many Greek philosophers did this, and several have exerted an enduring influence. In the impulse which he gave to human thought, the greatest of them was Socrates. He never wrote, but spent his life talking and debating on ethical problems, forcing his friends and his adversaries to think logically on such subjects. Under his inspiration there arose in Athens four schools of ethical teaching, all of which have had an enduring influence.

Aristotle

The most important of these, and the one which we suppose to have followed the teachings of Socrates most closely, undertook to test all ideals by the standard of pure reason, and held that happiness was most certainly to be attained by the efficient exercise of the reason. Plato, who made the most ample written record of the arguments of Socrates, established a school, in which Aristotle was a pupil. Aristotle has influenced human thought more than any other one man in history. He defined happiness as the

object of conduct, agreed with Socrates that the same conduct must be wise and be good, and, in his treatise on politics, treated it as an axiom that the good qualities of anything must be those which preserve it.

Greek ideals not general

Greek civilization was supported by an economic foundation of slavery. Our word barbarian is the Greek word meaning anybody not a Greek. The Greek philosophers studied their own conditions, primarily, and wrote for civilized freemen. The ideals they set up were those proper for "gentlemen," and were not intended to be those of men in general. It was only such fundamental virtues as truthfulness which they recognized as to be expected of all human beings. Courage was a virtue peculiar to freemen, but, as already stated, rather a vice in a slave.

Ideals of universal religions

There are in the world three wide-spread religions, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, among the adherents of each of which there have developed schools of ethics. It has been noted that Gautama, or the Buddha, did not claim divine sanction for his teaching; but in its spread this has become mixed in most places with a large amount of belief in the supernatural. The most general characteristic of Buddhist ethics is the search for happiness in freedom from want. It does not make a man unhappy to be without what he does not want. This was the teaching, too, of the "Stoic" Greek school.

All of these religions, in their purest forms, differ from the Greek philosophy in that they present ideals which admit of universal application. Any man can be admitted to any of these three, and, at least in theory, admitted on a plane of equality. All of them teach that conduct proper on the part of one adherent is proper for another. They all teach the brotherhood of man, or at least the brotherhood of their own adherents. An ideal held by very many men is more likely to survive than is one held by but few. And since, according to our own belief, all men are entitled to equal opportunity to use such ability as they may have, whether or not they are really equal in every respect,

an ethical system which recognizes the brotherhood of man on the widest scale must make the widest appeal, and will generally be regarded as the best.

To the extent to which the Jewish code of morals and the Greek philosophical and ethical systems denied the brotherhood of man, and cultivated ideals incompatible with the granting of equal opportunity to all men, they have been largely outgrown. The ethical standards of today must be such as men in general can subscribe to. The wisest of the Greeks would have given one code to the professor and another to the farmer, one to the man who sits before the fire and another to the hod-carrier. And the Jewish laws were for the Jew and not for the Gentile. The laws of Islam are likewise for the Moslem and not for the unbeliever; but the case is essentially distinct, in that all men are invited by Islam to come within the fold and enjoy its privileges.

Love

Besides faith, the prevalence of these great religions has brought a new element prominently to the fore as a factor in morality, that of love. Mutual good will within the particular social unit is a general condition of successful social life; but no such feeling on a very wide scale could have a place in an ethical system designed for any single community or nation or class. The acceptance of altruism or love as a dominant ideal is exceedingly important in fitting men for social life on the widest scale, and is therefore a great improvement in ethical thought.

Purity and humility

Among the other characteristics of the ethical teaching of Jesus are purity and humility. Neither of these is distinctive of Christianity, as compared with the best Greek ethics, and neither is as fundamental in Christianity as is brotherly love. Accordingly, neither is as constantly observed. Humility was a very appropriate ideal for Christians, when almost all of them were poor people, without power or standing, in whom the expression of too little humility would have been dangerous. When Christianity became strong, and Christian organizations could

enforce their will upon others, humility ceased to be a conspicuous guide to their conduct. There was no humility about the Spanish conquest of America or the Philippines, done though it was in the name of the church.

Christian morality is valid ethics

The general agreement of religious teaching and scientific ethics has already been pointed out. It may be noted now that the distinctly moral teaching of Jesus agrees in detail, as well as in general, with such ethics. Of all his ideals, the one least observed by his professed followers is that of submissiveness, and returning good for evil. Yet, there is no question, harmony being essential to the strength of all society, that the general observance of this ideal would strengthen any society. Patience will always outlive impatience. Personal resentment is an altogether unsocial feeling. But aside from argument, we have ample direct evidence that this ideal works well. Of all people, the Chinese are the most ready to submit to abuse, and have outlived all of their oppressors. No people in history has ever occupied a prominent place for as much as a thousand years, without having to put this ideal into practice as a virtue.

Evolution of ideals

There have been constant changes in ideals, and substitutions of one ideal for another, as conditions have changed, or as men's ideas of what was good for them have become different or more perfect. This evolution of ideals is inevitable, and is a very important feature of human progress. We have already seen that habits are subject to evolution; that good habits—good because they are beneficial, because they provide the prospect of surviving—survive and become widespread, while bad habits die out and are forgotten. The observance of ideals, of standards of conduct held by large numbers of men, involves all who share in the respect for these ideals in habits and customs of the same kind. Just as the habits and customs are subject to selection, so, obviously, are the ideals also.

A bad or wrong ideal is clearly one the observance of

which will lead people to improper conduct. Improper conduct is such as lessens the prospect of survival, and in time it always gives way to proper conduct. As those whose conduct is improper pay the penalty of death, there is an end to their conduct; and as those guided by improper ideals perish, the ideals cease to have followers and vanish also. In the case of bad habits, men have a limited power to give them up and thus escape their consequences; a bad habit can be escaped more easily than an instinct which has ceased to be good. In the case of ideals, men are still more free; when men recognize an old ideal as no longer good, they thereby abandon it, which is by no means true of a bad habit. Whether or not it be thus voluntarily or rationally relinquished, a bad ideal is bound to go the way of bad things, to oblivion.

Disappearance of ideals

Achilles had ceased to represent a general Greek ideal before the days of Grecian greatness; and the cunning of Odysseus by no means represented the ideal of later Greek thought, however completely the intellect did retain the foremost place in Greek ideal life. In our own recent culture, the ideal of conformity to custom has been relegated to a minor place, and its place has been taken by ideals of enterprise and progressiveness.

Interaction of customs and ideals

It has been shown that ideals normally grow out of customs, and survive or disappear as the customs with which they are associated remain good, or, with changed conditions, cease to be so. This origin is indicated by the words "ethics" and "morals," derived respectively, from the Greek and Latin words meaning customs. Similarly, the German word *Sitte* means custom, but *unsittlich* has the force of immoral, reflecting the ideal of conformity. And the Englishman condemns an act, essentially in its moral aspect, when he says "it is not done."

But conversely, ideals influence and modify customs, and this is the reason for their importance. Everywhere and always, there is a tendency for the conduct of the people to approach the ideals they recognize. This follows

both from the recognition of an ideal of conformity, and from the natural effort of mankind to be excellent—excellence, for the individual, being represented by his ideals. Aside from individual success in this effort, there is a mass movement of the people toward conformity with their ideals, which results from the operation of natural selection in the same way that all substantial progress is effected.

Improvement of custom by selection

A few examples will make perfectly clear this progressive evolution of improved custom. Suppose that in a land which holds the ideals current here, a man, either because he does not subscribe to the current ideals or because he is too easily tempted away from the effort to conform to them, has the habit of fighting with his neighbors instead of living at peace with them. In several different ways, such conduct is almost certain to be detrimental to the man who practices it. If the disposition to strife is acute, it will result in fighting and in the course of time fighting usually results in the fighter's being killed. If he is killed, the fighting disposition dies with him, and he leaves no descendants to inherit his badness. This is an extreme case. Suppose that he is a thief. Society will eventually put him in a place where he has no opportunity to have descendants who might inherit the thievish disposition.

In either of these cases, if the man be fortunate enough to escape personal reprisal and the gallows and the jail, the bad disposition and habit will be disapproved by his neighbors, and the effect of this disapproval is of course a measure of difficulty in securing a mate; that is, the unpopular man has not by any means an equal prospect with the popular man of ever raising a family. Short of being a murderer or a robber, we can imagine the case of a sneak, or a liar, or a man with a sour and disagreeable disposition. All of these anti-social attributes operate in the same way, to hinder the prospect of having descendants who might inherit them. So, any personal characteristic which is contrary to or in conflict witth the ideals

held by a community or people, or with their customs, places the individual at a relative disadvantage. In the course of generations, there must, therefore, be continual progress toward the realization of the ideals, by the natural weeding out of those whose personal ideals, dispositions, or habits are least in conformity with them.

Humanity constantly improves

Without stopping for an illustration of the positive selective value of approved conduct, or for further argument, it must be clear that among all people, whatever ideals they hold, there will be a gradual approach, from generation to generation, to these ideals. This conclusion can be amplified into a very broad and significant one; for among all peoples the ideals represent the conception of excellence, of the best. Each man's real personal ideals are the best he personally can imagine, and the common ideals of the people represent their collective conception of perfection. Since among all peoples there is a constant and inevitable tendency toward something better than the current practice, something which represents the current idea of perfection, humanity as a whole must constantly be getting better. As a general proposition, overlooking the eddies in the stream, each generation must find the world a better place to live in than the preceding generation did.

Progress is unlimited

This progress toward perfection has no limit. For the ideal itself is like a will-o'-the-wisp, which one can follow, can constantly move toward, but which as constantly keeps out of reach. It always keeps its distance ahead. Since ideals are themselves subject to evolution, as an ideal is approached by practice, it is either discarded for a better one, or else it moves forward. It is always in the power of man to conceive something better than the reality, to imagine a better state than the current one. As the current one improves, the imagination also goes forward, and the ideals become better; the practice of one age may be very much better than the ideals themselves were in some other age long before. There is no apparent limit

to this progress, and no reason for supposing that any limit exists; the improvement of humanity can be expected to go on indefinitely, and so far as the word has a meaning, to continue "forever." The heaven of the ancient world does not fascinate most of us now.

As this betterment goes ahead, we should not expect that the world will arrive at any particular state of perfection, or happiness, which we imagine today; for our successors will find defects in our conception of perfection before they attain it. But it can be prophesied with confidence, that the world will some time be a better place to live in than any of us are able to imagine.

The concern of the individual

Humanity moves steadily forward, and will so move, to the approximate realization of today's ideals, and the struggle toward better ones tomorrow. Since this is inevitable, and nothing we may do individually will very seriously interfere with the progress as a whole, are you and I free to fold our hands and stand aside, or even to try to buck the current? In a measure, yes; along with his intellect, man is endowed with a certain freedom of choice, and a part of the men in every generation do, unconsciously, elect this course; it is by getting rid of them that mankind becomes essentially better.

Our freedom of choice does not go so far that we can choose in this way if fully conscious of what we are doing. It is the dangerous, little knowledge, by which men grasp their individual unimportance, but do not grasp their responsibility or legitimate hope, which lets them so choose. The clear and certain penalty is death; but not merely the normal end of individual life, which comes properly to all of us in turn, whether we do well or ill. It is disgraceful death, which proves us unworthy children of worthy sires, which finally and without further hope makes vain their worthiness. None of us is so insanely selfish that it is indifferent to him whether the good future world be enjoyed by his own people or by some alien race, proved better by their inheritance of it.

CHAPTER IX

THE CONTROL OF CONDUCT

Ideals are standards of conduct but do not control it

The ideals are standards for the judgment of conduct, and as such they influence it. But they do not themselves control conduct, and it is only as they are construed and applied by the intellect that the most of them have practical effect. This will be fully realized after a moment's consideration of the Golden Rule; or of one of the most generalized and abstract modern expressions of an ideal of conduct, Kant's famous categorical imperative: "Behave so that the guiding principles of your conduct might serve at any time as the foundation of a universal law-giving." Many people believe that Kant gave to ethical philosophy the best expression it has yet received, but there is probably not one of us who can use the categorical imperative as a safe direct controlling principle of his own conduct. Before it could so serve, one would need, by long experience, personal reflection, and a high degree of self-mastery, to have reached the point where one's conduct is practically sure to be correct. It is too far from action. An ideal serves as a standard, as a goal; but it is neither a motive nor a competent guide.

Control is by instinct, intelligence or reason, and habit

Conduct should be judged, then, according to the ideals, but will be controlled, as we have already learned, by instinct, by intelligence, and by habit. Of these, we have found instinct to be the quickest, and, under fixed and constant conditions, perfectly sure and safe. But, as conditions change, instincts are too fixed in their nature to continue safe. Reason is slow; but, in the measurement of its development, it grows to be more sure than instinct to aim at and accomplish proper results.

Instinct itself is not an unfailing marksman, creatures of any kind varying in their instinctive responses as well as in other respects. If a lot of flagellates of one species are placed in a dish of water, not all will act alike in

moving toward or away from the source of light. And as instinct is in less complete control of the action of man and selection is not focussed on it to the same extent that it is in most animals, so it varies more from individual to individual. Also, instincts conflict among themselves for control, and as they vary in development one will control one man's action while a different one dominates another man's. For example: A white man goes into the interior of New Guinea, where the savages have the wild man's fear and hatred of strangers. In any tribe he may run across, some of the men, moved by antipathy or fear or hunger, will desire to kill him at once; while others, moved by the instinctive desire to please, or by curiosity, or in whom fear finds a different expression, will be disposed to welcome him, or to help him on his way.

We have also found that conduct developed under the control of reason may be made almost or quite as quick as instinctive conduct itself, by the formation of habits. While reason should direct the formation of habits, it can withdraw from control when they have been established. It is thus possible for conduct to be like instinctive action in its quickness, and still be appropriate to conditions which instinct could not fit.

All of these controls of conduct—instinct, reason, and habit—admit of development, in physiologically the same way that the muscles of the leg are developed by running, or the auditory organs by listening to music. It is possible for any of the three to be underdeveloped, or seriously misdeveloped; and this is true of any single instinct or habit. These controls react upon and may dominate one another. The instincts being the attribute of the lower rather than of the higher animals, and the intellect the characteristic of man, it is easy for us to believe that, at least under conditions worthy of man, reason is the more proper guide of most human conduct. In order that it can be the safer guide, it must obviously be well schooled; and unless this be done, it would be better, when they

conflict, to let instinct remain in charge. If the intelligence is intelligently developed, so that in its control of conduct it pays capable regard to both purpose and consequence, to immediate and ultimate results, direct and indirect, mental and evidently physical—then, and only then, is it wise to attempt deliberately to give it mastery over the instincts and to submit all conduct, except when this would be uneconomical, to intellectual control.

Perfect "self-mastery" would be very uneconomical

Our instincts are as much our own as are our ideas. Still, because we inherit them, and are presumed to develop our ideas and ideals, the instincts are sometimes regarded as an interference with our control of our own conduct; and indeed they often do interfere with the carrying out of our reasonable purposes. For this reason, the state in which a man would be quite rid of interference by his instincts, and be able to control his conduct completely by his intelligence, and to keep it always and completely in conformity with his intellectual ideals, has been conceived and described as a state of perfected self-mastery. The expression is at least as old as Aristotle, and the idea is older. Self-mastery is understood to be intellectual mastery, and would consist essentially of the elimination of the instincts as factors in the control of conduct. Self-mastery, in this sense, is never attained, and would be very awkward if it were. It would result in the necessity of developing habits where instincts are safe and more reliable, or else in having to give attention to details of action which now require no conscious intellectual effort. Self-mastery so complete that it would take an effort of the mind to decide how to eat and go to sleep and when to wake up would be quite inconvenient. It is far simpler to trust the fulfillment of our proper but merely animal wants to the instincts which nature has provided for their satisfaction, and to content ourselves with such intellectual control of these instincts as will keep them from getting away from us and leading us into misconduct. This measure of control is attainable, and ought to be universal.

From what has been stated, it is clear that to control our conduct in the manner most worthy of human beings, we should first develop the intellect in qualification for the control of conduct. We should then see that it has this control, dominating or eliminating such instincts as would drive us to conduct in conflict with our ideals, but making use of such as are properly usable. The intellect is developed by experience, by instruction and by reflection. Assuming its development, it can be given the desired control over the instincts in two ways: by a measure of the self-mastery just referred to, and by the development of proper habits.

Reason must control the formation of habits

Habits are easy guides, economical methods of controlling or regulating conduct, once they are developed. The more of our work we can do by habit, the more of our mental energy we have left for other things. So it is well worth our while to give some attention to the general subject of habit; just as at all times it beseems us to give very careful personal scrutiny to our own habits, considering what habits should accomplish, and how we can develop any particular habit which we feel that we need. As a figure of speech, the formation of a habit has been likened to the passage of a succession of wagons across a field, or of one wagon many times, each trip taking naturally the way of the preceding. That is, the habit is pictured as a rut on the surface of the brain. We do more easily what we have done before. We think more easily than we have thought before, and in particular we think more easily what we have thought before; and we will more easily do what we have already willed. Like lightning, commerce, and poor students, conduct takes the easiest course; so it is our business to make proper conduct the easiest for ourselves. This we can do. The other side of the same proposition deserves also to be noted and kept in mind—that care must also be devoted to the avoidance of bad habits. Every road laborer knows that it is easier to prevent ruts than to remedy them.

Almost any act which we have occasion to repeat will gradually become automatic and be performed without conscious effort. So, if one of us starts to change his coat, very much as a wagon which starts down a deeply rutted road will have difficulty in turning out, but none at all in following it to the end, so when the coat comes off, the collar and shirt are likely to follow it unless there is a conscious and particular effort to halt the operation when it has gone far enough. We learn to do by doing, and we can contract the habit of doing any particular thing by doing that thing under direct and sufficiently constant intellectual control, by a conscious effort of the will.

Work is an important basic habit

Obviously then, we can acquire habits of almost any kind that we may choose, if we insistently enough determine to acquire these habits. Work is a habit, just as particular kinds of work become particular habits. Any new kind of work is difficult, and work of any kind is difficult for those not used to working. In the case of work of most kinds, people commonly believe or assume that the difficulty is a physical one; but in reality, the difficulty is almost always chiefly mental. The practical work of students, in agriculture, for example, illustrates this. In beginning such work, almost every student finds it arduous. If a student who has finished such work a year or so ago is sent out to do it, it does not occur to him to consider it hard. The difference is not in the muscles, for the more advanced student is not likely to be used to using those employed in the work of new students. The older student finds the work easy because he does it without mental effort. But this is not the best of the story. Some time after work becomes easy, it can become a source of pleasure; and whoever, occupied with routine work, as a student or otherwise, fails to realize this fact gets out of each day less happiness than he might.

The same is true of study as of field work. When each student enters school or college, and again perhaps

at the end of each long vacation, study is arduous at first, but becomes easy, and finally agreeable, as he develops or reacquires the habit of study. The army recruit goes through exactly the same experience. However he previously may have valued his beauty sleep, he ceases presently to be able to sleep, or to wish to sleep, beyond the time for reveille.

Regularity is the most comprehensive of all habits

The essence of habit is regularity. As work is a habit in a broad sense, and comprehends habits of doing many particular kinds of work, so regularity is the most comprehensive, and therefore most important, of all habits. There is a popular idea that it is human nature to desire change. The idea has of course a basis of fact. The result of constantly doing work of one kind is excessive development in one direction at the cost of proper symmetrical development. Too great uniformity of environment is a misfortune; for we get ideas from the environment, so that too great monotony results in narrowness of mind. But, except as an escape from extreme uniformity, or monotony, change is not good for us, and it is not normal human nature to demand it. It is human nature to love most the place known best; away from both, the boyhood home is dearer in memory than is the campus. Yosemite and the metropolis are delightful places to visit; but after years abroad, they will not call us back, as the home and the campus will. Likewise of work: the subject of study which receives the most attention becomes the most enjoyed. It is common experience that students who do conspicuously fine work in any one subject become so attached to this one that they find it difficult to take time from it for proper attention to their other studies.

Changing can become a habit. It is a bad habit and is properly regarded as dissipation. But, as is true of all habits, one may come to depend upon it and to be unhappy without it. It is as good an example as is needed of a habit which should be shunned with care. A tramp has no house. As the habit which comprises the essential basis

of all habit, regularity is the most basically important habit to acquire, and its acquisition will bring the greatest prospect of happiness. If we are regular, steady, methodical in our general behavior, it is far easier to acquire any particular desired habit than it is if we let ourselves be subject to the appetite for change and variety.

The fact that the general habit of regularity makes other and more particular habits easy to develop has the same natural foundation as the power of money to draw an income, or of good health to insure long life. It is one of nature's principles that "unto him that hath shall be given." Whither our road leads, we are going. This is an unescapable fact. We cannot escape the principle, even by standing still. Getting rooted in place is proper conduct for plants but not for men.

It behooves us then to choose our road with care, and then to follow it steadily; and to develop and use our habits to make the road easy and our progress rapid. As the best direct subject of effort, take the habit of work; if we do not already have this well developed, it is a good one to acquire, deliberately and thoroughly. After experience of a month or so, we can look back on it as an accomplishment, and then use our experience in the development of this fundamental habit to encourage us to undertake to develop other habits which may promise to bring happiness by making us walk nearer to our ideals.

Mental habits are most worthy of attention

Habits, it will be observed, are formed chiefly in the mind. Some habits are altogether mental, others involve the action of the mind and correlated action of various parts of the body. Since the habit is in some cases altogether mental, and in others largely mental, we must, in the development of a proper set of habits for the control of our conduct, give conscious and careful attention to the things that we think. None of us are as used to controlling our thoughts and molding them along the lines of habit as we are to the control of our hands. Nevertheless, the mind is one of our organs, and with sufficient

effort is, like most other organs, subject to our control. This also we can prove by experiment. We all know that if we will strongly enough to think of a certain thing we can think of it at a later time, with a certainty depending upon the effort; while if we do not decide with sufficient intenseness to do a thing we know we should do, the opportunity to do it may pass while we forget. If then in a single thing we can control the action of our mind, we must believe that, by controlling it in the same way over and over, we can force it into the mold of habit. And if we force our minds into the right kinds of habits, it will result as a very simple matter that such of our conduct as people can see will be under easy and proper control.

For the control of our thoughts, each of us is individually responsible and can get little reliable help from without. Each alone can really know what his thoughts are and whether or not they are what they should be. Others can judge only by the visible conduct to which the thoughts lead. Since the results depend upon the individual, and since they are very far-reaching, it behooves each one, for and by himself, to give most careful and constant attention to the control of his thoughts. Careless thinking must lead to the habit of careless thinking, and the habit of careless thinking is incompatible with any habit of careful acting. Every boy must to a great extent be left to build his own castle in Spain. His parents and his teachers may suggest and advise as to the nature of these castles, but when all the help has been given, the boy will choose for himself the type he will build. Our castles in Spain and the work of our hands are bound to have the same design. We cannot dream of idleness and exhibit industry. We cannot dream of lust and violence, and hope that our conduct will not reflect our imagination. Our day dreams and our ideals are bound to be confused unless they are alike. We cannot covet in our minds and withhold our hands. And it is our castles in Spain which establish the nature of our thoughts.

The next time each of us sits in his room with a little spare time on his hands, he may well take a look inward, and see what is going on. If what he finds does not meet his full approval—and if he does not think it would meet his mother's approval, it is useless to try to believe it meets his own—let him correct it, and not be surprised to find that he can correct it. Let this be repeated as often as it needs to be, and after no great while it will become unnecessary; and after not more than a month of such self-training whoever tries it will be very much the happier for it. There is no doubt about this. And there is no way in which each of us can immediately secure more happiness, and happiness more real, than by so regulating his mental habits that for at least most of the time the things that he dreams when he has nothing else to do can be matched up with the ideals which he is willing to profess among men and women.

Habits need particular care because they have not nature's sanction

Valuable, and even necessary, as they are, habits are also dangerous things. They need watching far more than the instincts do. Unless habit be formed under the careful supervision of the competent intellect, there is vastly more danger than safety in the replacing of instinct by habit as the manager of the details of action. For the instinct has been developed by nature; it has nature's sanction, and the most of the instincts bring happiness with their satisfaction. The habit has not nature's sanction. It may be right; but if it conflicts with instinct, it is more likely to be wrong. And because it is more mental than of the body, if it be wrong, and if it run away with one, the damage is to the mind. In this way the bad habit brings unhappiness as its consequence. If it does this strongly and promptly enough, the damage is not serious, because the habit will be corrected. But it may corrupt the mind to the point where happiness is not normal, where those things produce happiness, at least temporarily, which ought not to produce it. The most advertised example of this kind of habit is indulgence in alcohol, but there are many

other habits likewise likely to run away with the mind and body unless kept in careful check. This is the usual origin of all intemperance. The habits, then, demand attention much more insistently and urgently than the instincts do. They are much more likely to cause trouble if, without competent intellectual control, they usurp the control of conduct. So we should choose our habits, develop them studiously and deliberately, and watch them with the utmost care.

Again, in supplanting the instincts, in whatever measure may seem desirable, by the intellect or by intellectually chosen and controlled habits, the ends which the instincts have had to serve must not be lost sight of, and must on no account be sacrificed. For our instincts, one and all, have been developed for our preservation; to the satisfaction of their demand for action, happiness has been given as nature's stamp of approval; and this award is given more immediately than it is to intellectually controlled conduct. If we lose the ends which the instincts are there to serve, we lose at once our prospect of happiness and our chance of survival. It is only as the developed reason promises more certain attainment of the same ultimate ends of effort, that the instincts in any considerable part can safely be disposed of or replaced.

The duty of the intellect

Our conclusion is that the instincts should be left to serve their proper ends; but that the intellect must determine what ends are proper for them, how far the instinct can be let alone to serve these, and when other control would, under our conditions, be better. Intellectual supervision must guard against the overdevelopment of such instincts as the appetites, and against excess in all instinctive conduct. Similarly, in the field of habits, the intellect should decide what habits are desirable, and having chosen them appropriately to their ends, should supervise their acquisition and operation. And finally, all new, or exceptional, or especially important conduct should be under immediate and direct intellectual control. And in this

control the intellect should be completely dominant, without possible interference by instinct or habit, by appetite, passion, or sloth.

The nature and value of wisdom

The intellectual equipment adequate to all of these demands constitutes wisdom. Wisdom is built up from knowledge, but is a higher function of human thought. Justice, charity, and strength are ingredients of wisdom, and it is always temperate. As the protoplasm controls its own building up, and can produce the substances which in turn compose it, so wisdom begets strength and courage, justice and charity. It tempers the feelings and harmonizes the ideals, and is the essence of truth and beauty. Without wisdom, courage is rash, justice is hard, and charity is weak. Solomon, reputed the wisest of men, says:

> Happy is the man that findeth wisdom,
> And the man that getteth understanding.
> For the merchandise of it is better than the merchandise of silver,
> And the gain thereof than fine gold.
> She is more precious than rubies;
> And all the things thou canst desire are not to be compared unto her.
> Length of days is in her right hand;
> And in her left hand riches and honour.
> Her ways are ways of pleasantness,
> And all her paths are peace.
> She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her;
> And happy is every man that retaineth her.

The protoplasm of a single cell builds itself up until it produces a tree or a rose or a bee or a man. In every one of us is a germ of wisdom, or some measure of wisdom already developed. We know no limit to its power of growth, but the realization of this power depends upon ourselves. We can starve it by sloth, or kill it by falsehood, injustice, intemperance, and debauchery. Or we can feed and stimulate it, by work, cleanness, and

honesty, and most of all by the constant exercise of the wisdom we already have. If we recognize it as our business to develop our legs, without the hope of catching an ostrich or a deer; or our arms, which will never be as strong as an ape's; or our eyes, which will never be as keen as a hawk's, surely it is much more our business, and more worthy of us as men, to endeavor before everything else to make ourselves wise, wherein we are supreme above the rest of nature.

And as we strengthen ourselves in wisdom, the control of our conduct will be safe, our conduct will be worthy, and our days will be completely happy.

CHAPTER X

PROPER CONDUCT

We are now ready to terminate this survey of the general principles of ethics, by seeing what conduct they show to be proper. In doing this we go again over much of the same ground covered in the discussion of ideals. This time our subject is not the standards of conduct but the conduct itself, the study being, in effect, of virtue and the several virtues.

Conduct must be appraised by wisdom

The conclusion of the preceding chapter was that wisdom must be depended upon for the safe ultimate control of human conduct, and that it must also be trusted to determine what constitutes conduct worthy of a human being. One may hardly expect to impart or acquire wisdom itself by lectures or from printed pages. It is rather in the nature of wisdom that each man's is his own, and that only personal reflection over what may be taught or be acquired by experience is practically able to produce it. The human brain, however, is, at least in its potentiality, a dependable enough machine so that, if it is made to assimilate the same material, and handle this material according to principles which can be taught, it can be expected to produce approximately the same results in almost all cases. This material is knowledge. Men can be made to know alike, and to draw similar conclusions from the same knowledge.

The digestion of the principles established in the preceding chapters should help in the acquisition of knowledge which is good raw material for the production of wisdom, and at least suggest how this knowledge is to be worked over and applied. We have now to apply our knowledge and such wisdom as we can command to deciding, in rough outline, what conduct recommends itself to the common wisdom of men.

We are familiar with various ways of appraising and

Tests of conduct

judging conduct. For instance, we always have been told to do our duty and to obey our consciences. We also understand that conduct, to be proper, must conform to our ideals. We have learned, too, that good conduct promotes happiness. And, going behind these rules, we understand that conduct is good if it is favorable to survival; this is the basic principle. In its use, it must be construed by wisdom and tempered with wisdom. The same understanding by which we derive the principle that proper conduct must favor survival, and that bad conduct leads toward death, forces us also, if it is properly construed so that it becomes wisdom rather than mere information, to realize that in many emergencies we shall do wrong if we look out for our personal safety rather than for the more general welfare. But, even with the qualification which makes this a sound general principle, it is not a practicable test of the propriety of the details of conduct, because it is too general. It is not practicable, in the judgment of most individual acts, to appraise their survival value as a means of deciding whether they are right or wrong.

For this purpose we have recourse to subordinate rules, principles, and standards, and it is these subordinate criteria of goodness which are primarily to be tested by their conformity to the ultimate principle of happiness-producing or survival-favoring. We have found that the sense of duty, the ideals, and happiness have developed under the test of selection for survival, and are therefore valid criteria.

Conscience and sense of duty

None of these subordinate tests of conduct is safe without the exercise of wisdom. It is universally agreed that conscience and the sense of duty are subject to education. This could not be true if they were not subject to change. A well-trained sense of duty is obviously better qualified than an untrained conscience to insure good conduct. But it is unthinkable that an instinct or a sense, which is sometimes imperfect or even quite defec-

tive, and is probably always susceptible of education and improvement, should always be a satisfactory standard by which conduct may be judged. It is rather doubtful if the conscience or the sense of duty ever is so perfectly trained that it can be trusted infallibly as a basis of judgment of the propriety of conduct.

Nobody should jump to the conclusion that what has just been stated is disparaging to the conscience. Nor can it be construed to justify any man, even to himself, in ignoring his conscience; nor may he distrust it, except when he can feel sure that the basis of distrust is provided by wisdom itself. We are all unfortunately weak in wisdom, and such wisdom as we have, being a function of mature thought and the highest of such functions, comes only with age and at the best comes slowly. We know that really proper conduct, which, enlarging somewhat the meaning of a word, we may call ideal conduct, is conduct good when judged at once according to the double standard of motive and result. As to the motive, the conscience and sense of duty are competent guides. The man who habitually attends to his conscience, allows it free development, and follows its dictates, will act properly so far as the motive is concerned. Ignore the conscience, interfere with its free development, even by neglect, or distrust or disobey it as a guide, and the probability is that the conduct will not be proper from any point of view.

Motive and result conform under fixed conditions

In the course of evolution, the conscience has developed on the basis of results; and although we use it safely to judge motive only, conduct inspired by motives satisfactory to the conscience will bear results which are likewise proper, if this conduct is manifested under conditions not essentially different from those under which the conscience was evolved. Little as our environment and our lives seem to resemble those of savages, it is still a fact that the features of life which we have in common with all humanity are more basic, and on the whole far more important, than are the particular features of the lives of

single groups of people, even those groups whose life is most complicated by civilization.

There are, of course, differences, and very important differences. To be proper for ourselves, our conduct must be adapted to these differences. The peculiarities of civilization, and of particular civilizations, are impressed upon us by education, and it is by education that we are adapted to these features of life. This is because our civilization has developed more rapidly than instincts could possibly develop in association with it. More than this, our educational machinery for the adaptation of men to the lives they may be expected to lead has become so perfect, and change is so rapid, that new adaptive instincts might be a nuisance, even if they were an inheritance of the acquired characters of our own parents.

For the sake of distinction, we call the conscience an instinct, and the sense of duty, this instinctive base, modified, adapted, and improved by education. The instinct will produce results with approximate accuracy only under the conditions under which it was evolved. The power of the sense of duty to control conduct so that the results will be proper under our shifting conditions of life depends upon the perfection with which it is educated in each one of us to fit these conditions. At the best, this education depends for its perfection upon the wisdom of those who educate us and upon the wisdom we exercise in the individual use of what we learn. If education were perfect, the sense of duty would be an almost infallible guide to proper conduct, judged by effect as well as by motive.

Wisdom may overrule conscience

In practice, education is never really perfect; and it is therefore possible at times to conduct ourselves better by the immediate exercise of wisdom than by trusting completely to the sense of duty alone. The conclusion is that the conscience can be trusted to guide us to conduct with proper motive, and usually to accomplish proper results; but that occasionally, wisdom, if we are sufficiently endowed with it, may well interfere, and even overrule

the conscience. Before we permit it to do this, we should be very sure that our wisdom is real.

Harmonizing the ideals

Turning to the direction and judgment of conduct by its conformity to the ideals, wisdom is often called upon again to intervene. For, just as the good physician diagnoses the case by all of the evident symptoms, not by one symptom alone, so conduct must be judged by the whole body of our ideals and not by any single standard. Conduct may conform perfectly to one ideal, and still be wrong because in conflict with others.

Bravery *versus* discretion

Some pairs of ideals are in natural opposition. Bravery is one of our oldest ideals, one still highly prized, and particularly esteemed by young people. Nobody thinks much of a coward; young folks are likely to detest him more than their elders do, perhaps because they are less able to see other qualities which may palliate cowardice. Discretion is another ideal, perhaps equally old but never so celebrated. We are guided by the ideal of discretion or caution when we take thought before we act, and thereby frequently keep out of altogether needless trouble. Either of these ideals, bravery and caution, if carried to an extreme, sacrifices the other.

If a man judges or guides his conduct according to the ideal of bravery alone and makes a practice of ignoring the possible or probable consequences, his conduct is likely to be bad, and this is likely to be demonstrated by his letting rashness lead him to destruction. On the other hand, if a man pays respect to the ideal of discretion only and stops in every emergency to weigh the possible results of acting, and insists upon safety before doing things which, as a member of society, he ought to do, his conduct is likely to be equally bad; and his lack of bravery may result in injury to the whole social group upon which his personal safety really depends.

Truthfulness

Truth is one of the ideals most universally accepted, and is so generally good that, unlike bravery or discretion, there is no other ideal with which it can be contrasted.

Still, under extraordinary conditions, it may be in conflict with other ideals. The people most famed in history for their devotion to the truth were the ancient Persians. When King Cambyses was dead, and the false Smerdis, a Mede, had stolen the throne, pretending to be Smerdis the brother of Cambyses, and there seemed to be no other feasible way of saving Persia for the Persians, Darius advised his associates to resort to a lie in order to get access to the palace, and they thus entered the palace and slew the usurper. The justification was that thus only could Persia be saved. In this case, the ideal of public service, or perhaps the narrower one of patriotism, was properly given precedence over the ideal of veracity. History is full of lies, but we have had to go back twenty-five centuries to find the case in which the lie was justified. It is likely that no one of us has ever personally known of a case in which the truth could properly be distorted, and none of us is ever likely to be justified in lying.

Veracity *versus* class loyalty

Another ideal which, like bravery, is likely to be most conspicuously respected by the young, is that of loyalty to the subordinate social group, that is, to a minor group within the state. Among boys, this takes the form of loyalty to their gang or club or classmates, even at the sacrifice of loyalty to larger groups, such as the school, the community, or the state. It is no rare event for some of the members of such a youthful group to indulge in conduct which the group recognizes as improper, but for the other members of the group, under the undue influence of the ideal of loyalty, to protect the offenders even at the sacrifice of the truth. As to lying in such cases, it is bad; such circumstances as have been described are never a sufficient justification for it. Also (and this aspect of it usually makes a stronger appeal to boys than its badness) it is foolish. Even within his own gang, the known liar loses respect. If reputation within the minor group seems momentarily more important than anything else, it will be better established by refusal to testify than by lying.

Divided allegiance

The amount of loyalty due, respectively, to smaller and larger social groups cannot be settled in such positive terms. It is very unusual for the poor citizen of his community to be a good citizen of the state. The disloyal member of a gang of boys is likely to be weak in loyalty to his state when he is grown. A man, and likewise a boy, must respect his own ideals and be guided by them in his behavior. Having naturally a well-developed ideal of loyalty to their fellows, it is entirely proper that the conduct of boys should bear evidence of this ideal. The only question is as to how far this loyalty should take precedence of other ideals, including other manifestations of loyalty. As a general proposition, the larger, more durable, more formally organized group takes precedence over the minor ones, as a matter of common sense and right. The welfare of the state is more important than that of a community. The reputation of a school is more important than that of any group of students. If this is not clear to students, the fault is with their education, and is not inherent in the nature of boys. There is no body of student boys in the world who cannot be educated to a common agreement that their paramount local interest is in the welfare of the whole group. Where this fact is not appreciated, the usual reason is that there has been no education at all on this subject.

There is probably no ideal which may not, in some emergency, conflict with some other. When bad conduct results from the conflict, it is because one ideal is followed to an extreme. For the harmonizing of ideals, and for decision as to how far any one ideal may be followed in any single case, we must trust to the exercise of wisdom. The general principle which provides a basis for most such decisions is that extremes should be avoided.

Temperance

As a guide to the avoidance of excess in the observance of single ideals, as well as to the avoidance of all excess of whatever kind, we have an ideal which has not before been mentioned—that of temperance, or moderation. In

one form or another, this ideal is observed by every people in the world. It underlies the abhorrence of the Malay and American Indian of the display of emotion; for nothing is more likely than emotion to cause excess of conduct. By abstaining from the display of emotion, man not only avoids provoking it in others, but also schools himself against the improper excitement of his own feelings.

As the ideal of temperance is associated with the best-grounded and most conspicuous customs of some people without any formal science of ethics, so at the other extreme of ethical development, we find that in the system of Aristotle temperance is given supremacy above all other virtues. Aristotle found the acme of wisdom in the observance of the mean, or middle course, and the golden mean has ever since had a central and foremost place in the schemes of moral and ethical teachers. Temperance may be confused with caution, and caution may be carried to an extreme; but it is in the nature of temperance that, so long as its nature is kept clearly in mind, no extreme is possible. We can accept it then as a safe general rule that extremes are dangerous, and that conduct which avoids extremes is in that respect good.

It is worth while to note with care that the principle of temperance applies even to its own application. One should not go to an extreme in condemning apparent extremes. For example, celibacy is such anti-social conduct that its general practice would put an end to society in a generation; and yet our civilization owes much to the individuals who have been celibates for the sake of completeness of devotion to public service. The stand-patters of every generation charge the progressives with going too far in a good direction; but the radicals and fanatics have often enough been canonized when the world caught up. Every leader in real progress is likely to be regarded as an extremist by the most of his contemporaries. Conformity is a sound ideal and is good practice.

Conformity

A large measure of it is necessary for the cohesion of society; but perfect conformity to custom would be fatal to progress.

It has been shown that our ideals and our customs react mutually upon each other, and that our ideals, at least the older of the social ones, grew out of the customs of groups of people. The general goodness of customary conduct and that of the ideals have been demonstrated. The existing conditions among the peoples regarded as most enlightened are exceedingly complicated, are in process of rapid change, and neither are nor of late have been as fixed and durable as are the conditions of life of comparatively "uncivilized" people. Our customs, developed in association with the conditions of life, are likewise comparatively ill established. Our customs have therefore become comparatively weak guides and sanctions of conduct.

As life has become complex and varied, and custom has lost some of its binding force, the thought of men has been growing more free. And as our ideals, even though derived from custom, are now essentially the product of thought, they have gained a new and broader foundation, at the same time that custom has been weakening. With progressive ethical enlightenment, conduct must be judged more and more by its conformity with the ideals, and the justification of questionable conduct by its conformity with alleged or actual custom loses its validity. However, it remains true, and may be expected always to be so, that custom in general is good; and that, except as reasons to the contrary may appear in particular cases, conduct may fairly be regarded as bad if it is contrary to established custom.

Custom and ideals are conditionally good

It is by this time clear that the goodness of custom is conditional, that is, that customs can be expected to be good only under the conditions under which they are evolved. At least so far as they are derived from and reflect customs this must be true of the ideals also. To

illustrate first with a clear and very practical case: Americans harvest rice with binders, and it would ruin an American grower to harvest his crop by hand, even if it were physically possible. Orientals invariably harvest rice by hand. From Japan to India and Java, white men have scorned this unprogressiveness, and Japanese and Filipinos have wailed in agreement with their critics; but the fact is that binders cannot be used in the Orient, and ought not to be used there if they could be. Both of the diametrically opposed customs are good.

The same principle holds with no less force in matters not so evidently practical. Because the American population contains many and diverse elements, rigid, detailed uniformity of custom might not be possible. Moreover, the majority element, of British origin, is of a race which has fought its way since prehistoric times in competition with other peoples, and is a blend, due to conquests, of races of quite diverse cultures. Such a race could hardly help being progressive in character; and the least conservative of its elements has naturally been the most likely to break home ties by emigration. The people of the American colonies could not have been and have remained very conservative and formed a nation, because their communities differed from each other and still more because they all lived under conditions very different from those under which their ancestors had lived. It is in the nature of the case that our culture is progressive, and that progressiveness and enterprise have a prominent place among our ideals, and conservatism a minor position. In our enthusiastic appreciation of our own type of culture, however, we undervalue old customs, to an extent which may very possibly effect our ultimate destruction.

Attention has already been called to the opposite type of culture, exemplified by the Chinese. Considering that the Chinese are the most numerous people in the world, and have enjoyed an unbroken cultural continuity which no other people have approached, the merit of their type

of culture, at least under their conditions, is not open to question. We have tried economic competition with them, in California, and have escaped for the present by keeping them away. The world is become too small for us to hope to avoid it indefinitely. Sooner or later, we have these well-schooled experts in survival to meet. We may not have to meet them on their own ground, and are not called upon to adopt their ways; our salvation is rather to be expected from the exercise of our own virtues.

We cannot sanely hope to succeed in the competition of the future without the uniform use of any time-tested virtues at all. Our race never became a great one in the world by magic. Its customs and ideals were good, and to these, substantially, we must pin our hope to remain great. It is the unequivocal lesson of history that every time a race grown great has then grown lax in the observance of the customs which made it great, its progress has been toward the graveyard.

Activity

In the discussion of feelings, we found that activity is good conduct in all animals except parasites and degenerates and that it is a source of happiness for ourselves. Inactivity is essentially bad, resulting in unhappiness, and being unfavorable to survival. Except for the need of rest, an idle hour is wasted time, and if we would get the most of happiness from life we have no time to waste. Even if, keeping busy, we occupy ourselves less profitably than we might do, our time is relatively wasted, and to this extent our conduct is not good. When there is doubt as to the best use of our time and energy, wisdom is called upon to answer the question. However, it requires little wisdom to appreciate the fact that Satan is always ready to occupy idle time and hands and to avoid inviting him to do it.

Mental activity

Different creatures busy themselves in different characteristic ways. Among all creatures, man is distinguished by his development of the power to think. He alone depends primarily upon his intellect to insure his survival.

We are therefore justified in the opinion, which we probably hold anyway because we like it, that thinking is not only characteristic of man, but it is also of all conduct the most worthy of man. While all activity is good, mental activity is especially so, and while all idleness is bad, idleness of the brain is peculiarly so. This being so, it must also be true that no other activity leads so surely to happiness and to so much happiness as the activity of the mind. As persons whose chief present business is the development and enrichment of the mind, students should learn early to appreciate this source of happiness, as any boy who will can do from his own experience. Anybody, young or old, who does not consciously and regularly enjoy the activity of his mind is missing a very important source of happiness.

Symmetrical development

This emphasis upon the particular merit of mental activity must not be construed as disparging activity of other kinds. The good maxim, "a sane mind in a healthy body," comes from a people whose distinctive contribution to our civilization was political. The frail, anemic bookworm is no more an ideal man than is the champion pugilist. Proper observance of the ideal of temperance forces the avoidance of one-sided development. Living in an age when the division of labor is so perfected that high individual specialization is essential to success, we need to exercise a care never necessary before, to prevent the atrophy of other faculties in the high development of some one power. With all our specialization, our lives are only as narrow as we let them be. Individually a farmer, or a lawyer, or the affixer of its nut to a particular bolt, every man is also the member of family and community and state. He can read, play golf (barnyard or Scotch), think, and speak. He can find happiness in any proper activity, and may find the most in those aside from his special occupation; but there is a legitimate source of it, and the most constant one, in the routine, the efficiency of which makes diversion possible.

Efficiency and achievement

Added to the happiness derived from activity in general, and the greater happiness from activity of the more worthy kinds, there is particular satisfaction in efficient activity, and a joy all its own in achievement, or victory. The boy who wins his race is rewarded for seasons of training. A perfect recitation brings the reward for the labor of preparation. But these are only the beginnings of the real reward of accomplishment. The boy or man who will take a licking is the one who will get it. If two boys of equal athletic ability meet on the track, the one who never flunks a lesson is sure to win; he is too used to victory over his obstacles to be beaten. Nothing succeeds like success.

Minding one's own business

Before discussing mutual activity, attention may be called to the evil of excess in it. Complex as any man's business may be, it still has limits, and differs from the business of other men, at least in being his own. Our survival, speaking for our children as well as for ourselves, depends upon success in our own affairs, and is measurably independent of the affairs of other people. Therefore, for the same general reason that mental activity is worthy of man in general, it is the pursuit of our own business which is most worthy of us as individuals. Minding our own business is good conduct, and interference with that of other individuals is not good.

Mutual activity

In connection with the necessity of activity and of worthy activity as essential to human happiness and survival, it must be remembered that man is essentially a social creature and that worthy activity must be related to his social nature. The opportunity falls in different measure to different men, but in some measure to all men, to exercise themselves in social service. This opportunity depends in part upon ability, whether innate or acquired by training, and in part upon freedom from work of other kinds. It is the business of a man to provide properly for the real needs of his family and not to sacrifice this duty for the sake of public service, except as such service

is required of all citizens alike or in proportion to their several abilities and in emergency.

The general demand of society, as has already been shown, includes such items as payment of taxes, intelligent participation in elections, acceptance of office when practicable, and more exclusive service in such emergencies as war. All such service is good conduct, and a man is badly educated if he does not find happiness in rendering it. But public service beyond the minimum required, provided it is not at the sacrifice of other real duties, is conduct peculiarly worthy of modern man, as is testified to by the facts that it brings honor in general and glory in exceptional cases and that man almost universally finds happiness in such activity. Because of the inducement of honor and happiness, men commonly participate in public service with less tangible inducement, in the form, for instance, of money, than they would expect and require if they applied themselves with equal devotion to other pursuits.

We can conclude, then, that both because man is characteristically social and because the intellect is his most characteristic attribute the conduct most worthy of man and the best conduct of man is active, intelligent social service, and that this kind of activity promises to those who participate in it the greatest possible happiness and the most perfect happiness.

Family service

Even such virtuous conduct as public service requires control by wisdom, and must not, except in time of public crisis, be permitted to interfere with a man's duty to his own family. Happiness and the prospect of survival are sacrificed together unless the fundamental interests of the family are properly cared for. Neither the individual nor the political state has interests as old or as important or as well insured as those of the family. States exist because they serve the same interests, the survival and welfare of the race. There is an old saying that self-preservation is the first law of nature. Most people seem

to believe this, but it is not really true. People will, indeed do many things to preserve their own lives. Under ordinary circumstances, nobody contemplates his own death, even in imagination, without pain. Fear of it is the basic deterrent from bad conduct, in the ordinary affairs of life.

Nevertheless, personal death is not the worst of evils, nor, except carelessly, is it usually so regarded. It is universal among living things that they care more for their helpless offspring than they do for themselves. To the majority of all the living creatures in the world, death follows, and very generally results from, the production of offspring. Yet none of these creatures follow any law of nature which would tell them to preserve themselves at the sacrifice of descendants. The male spider which fertilizes the female, and is then eaten by her, is only an extreme case. The human parent who hesitated at self-sacrifice if the safety of the baby demanded it would be a strange father or mother and would certainly reap an enduring crop of misery as the result.

Supreme happiness provided by children

Since the keenest, bitterest unhappiness we can imagine, and the only form of prospective unhappiness which will in general drive men to throw away their own lives without hesitancy, is found in the danger or death of the children—that is, in the failure of the prospect of survival—so it is reasonable to expect the greatest happiness in life to be found in our children, in their prosperity and welfare, and in the pride we take in their worthiness and success. Young people naturally cannot appreciate this fact from experience; but they can digest the evidence, as shown in the lives of their parents, and they can understand the reasons for believing that this must be true. And then, so far as the experience of other people and the observation of their elders and a logical understanding of the matter can control their conduct, they will hold themselves in restraint until their own supremest happiness is due.

The greatest of moral teachers, although he said that

without faith we are nothing, still placed charity above faith and above hope. This charity, rated first among the virtues, is not the giving of alms, which is good conduct on occasion, but means rather love for one's fellow-man, which is good always and for everybody. Our instincts move us to try to please those about us, and reward us with happiness when we try to do this, and again when we have succeeded. Experience tells us that happiness is as infectious as rage or cholera, that we can even catch it back from those to whom we give it. Wisdom gathers up instinct, teaching, and experience, and tells us that our conduct is good in the measure in which it brings happiness to our neighbors. Charity

Obviously, conduct which makes another unhappy is bad. But a negative observance of this principle is far from sufficient. We have learned that activity is good in itself; the activity which brings happiness to our neighbor must be doubly good. Also, we have learned that mental activity is more worthy of us than is any other working. Our neighbors cannot read our thoughts, but we cannot conceal their effects and should not have such thoughts that their expression needs to be concealed. The most constantly fertile source of human unhappiness may be lack of charity in human thought; but there is an unfailing source of happiness in kindly sympathy with those about us. Concern with our neighbor's business may be bad, as has been explained; but his business becomes our concern when we can help him or rejoice with him. In that spirit only, it is our moral right to judge him. Judgment, we are told, has no part in charity; but if charity has no part in judgment, this is an evil world indeed. Passive goodness not enough

Such conduct as is really, essentially good may well be constant and dependable, as is insured by making it a habit. A charitable frame of mind can be assumed, voluntarily, again and again, because wisdom tells us that we do well in assuming it. If this be practiced, it finally becomes habitual. It is thus, unless we have been so

blessed by training without effort on our part, that we can become amiable in disposition. Amiability, if the word is properly used, has no relation whatever to weakness; its effectiveness depends upon strength. Such a disposition makes its possessor happy. It makes his neighbors happy. And they make each other so. There are maxims to the effect that a man cannot lift himself by his bootstraps; it is not worth while to apply this to charity or to happiness.

Summary

We find that good conduct is good for those about us, and that the good fruit—happiness—of conduct which makes our neighbor happy tends to increase indefinitely. Applying the rule that our most worthy conduct is activity of the intellect, we can conclude that the best possible conduct is constant and active charity in our thoughts. This brings us, in the ethical estimate of the quality of conduct, to the most general moral rule for its control: "Love thy neighbor as thyself."

CHAPTER XI

THE FAMILY

The ethics of family life is a clearly and easily understandable subject if it is borne constantly in mind that the family exists for one purpose, the welfare of the children. If any other end, such as the accumulation of wealth, the moral development of the parents, or their ease or even their personal happiness, is made in any sense co-ordinate with the legitimate dominant and controlling end, the subject no longer yields to rational treatment. In all such cases, too, the family falls short of proper success. Except under exceptional and temporary conditions, life is so strenuous in its nature that success short of the fullest possible is ultimate failure. The undue exaltation of subsidiary family aims is one of the most dangerously immoral tendencies of modern social life. The production of children is of course the first condition of their welfare; but the business of the family does not end here and in the history of humanity never did end here. The insects provide further than this.

Origin of the family

In the earliest human days, man may have been so little superior to the rest of nature that some such group as the pack or drove was necessary for his safety against non-human perils. As his intellect evolved and he acquired the mastery of fire and tools and weapons, this sort of danger tended to disappear and families of the type we know probably became common. In more recent times, and even today in many parts of the world, community life is necessary for protection against human enemies. Isolation, where and when it is safe, favors the stability of the family, and complete stability is clearly and always in the interest of the children. Divorce is distinctly a city problem. During the most of human history, the protection of the children has been the paramount duty of the parents, and the best family at any

time and place has been the one that would make them safest.

The family of the modern Western World is a joint product of Roman law, Christian church influence, and Teutonic custom. Strict monogamy is a heritage from old Rome, fixed and emphasized by the Christian church. In other parts of the world, there still exist families of different and to us strange types.

Polygamy

By far the commonest of these is the polygamous family, consisting of one husband, several wives, and their children. Such an institution develops naturally where the number of women is constantly considerably greater than that of men. From the fact that war is a great selective destroyer of the men, it follows that where warfare is chronic, as it often is among primitive peoples, polygamy prevails. The excess in number of women over men is thus taken care of in an approved manner, and the decrease in population, otherwise inevitable from war, may be prevented as an enduring injury to the race. In one modern war, four-fifths of a nation's grown men have been wiped away. One has only to conceive the helplessness of a solitary woman in savage life, and the effect of having a large majority of the women unmarried, to realize that conditions have existed under which polygamy was a good institution—good for the race, and particularly good for the women.

Monogamy

Under the secure conditions of modern civilized life, the strictly monogamous family is the only tolerable type. The theory of the equality of all men and women demands it, and this theory underlies modern social efficiency. Without guaranteeing better hereditary paternity, the monogamous family provides incomparably better home education for boys. Because it is, under our conditions, the only proper family, it is the customary and legal type, and the custom and law must be observed and enforced.

The last point is worthy of particular emphasis. The facts that polygamy has had a proper place in the history

of man, and that there are lands where it has not been outgrown, provide no excuse whatever for reversion to it by few or many people under modern conditions. Individual cases are a serious assault on the strength of the social structure and merit any penalty needed to repress them. The temporary disparity of the sexes due to modern wars or emigrations do not justify polygamy, sanctioned or illicit, at all. Even a whole state which so offends may properly be disciplined by its neighbors.

Selection of mates

The first matter of interest regarding the individual family is its formation. So far as results are concerned, it seems to be fairly indifferent whether marriages are arranged by the parents or the choice of mates is left to the participants. In countries where the parents arrange the marriages, there is a general conviction that the wisdom of the parents, coupled perhaps with some practical understanding of the characters of the young people in question, can make matches which promise more enduring satisfaction than can the young people themselves. Associated with this system are the separate education of the sexes and more or less seclusion of the girls, both of which are calculated to bring the young people to the altar pure and to prepare the women for contented lives in complete devotion to the family.

Where the young people effectively make the matches, although subject to a measure of parental authority, moral and legal at first and moral and financial afterward, the theory seems to be that those who are to spend their lives together are entitled to a chance to choose their partners. Associated with this system in its freest development are coeducation and the free association of the sexes from infancy on. Under this system, there is no such specific training of the girls for their lives as wives and mothers and for contentment with life within the family; but there is a broader training for life as members of society on a larger scale, which greatly increases the opportunity of women for efficiency outside the family.

Judgment of the two systems must be based on this point. If the state or society at large can profit by the service of women outside the family so greatly that some family interest ought to be sacrificed for this reason, then women should be educated, formally and by experience, for the broader life; and if they are so educated, they and their friends will make their own matches. The ambitions developed by women where this system prevails are not entitled to consideration, because these are merely results of the education; any normal girl or boy can be educated to complete happiness in effective service of the kind, whatever it is, which society most needs.

The "one woman in the world" idea, free association in the village or social circle being assumed to make it possible to find the one, is only a happy fiction during courtship. It should and usually does become a reality with marriage; and this can happen as well if the parents arrange the matches as it can if they are made by the young people. It is not to be expected that marriages should result in happier married life where the women are trained for life outside the home than where the girls are trained specifically to be wives and mothers, and, on the whole, they do not so result. Too much life outside the home is not good for the family, and unsatisfied ambition for outside life is worse than its realization. Even in those Oriental lands where divorce is exceedingly easy, at least for the men, it is not more common than in American cities.

These are practical ethics, and the fact is of course to be recognized that coeducation and the equivalent education of boys and girls are established practice in the United States, and that the tendency is in this direction in all civilized lands. This being so, the reason for still discussing the respective advantages of the two systems of arranging matches is to make it clear that our system throws a novel strain on the stability of the family. The arrangement of matches by the elders has stood the test of immeasurable time. After Isaac selected a father-in-law for

Jacob, Jacob served Laban seven years for Leah and yet seven for Rachel, and his seed are as the dust of the earth. Clisthenes, king of Sicyon, kept the select youth of Greece at his court for a full year before picking a husband for his daughter, and by this care became the ancestor of Pericles.

The education of women for efficiency outside the home and the making of matches by the participants are revolutionary novelties in the history of civilization. The former of these involves dangers to the family which should become less as they are recognized and appreciated and, as far as may be practicable, obviated by including training for family life and contentment in it as a part of the more extensive training which is firmly established. The time now given to the education of girls ought to make it possible to include the education their grandmothers received, along with whatever else is proper.

Fitness for marriage

An indispensable prerequisite for marriage should be the assurance that the parties are physically fit for it. There is no country where such fitness can be assumed, constantly and safely. For the state to insist upon the proof of fitness, as Wisconsin, for example, does to some extent, is no invasion of private rights; for no individual has the right to propagate disease, or, knowingly or unknowingly, to rob another of the prospect of children. The purpose of such a law is not so much to prevent unfair marriages, although this alone would justify such legislation, as to promote the future welfare of the community. Beyond freedom from disease, the possibility of issue might well be assured if it were practicable. The really strict moral system of Bontoc accomplishes this end; and in many lands the absence of children is ground for divorce.

Stability of the family

Once entered upon, married life is expected to be permanent. Unfaithfulness justifies the innocent spouse in asking for divorce, and so may childlessness. But the state, as well as the parties immediately involved, is concerned with the stability of the family as an institution; and the

state can gain by divorce so rarely that it would probably better be impossible. Unfaithfulness to marriage vows is a violation of the most important contract, to society as well as to the individuals, which the parties to it ever make, and the state should punish its violation with the severest penalties; not by divorce, itself a public evil, often welcome to the offender, and likely to spread the mischief. The ways of many primitive peoples, death or expulsion from the community, are more effective and therefore better. Such penalties do not have to be enforced, because where custom is strong enough to establish them it is too strong to be violated. There is no question that the recognition of the possibility of divorce is a frequent cause of infidelity.

Size of family

We turn now to a consideration of ways of accomplishing the chief aim of the family, the successful rearing of the children. Such success is in part measurable quantitatively, since the family which successfully raises several children is obviously more successful than a family which raises only one or two, and gives these no better start in life. The number of children which one family ought to raise depends upon the social and economic conditions of the community or state, as well as upon the conditions of the family itself.

In primitive society, where life itself is comparatively simple, training for life is likewise easy, and it is practicable for the family of average ability to rear more children, and equip them for life of the same kind, than can be undertaken safely where life is complex and the necessary training is long and expensive. The writer had a Bagobo friend, Angat, a nobody in his youth, but a Dato in his old age because he raised twelve fine boys. Under the Bagobo conditions of past generations, his family had served itself and its community in the best manner possible.

Under the conditions to be found in most parts of the world, it is impossible for the average family to raise twelve children and train them properly for life, as good

and efficient citizens. The training of each one is too expensive and takes too long, aside from other objections to such multiplication of the population. It is clear enough that those who rear no children are either very guilty, or woefully unfortunate. But what is demanded is not the mere production of human beings; the happiness of the parents and the welfare of society alike depend upon the success of the children, and so upon their training for eventual success. Inadequately or improperly trained children have no fair chance of success. The attempt to raise a larger number of children than the family can expect to train properly is therefore immoral, just as is raising none. Parents will not knowingly handicap their own children.

Density of population

There is an indefinite relation between density of population and proper size of family. A comparison of Java and the Philippines shows this clearly. If the Filipinos were six times as numerous as they are, their population would be about as dense as that of Java. With equal industry, they might expect to maintain a much higher standard of living than the Javanese do. Let the average Filipino family be as large as it may, there is no danger that for many decades, at least, there will be any lack of opportunity for each generation to live better than the preceding one. Java, too, can well support a greater population than it does. It is true now, though, that the people are too poor to support good schools, and crowding is one of the reasons for their poverty. If the population of Java continues to increase as rapidly as it has done, and as that of the Philippines might well do, the only result to be expected is that it will presently become too great for support by the natural resources and there will be famines in the inevitable years of poor crops. Neither a family nor a state should follow a course likely to lead to starvation. It is clear that under conditions existing in the Philippines large families are in the interest of the people collectively, and that in Java a considerable increase in population would involve grave peril.

Mankind is always at the crossroads

One may not safely conclude from these illustrations that a Filipino family should raise children primarily in the interest of the state, nor that a Javanese family should limit its size for state purposes. In both cases, the family may fairly give consideration first to the prospects in life of its own children, but, in their interest, will not wholly overlook the conditions of society at large. The idea that families and even races are under a social obligation to restrict themselves in numbers is prevalent enough to merit scrutiny at this point. Reliable statistics, which are somewhat of a novelty in human history, show that the population of the earth is increasing, and becoming much greater than it ever was before. This happens because men have found ways of producing and distributing more food than ever before. It is to be expected that population will presently overtake the food supply. But this is no new emergency. A tension between population and means of subsistence exists normally; without it, evolution might well cease. Society has averted some measure of misery by checking the population in a great variety of ways. The sterilization of slaves, the killing of weak and unhealthy babies, polyandry, suttee, and the ceremonial sacrifice of the aged are familiar methods. The method advocated now is birth control.

Descriminating limitation may be a sign of progress. But every race which has practiced indiscriminate limitation of numbers has to that extent abandoned hope. As to races, if we practice birth control as some people say we should, and the Japanese go on increasing in numbers as they are doing, they will inevitably grow past us in the world as a whole, as they have done in Hawaii, and as Germany did outgrow France. As to families, even in Java, if some limit themselves in size and others do not, the former will in the course of time die out, and the descendants of the latter will inherit the land.

Status and size of family

As to the status of the parents, we may recall that, while men are fairly entitled to equal opportunity to exercise

their ability, it is foolish and impractical to presume that all men have equal ability. The very poor family can obviously not give its children as good a start as a more wealthy family, and in justice to those it does attempt to raise it ought not further to injure their prospects by trying to raise a considerable number of them. With increased wealth, there is no constant increase in the number of children that might be educated well; for wealth, however useful, is less essential than the personal care of the parents. With less than moderate wealth, there is a clear relation between the income of the family and the number of children it can equip well for life. On the other hand, great wealth makes a burden of its own care, commonly involves social distractions as well, and is quite generally associated with families smaller than the average.

Financial competency is only one aspect of the ability of the family to bring up its children. While all parents love their children, they differ widely in ability to decide what is good for children, in strength of purpose to do what they know is good for them, and in disposition to devote themselves to the constant care of their children at the sacrifice of personal ease and comfort. Parents who have the strength of purpose to devote themselves unselfishly to their children will of course educate them better, or give a good education to a larger number, than will parents who are selfish or weak of purpose.

Home training

Protection has given way to education as the paramount function of the family. In all states the training of the young is performed in part by the family and in part by the state, but the share entrusted to each agency varies widely. As a general rule, the share assumed by the state is greater, the richer, the more enlightened, and the more highly organized the state becomes. Formal schooling is compulsory in enlightened lands, and its period grows steadily longer. California had hardly any high schools forty years ago; compulsory attendance reaches to the age of eighteen now, unless the high-school course is finished

sooner. As such long formal schooling deprives the family of the old chance to teach boys to make a living and girls to keep house, these subjects are now taught, after a fashion, in school. Even so, and even in such a place as Bontoc, where the children do not even sleep at home, there must be home education underlying that given in the school.

Education begins early

This home training, whether or not the parents realize it, begins soon after birth. A child acquires habits and begins to develop its disposition long before it learns to speak, or has any understanding of the use of language. Before it can be given advice or orders, it is learning from the treatment it receives, and is guiding its conduct by what it learns. Because the parents do not realize that the training of the child begins so early, they frequently treat it in such a way that its resulting conduct is exactly what they wish to avoid and know should be prevented. This probably happens regularly in the majority of families. A healthy baby cries at first because of pain or hunger. Its mother is sympathetic and picks it up. The baby enjoys this; the pain may cease or the hunger be forgotten while it is entertained. Eventually it is fed and put down. After this happens a few times, the baby understands that by crying it can get itself picked up and carried. Thereafter, it will cry for entertainment as well as for legitimate reasons. Our great-grandmothers brought babies up well because they were too busy to spoil them.

For the meeting of its natural wants, a baby is provided with sanity just as perfect as that of a grown man is for the satisfaction of his wants. If crying and the exhibition of a bad temper are the methods by which a baby can secure the things it desires, it presently knows enough to cry and be cross. The more it accomplishes its desires by such means, the more firmly it establishes a fretful and cross disposition. The clear way to avoid this is to attend perfectly to its real needs and thus give it no proper occasion for crying, never to reward it for crying or for

crossness, and never let it become acquainted with pleasures, such as being rocked and carried, which will make it annoying when it demands them, or which are not good for it. This is common theory and the practice of trained nurses; it is stated here on the basis of experience with babies taught to laugh when they required attention. Long before they can speak, babies so trained learn that nothing can be accomplished by crying, but that laughing will get results. A baby which makes itself disagreeable in order to make others be agreeable to it is "spoiled."

Of all habits, the first formed are the firmest. It is sometimes maintained that the habits formed during the first two years of infancy have more to do with the making of the individual's character than do all those of subsequent education. A spoiled baby does not become a good child, nor an agreeable member of society.

Early habits and happiness

After a child learns to speak, and can be taught in words as well as by other treatment, there are still a number of years during which practically the whole of its education is received in the family. During these years, the same common-sense rules should be followed. It should never be rewarded for making itself disagreeable, nor permitted to learn to enjoy things not good for it or which it may not continue to expect. Regularity being the basis of all habit, it should be treated regularly from the start and expected to be regular after its own initiative begins to show.

It is unfair to the child, and therefore immoral, as well as foolish in a narrower sense, to let any child acquire bad habits or a bad disposition, or to miss the opportunity to start it well in life with regularity and other good habits and a cheerful disposition. We look to our children for our greatest happiness. Our happiness depends upon theirs, both because happiness is contagious, and because of our affection for them. Being happy is itself a matter of habit and subject to development as a habit. Nobody is made happy by a baby's crying or fretting, and the baby taught

to cry and be cross has a dreadfully poor start on what ought to be a life of happiness. Amiability in form is the first result of training a baby to laugh, but amiability in character grows promptly out of the habitual practice of the form.

Specific habits

Early childhood is the natural time for the inculcation and establishment of almost all of the virtues. Acquired at this time they will of course have a moral, not an ethical foundation. Ethical understanding will follow with enough years; but the practice is always the chief consideration. Obedience is very hard to learn unless insisted upon at first, and it is in early childhood that disobedience is especially dangerous. "Nicht folgen bringt *Kindern* Verderben und Tod." Industry is never arduous except because it is not learned early enough. In gentleness, considerateness, and manners, a child will be like its parents, requiring very little correction of deportment if the examples are regularly what they should be. Truthfulness, reliability, and punctuality are easily established as inflexible habits if the necessary training is given before there is the least beginning of contrary habits, to be corrected and eradicated. It is fair to the child to recognize the fact that as cardinal a virtue as truthfulness is not innate, that there is nothing immoral about its first lie. But it is grossly unfair to the child to tolerate its mendacity, even in the most trivial matters. Life is made up of rewards and punishments, but the fewer of the latter, the better. A very few punishments for the first lies will obviate many and much harder ones later in life. No treatment of a child is more enduringly cruel than failure to correct and correct impressively when the thing to be corrected is the child's first experiment of the kind.

Integration of home and school education

Besides underlying education outside the family, the home training should integrate with this more general education. Before a child is sent to school, it should be prepared for school. For instance, it should already be obedient and know how to be quiet when quiet is expected.

A child having to learn these things in school makes little other progress while it is learning them and interferes with the progress of other children.

Language

Before going to school, the child should, in particular, learn accuracy in the use of language. The adult uses language for the expression of thought, and the accuracy of his language is the expression of his carefulness in thought. In a child's first education, these processes are practically reversed. The child thinks out the things it is told. If it is told inaccurately, its thought will necessarily be likewise inaccurate. Its practice in thinking is based very largely on what it hears said, and if the conversation it hears is careless, its mental development will inevitably reflect this carelessness. Carelessness is as unfortunate a trait as a child can well develop, and mental carelessness results always in carelessness in other behavior. Grammar is nothing more than a set of rules for accurate expression. However indifferent the parents may be as to their own language, they ought never to spoil the beginnings of a child's education by using ungrammatical language to it or in its presence. Before a child enters school at all, it should use language so accurately that any subsequent study of grammar will serve for nothing more than to formulate what it already practices.

Play is naturally training

Play is an instinct of childhood. At first, the child has hardly anything to do except play. As it grows older, play gradually gives way to other occupations; but, being a proper source of happiness, it deserves to be encouraged in the fullest measure consistent with good training in other respects. It will be kept within bounds if the parents remember that, as an instinct, it was evolved because of its value in training the young for their subsequent lives. It can be directed and made to be valuable training, or it can be neglected and its value then be largely lost. By proper care, the instinct of play, and the disposition to play for the sake of pleasure, can be made to involve in their satisfaction a considerable part of the child's early edu-

cation; thus at the same time and by the same means the child is drilled in the exercise of a happy disposition and given information and habits which will become a most valuable part of its education.

Play and industry

In particular, the instinct of play, if exercised under proper care, can be developed directly into the habit of industry. By neglect of the child's play, its disposition to play is too frequently allowed to develop into a permanent habit of idleness. By its play at home, then, the child can be taught many things which it would otherwise have to learn with effort, and can be given habits which will make its school education easy, thorough, and rapid. The same supervision needed to accomplish these results will at the same time serve to avoid the dangers of unsupervised play—that it will run into vulgarity and dirtiness and the formation of distinctly bad habits.

As far as possible, the home education should be a direct and specific, as well as a general, preparation for school education, and this is what is particularly meant by the statement that the two methods of education should integrate. Education in both home and school differs widely in different countries, and failure of home education to prepare for the schools the child is to enter is a serious handicap to him. The schools of a city like New York, with a large immigrant population, find that the difference in language between home and school is the most conspicuous but by no means the only difficulty presented by the situation. There is no escaping this difficulty if the ways of a people have to be made over in a generation; but there is no question that a better total education can be given as one harmonious system than is possible by the disjointed efforts of home and school, working more or less independently. The prevalence and activity of parent-teacher associations contributes materially to the unification of home and school efforts.

The home is very likely to interfere with school education unless it co-operates with and supplements it. As to

co-operation, the fact that one system is more efficient than a mixture of systems makes the situation clear. As to supplementing school training, this is less necessary, and there is less time for it now than there used to be; still, training in school is never complete. Trades and occupations were once hereditary in far greater measure than they now are, and could therefore well be taught in the home. The long period of compulsory schooling which is now usual gives all citizens a much more equal opportunity than they used to have, but has inevitably curtailed the opportunity of the home to give education taking a large part of the time of the children. The result is fine for the children from poor and incompetent homes; the girl whose mother could not make her a skilled housekeeper is fortunate in being taught the various phases of housekeeping in school. But most homes can give a practice in housekeeping impossible in any public school, and many homes can improve on school teaching, aside from practice. If this kind of education were left entirely to the schools, there would result great uniformity of housekeepers, but few indeed would be as good as good home education makes them. Likewise, the grade schools instruct in wood-working, and many high schools in carpentry; but a carpenter can train his own son better than schools hope to do. In this case, apprenticeship has not quite disappeared, although we are used to seeing the unions admit to membership men whose chief qualification is their kit of tools.

Home should supplement school education

The abandonment, to a great extent, of home vocational education results necessarily from the steady extension of compulsory school attendance. The substitution of a much better academic training than children used to receive, along with a smattering of preparation for several occupations, gives children a much wider opportunity to display any ability they may have, and contributes materially to progressiveness of general culture. At the same time it makes the culture less stable, for home training is conservative. There is so far no cessation of the drift of

education from home to school. But, like tendencies in general, it may be expected to go too far; and the best preventative of such excess is steady exertion of the family to give all the training it can.

Morals

Aside from training to make a living, education almost throughout human history has been in morals. Family, church, and school shared in this, the church providing the guidance. As it absorbs more and more of the time of the children, the school cannot escape the demand that it take care of education of this kind. Laws everywhere provide for it, but the practice is too generally a farce. There are wide differences in the measure of this neglect, but everywhere there remains a real need for constant home training in conduct and morals. The affection of children for their parents, and their recognition of parental authority, give the parents a particular advantage in training of this kind. And, in view of the supreme importance of conduct, it is clear that no function of the family is more important than the constant moral training of its children.

Accessory aims of the family:

Comfort

Aside from its chief aim, the family has also accessory aims, which, as such, require careful attention but which should on no account be allowed to interfere with the most perfect possible realization of its main purpose. One of these accessory aims is comfort in the family, as a prerequisite of family happiness. Comfort is a mental condition, and the material equipment which is necessary to provide it is altogether dependent upon education. Education, in this case, however, is not only that given in youth, but includes also that which every human being is constantly receiving. Nobody is comfortable if his material advantages are inferior to those to which he is accustomed or to those enjoyed by people about him. Any American or European would be uncomfortable without trousers, but the Igorot will endure anything rather than wear them. Some men would be as uncomfortable without dress suits in the evening as others would be if compelled to wear them. Some people have no use for light at night,

others are comfortable with candles, and still others with kerosene lamps, while those accustomed to the use of electric lights cannot be comfortable without them.

Anything habitually used to good purpose tends to become effectively necessary. Even luxuries, without any real use whatever, become essential to comfort when they have been enjoyed for some time. As an ethical proposition, a line should be drawn between the conditions of comfort which fairly can be regarded as necessary or at least really useful, and the things which become conditions of comfort as a result of habit or example but are luxuries in their nature. This line will of course not be the same for all people, but with due regard for financial condition and occupation such a line can always be drawn and, when useless things are under consideration, can be drawn with real profit.

There is a constant tendency to expect and to demand a progressive "improvement" in the scale of living. In so far as this demand is satisfied by the progress of civilization, which places the luxuries of the rich of one generation within the reach of all in the next, it is altogether good. It is also to be expected that a family will be in more comfortable circumstances twenty years afterward than immediately after marriage. But it is thoroughly wrong to train children to depend for happiness upon conditions of ease and luxury which they are not quite certain to be able to command for themselves later in life.

Making money

For the provision of necessary and of useful things, money is necessary. The acquisition of money to be used in securing such things is a very important family duty, subordinate and accessory only to the proper rearing of the children. Its vital nature as an accessory aim is indicated by statistics collected in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, where an investigation was made of every family in which a child was born during the year 1914. Of the babies born in families with a weekly income of ten dollars or less, two hundred and fifty-six in every thousand died

before reaching the age of one year; while in families with a weekly income of twenty-five dollars or more, only sixty-four babies in every thousand failed to live through the year.

Beyond proper provision for current needs, including the education of the children, parents ought to endeavor during their active years to accumulate such wealth as will provide for their proper care during old age. This attempt should not be permitted to interfere with the best possible equipment of the children; rather than this, the children should be trusted to use the advantages given them, for the support, in turn, of the parents. Or the state may be looked to to provide for the aged. Some states do this as a matter of charity, and never do it well. But other states make regular provision for the care of the old, not as a matter of charity, but as one of general public duty and policy, in order that the parents may feel free to use their income to the fullest extent for the training of their successors. Since the proper training of children is the greatest possible service to society, a return in the form of old age pensions is reasonable, and there is nothing unworthy about its acceptance by all old people, any more than about receiving a retirement pension after direct and formal public service.

Thrift

The development and practice of the habit of thrift in the family, important as it is for the economic welfare of the family, is of more far-reaching value in that it is essential to the formation by the children of the same habit. Thrift is not stinginess or miserliness. It does not consist in doing without necessities, nor in refusal to do one's full share in all proper social work. It is simply the opposite of wastefulness. Waste has been permitted to become characteristic of our American culture, until it is a menace to both the stability and the future development of our peculiar civilization. Confronted with the necessity of stopping our waste, primarily the task of the adult population, it is too obvious to need argument that, while

we do this, it is at the same time our very serious business to spare the next generation from this evil of our ways, and equally obvious that this is to be accomplished by education. The state and school attacked this problem energetically while we were at war but are not equally awake to it in peace. Whatever the school may do, this training will be most effective in the home where constant association and example make the molding of habit readily practicable.

Ambition for wealth

Vitally important as is the securing of an income of money, when regarded as a subordinate and accessory family aim, it is a wide-spread curse of family life when given undue or dominant stress. The pursuit of dollars, as the chief or sole activity of one of the parents, is the commonest cause of lack of paternal care and a common cause of family discord. It usually demands the larger part of the activity of the one parent and naturally becomes a habit, and the habit tends to grow and exclude other activity. Established as a habit, it tends, as many habits do, to excess. Even if the pursuit of wealth is successful, it is pernicious in excess, and the habit holds on after a sufficient income is realized, after wealth enough is accumulated to insure a sufficient income without further effort, and even after the accumulation of wealth has reached the point where its mere possession is a nuisance.

In this way, many of the families whose ability is such that they should realize the greatest success in their pursuit of proper aims sacrifice these proper aims and devote themselves, the one parent to the accumulation and care of useless money, and the other parent to its dissipation and the idle enjoyment of its fruits. The family which cannot afford children while it might have them cannot buy them when it could afford them. It is no accident that poor families average larger than rich ones, nor that the poor as well as the meek finally inherit the earth.

False standards of value

The result of the possession and "use" of superfluous money is the establishment of false standards of value.

As a result of habit, excessive wealth may become necessary for comfort, and its mere possession may become necessary for personal happiness. But this kind of happiness, like any other which is impossible for humanity in general and is not related to natural ultimate aims, is pathological. Many men eat too much, usually as an indirect result of overvaluing money, and are unhappy if decently fed. Still others, by a similar course, acquire the champagne habit and are unhappy while they are sober. Some of these men become gouty and must have their feet in a pack and on a stool, or else they are unhappy. Most of these forms of pathological happiness are accompanied by a large measure of unhappiness, all lead to unhappiness, all are selected out in the course of generations, and a sane man should be able to recognize them, one and all, as bad.

The man who acquires great wealth does so as a rule by effort, and the effort expended in securing it gives him an idea of its value. Those habituated to a surplus of money without having had to earn it have usually no idea at all of its value, merely regarding it as more important than anything else. The damage done by the establishment of false values is accordingly much greater to the children than to their fathers. Therefore, even if the accumulation of surplus money may do no harm to the parents, it still provides for the children the means of cheerful decadence, which they can almost invariably be trusted to indulge in within a generation or so. In this way, however well the parents themselves may appreciate their proper aims in life, if they pass superfluous fortunes down to their children they sooner or later defeat their hope of having successful descendants.

The time has not come when many men can be expected to abstain from leaving fortunes to their children for these reasons; nor are these considerations much of a consolation to those whose efforts fail to bring in as much money as they really need. Humanity grows wiser, though; and

the discontent of many people is likely in the future to result in a more equal distribution of the real blessings of wealth and in a consequent improvement of the family prospects of rich and poor alike.

Parents are equal partners

The spending, as well as the mere possession of superfluous money, is especially demoralizing when done by those who have not earned it. The father being normally the earner, the mother and children are likely to be less competent and responsible spenders. So far as the mother is concerned, however, any lack of sense of responsibility results from impropriety in the relations of the parents. The family is essentially a partnership, and an equal partnership, both parents being fairly bound to complete devotion to the accomplishment of the family's proper aims.

In the work of the family, a division of labor is as necessary, for the sake of efficiency, as it is in other business. So far as the lines of this division are established by nature, an incomparably larger share of the work falls to the mother. In compensation for the bearing, and for the larger part of the care of children by the mother, the burden of protection and support becomes in larger part the father's duty. Civilization has lightened his responsibility for protection and increased his responsibility for support. Wherever in the world population is not excessively dense it requires in these days no unreasonable effort for the father to provide for the support of his family and still have opportunity for his proper share in the education of the children and for leisure enough so that his "struggle for existence" should be a pleasure and not a grind. Where this is difficult, in the absence of excessive population, it is because of bad economic conditions, which a truly enlightened state must be able to remedy.

If the father is the sole financial support of the family, as he may be properly, he earns money as a partner, and as his contribution to the work of the family. It is no more his personal money than the children are the particular

property of the mother. If every father could and would appreciate this fact, it would go a long way toward making the life of every family the constant joy it ought to be. Foolishly enough and more strangely, the mother frequently sanctions her husband's feeling that the family property is particularly his because he earns it. Parents in general appreciate the fact that they are equally interested in the children. They need always likewise to remember that the father, in earning the income, merely contributes his share to the partnership, that this income is properly that of the firm, and that they are equally responsible for its care.

The head of the family

An equal partnership has no fixed head. In the division of labor in the family, each parent is expert or is expected to become so, in his or her own department of the family work. It is naturally conducive to good results that in each field the more expert member should exercise general control. In this there is no natural reason for questions of authority to arise and they certainly should not be allowed to become acute. Since people differ naturally in ability, one parent is likely to contribute more to the family welfare, and to exercise effective control of its affairs; and if the difference in ability is real, not assumed, the exercise of influence will not produce friction or discord. If these do result, the assumption of authority is probably not justified. An earnest enough mutual effort will prevent friction and discord in any family and is certainly worth while.

Culture of the parents

The parents ought obviously to be qualified to impart the training and instruction which the children need to receive from them. Since it is impossible to know what should be taught, except from a fund of knowledge and understanding much broader than is the material to be selected and imparted, it is important that the education of the parents should be decidedly superior to that which they are expected to pass to their children. To meet this demand, the parents must see that their own education

does not cease; that is, for the sake of the children, and thus as an accessory family aim, it is the duty of the parents to endeavor constantly to improve themselves mentally—or, if a distinction is made, mentally and morally. As an accessory family aim, this is exceedingly important, hardly less so than the securing of a proper income. It has been shown already that the ambition to improve ourselves, shown by the struggle to excel, is instinctive.

Like the struggle for wealth, the attempt at parental self-improvement is sometimes exalted into an aim in itself, and the danger that this will be done is particularly great because of the plausible pretext one may offer one's self in such an attempt. Justification of an effort at mental improvement and still more at moral improvement is so easy that in the pursuit of such aims and in enjoyment of the pursuit one is tempted to regard these aims as ultimate and to let nothing stand in the way.

There are two lines of reflection which should lead to a check on such a tendency, aside from the principle that all excess is dangerous. The first of these rests on the obvious fact that apparent personal improvement accomplished by the neglect of duty must be spurious, not real. The definite and immediate duty is always more certain than a vague and indefinite one, and should therefore receive attention in preference to the latter. The care of children, even construed as broadly as one will, is still more definite than is the moral improvement of self, taken in such a general sense that it is possible to place it in opposition to family responsibility. The second consideration is that, since the family is a partnership claiming constant precedence over the individual, neither parent retains rights in conflict with the interest of the family; and it is at least good policy to consider that the parents collectively have no rights conflicting with the family's ultimate interests, which are expected to be realized in and by the children and the children's children.

But, though the parents have not a right to improve

themselves when by so doing they would jeopardize still greater interests by the exercise of this right, they have a manifest duty which they can perform with the same proper results. As an ethical proposition, the performance of a duty is always regarded as better than the exercise of a right; and the substitution of a duty for the asserted or assumed right certainly need not result in any failure of the parents to perfect themselves to the greatest practicable extent. The duty of the parents to improve themselves for the benefit of the children is clear and mutual. Mutual encouragement and assistance in this effort, with intelligent mutual appreciation of its proper object, promise a constant return of satisfaction and happiness.

These statements are made in somewhat vague and general terms. Their object is to affect the disposition rather than any specific acts. One might be more specific, and, presuming sympathy and affection, suggest the reading of good books and the discussion of real interests, in preference to killing time, gossip, and the light touching of transient interests; but, if the disposition to improve and to be improved is active and mutual, the details of action will reflect the disposition and accomplish its aims. The details of deliberate parental improvement will always be safe and appropriate if the interests of the children are kept constantly in mind.

Children are partners in the family

The children are minor partners in the family firm. Their voice in its management may grow with their years, but is always subordinate. As they approach independence, they should share freely in its counsel, to prepare them properly to take their places as heads of families in their turn. From childhood on, however, they should be trained in appreciation of their status as the ultimate beneficiaries of all its efforts. This appreciation will strengthen the natural bonds of affection, and make the child proud and zealous in whatever help he can contribute to the family's work and welfare.

This co-operation by the children is tremendously im-

portant. Their industry and thrift may not be required for the family's financial security and may not be great factors if they are needed. The training they give themselves by co-operation of this kind has real and enduring value. But the greatest benefit of their appreciation of their place in the family comes from their sense of responsibility for their own education. The educations received, on the one hand by the boy who submits to it as the sad but fortunately temporary fate of youth, and on the other by the youth who goes after it eagerly as, aside from life, the one real benefit to him of all past human effort and achievement, are too different to be compared. The boy who in mere docility honestly tries to educate himself has still no chance in competition with the boy who goes at it with enthusiastic zeal to make the efforts of his parents bear finer fruit than such efforts ever did before.

Duration of family

We have been discussing the family as an institution of two generations. It is tied in each direction, by the same kind of bonds, to another generation. The ideal family bonds are strong enough to resist the scattering of the members and to endure in spite of eventual separation. Each member is stronger and safer if the family ties are strong and lasting. Beyond the family occupying one home, the tie of blood is through the parents, grandparents, and ancestors. It is where the memory of the forebears is cherished and revered that the safety and welfare of each home are insured and enhanced by the strength of the larger family. Scoffing at family trees is a popular democratic pastime. But it is the teaching of common sense and history alike that pride in family is a source of strength, security, and inspiration. How much of the achievement in a series of generations of the Darwin family, the Adams family, and the Alcmaeonidae is due to inherited ability, and how much to the inspiration of family pride, no man may say.

The family, being itself a necessary group of individuals,

The family the unit of the state

is the natural unit of the state. States differ in the directness and completeness with which the larger organization is based on the family unit. There is a spreading tendency to regard the state as composed of individuals, rather than of families. The inevitable effect of making the individual the unit of the state is to weaken the family as such a unit, and it is very doubtful if the family can be weakened in this respect without being weakened in other respects at the same time. It is accordingly not strange that this tendency manifests itself in association with a congestion of population in cities which is itself unfavorable to the best family life, with the sacrifice of homes for flats, and with the wide-spread ambition of women to become wage earners.

Woman suffrage is of course a feature of such a tendency; for if the unit of the state is the individual, it certainly ought not to be the individual man more than the individual woman. There is no question that exclusive management of state affairs by the men has sometimes resulted in unfairness to the women. If the only method of preventing such unfairness is the regular participation of women in political affairs, they ought clearly to participate.

In the exercise of political activity by women, however, the fact must not be overlooked that the substitution of the individual for the family as the real political unit is to be expected to weaken the family. The family is a very old institution. Possibly it is antiquated. Some people believe that we are approaching the necessity of social reorganization, and the development of a social structure in which the family will play a less important part than it has done in the past. In contemplating such a possibility, we may not forget that the family is so very old that our instincts as well as our education are responsible for the happiness we find in family life. Woman suffrage is a settled condition; it may have been necessary, before men could be made to vote and legislate as repre-

sentatives of families and of the whole people rather than as individuals and the representatives of men. By itself, it need not injure the family.

Mutual dependence within the family

The common demand of women for activity and opportunities aside from those and beyond those provided by the hitherto general social structure based upon the family as the social unit is a more dangerous symptom of discontent. The opening of many new occupations to women certainly makes them more independent, but it does not with any such certainty improve their prospect of happiness. We have made independence a fetich. The time of independence for families was milleniums ago; that of independence within families never was nor will be. There is no proper independence of man or woman. Whichever practices such independence dies, and that is the end of it.

Human life is growing constantly more diversified and complicated, or, as people vaguely say, more full. On the whole, the wider opportunities have developed outside the family rather than in the home. The removal of children from the home for longer schooling creates the opportunity and the need for new activities for women. How far it may be possible to adjust the opportunities of men and women, with fairness to both, by bringing opportunity into the family, rather than by forcing women to go outside in their search for it, is not clear. Surely, however, such an attempt should be made, earnestly and enthusiastically, by men and women alike, before the home is placed or kept in too serious jeopardy through the enjoyment by men of opportunities which are unfairly superior.

It has been bred in our blood to find our greatest happiness in the home. The home is not woman's sphere alone. Except as man's share of the family duties drives him to outside activity for the family support and the maintenance of the larger social structure, the home is man's best sphere also.

CHAPTER XII

THE STATE

We return now to the subject of political organization. The science treating particularly of this subject was called politics by Aristotle, who made it the latter half of the course of instruction of which his ethics made up the first part. We more generally use civics with this meaning, and use politics as the name of the art of government. It is not our business here to make any thorough study of politics or civics. But the treatment of ethics would be very incomplete without a general understanding of the formal organization of society, on whatever scale, from village to empire. For, while the particular field of ethics is the conduct of the individual, it has constantly to consider the individual as a member of society.

Theories of government

A. *Laissez faire:*

The aim is freedom of individual effort

There are three general ideas as to the proper aim of political or governmental effort. One of these is that the chief function of government is to secure to the people the largest possible opportunity for the exercise of individual initiative and effort; that is, the greatest possible freedom. This idea was highly developed in ancient Athens. In modern times, the philosophic development of this idea or theory was to a great extent the work of French writers; but, in the practice of government, England and English-speaking lands led in the steady development of the principle. The general trend of English government for a long time was toward a state in which each individual should have the fullest measure of freedom which is possible without conflict with the exercise of the same right to a similar extent by other citizens, one in which each citizen should pursue his own ambitions with the least possible social or political interference. Believers in this theory of government place the greatest emphasis on the rights of the individual. At the same time, they recognize, of course, the fact that every man's freedom

must be limited to some extent by the freedom which the same system of government must also give to his neighbors in the pursuit and realization of their ambitions.

B. The direct aim is the happiness, or satisfaction of the people

A second idea or ideal of government is that its primary function is to promote, as fully as it can, the happiness of the people governed. In this use of the word, happiness may mean no more than satisfaction; but it should be synonymous, rather, with welfare. Taking it in company with the ideal of temperance, that is, with proper regard to restraint under the guidance of wisdom, and to avoidance of the temptation to pursue a good idea to an extreme, we may well accept the happiness of the people as a proper aim of their joint efforts, as a state. But caution is always needed in exalting happiness as the direct object of effort, whether individual or collective. It has uncounted possible sources. There are many and various phases of happiness which hardly exist except as the result of education. By the appropriate exercise of its function of education, the state can therefore secure the happiness of its people, and at the same time follow any one of a wide range of policies. Two contrasting illustrations will make this plain. As we have been educated, we certainly derive happiness from the exercise of our personal freedom. But the accounts of Peru before the conquest by Spain describe the people as ideally happy under a government which permitted no individual freedom at all.

The fact is that all education modifies the sources of happiness. A boy's attempts to enjoy himself change from year to year. Whenever responsibility begins to develop, and open the way for the happiness which comes with achievement, such happiness as Diogenes claimed to find in total absence of care becomes impossible. The Garden of Eden ceased to exist forever when Adam tasted the fruit of wisdom. It is also clear that the happiness of individuals, like their freedom, may be incompatible. It is a reasonable policy of the state to endeavor to adjust the conflict of individual interests, as regards happiness

and freedom alike, and to seek to provide the greatest possible average happiness, or, what amounts to the same thing, the greatest total happiness of the citizens.

C. The aim of the state is collective efficiency

The third idea as to the proper aim of government is that it should develop the people as a whole as completely as it can, develop them collectively rather than individually. The aim of the state would then be to be composed primarily of efficient citizens, efficient in co-operation, rather than of free citizens or contented citizens. And efficiency in such a state is measured by what the individual can contribute to the general welfare, rather than by what he can accomplish in the pursuance of individual and sometimes selfish ambition. The competition between modern states tends to demand emphasis upon this ideal of government. Wise and efficient administration, holding to this ideal, may be expected to place the state and the people at a great advantage, whether in the political competition between states, or in the economic, or even the cultural, competition between peoples. Such a state can realize the advantages of co-operation and organization in the fullest possible measure.

Here again, the danger lies in the carrying of a good idea to a bad extreme. A governmental policy which is justified chiefly by the demands of competition is likely to become focussed on that most strenuous form of competition, war. Philip made his people efficient, and he and Alexander utilized their efficiency with most conspicuous results; but not only were these monarchs without known descendants a few years after they died, but the Macedonian race disappeared within a few centuries.

Modern history furnishes a most perfect illustration of the danger of the ideal of efficiency. During the half-century ending in 1914, collective efficiency was the whole aim of German government. The effects of this policy were shown in every phase of German life. At a rate which the world had never seen before, science and its applications went ahead; national wealth increased and

standards of living were raised; health improved and average life was prolonged; the basic education of the whole population and the higher and technical education of a proper proportion were improved; the power to support a home population increased vastly, and at the same time the German population grew enough to Germanize neighboring land peacefully and colonize lands more remote; and the German state kept itself powerful enough to banish the danger, if not, perhaps, the fear, of such foreign interference as had held the German people back in preceding centuries. All of this was accomplished in spite of a distraction of effort, for the sake of power, far beyond the reasonable demands of safety. And then war, made inevitable and precipitated by the efficiency of German preparation for it, undid these achievements, in a tenth of the time it had taken to accomplish them, with a thoroughness which cannot yet be appraised.

The ideal state will harmonize these aims

Looking at these ideals of government as we do at personal ideals, and recognizing, in the light of history and common sense, that there is good in all of them, it is easy to understand that they are good only in moderation. Excess must lead to stagnation, if happiness is made the direct and dominant ideal; to warfare and ultimately to destruction, if efficiency is unduly exalted; to collective helplessness, if the interests of individual freedom are carried to an extreme. The same war which revealed the evil of unrestrained efficiency forced England, for the first time in centuries, to assert the full right of the state to control the activities of the individual. In practice, the usual way of government is to seek a compromise between these aims, and this is found, in general, by the mere avoidance of excess in the pursuit of any one of them. But the way of wisdom is not to seek compromise, but harmony. And they can be harmonized when we recognize a higher purpose of government, to which each of these aims stands in a subordinate relation.

The ultimate aim of government is the survival of the people

As the whole argument in the preceding chapters must make us expect, we find this higher purpose of government in the ideal of survival. The dominant aim of any people is to survive. Their government or state is the greatest of the instruments which they use for the accomplishment of this aim. As the individual finds his happiness and recognizes his welfare in acts and in conditions which are favorable to his survival, so do people collectively, whether in small units, as the family, or in the largest unit, the independent state. It is therefore perfectly right that the proper happiness and welfare of the people should be the aim of governmental effort. Wisdom, applied to statecraft, as to the conduct of the individual, demands that welfare should be recognized as that which promises survival, and that happiness be not found in effort, accomplishment, or conditions which immediately or ultimately are conducive to failure to live.

The form of government

We have already concluded that so far as a conclusion can be drawn from history there is no necessary connection between the form of government and the success of the state. Success in war has been a main theme of history, and has been achieved most often by strongly centralized governments with monarchs of almost unlimited authority; the Mongol Khanate and the empire of Alexander are good examples. Still, Rome, as a republic, made herself without a rival in military strength. The same lesson can be drawn from history if other phases of success are considered. The Peruvians were happy under a monarchy so absolute that it dictated where each man might live, what he must do and whom he must marry. But the Athenians were certainly happy in the exercise of a democracy more complete than could be attempted except where the city composed a sovereign state.

Advantage of democracy

But, though history may not teach clearly that any one form of government is in general superior to others, the conclusions reached on other grounds in preceding chapters furnish grounds for a different judgment. We have

found, in discussing the sources of happiness, that it is to be found in very perfect form in intelligent public service. Some forms of government exclude a large part of the people, regardless of their particular abilities, from the opportunity to render such service, and are therefore ill-fitted to secure to their people this proper form of happiness. Similarly, from the standpoint of efficiency; it is clear that a government which limits the ambition of a part of its people inevitably limits the accomplishment of those whose ambition is curbed. The most efficient state must be that which utilizes for each purpose the services of the citizens who can perform this service most perfectly. As an ideal, it may be that this could be accomplished only by testing every citizen as to his capacity in every direction, which is obviously impossible. It is possible, however, to work toward such an ideal; and in the measure in which they approach it states must secure the maximum of efficiency, and of public service in the broadest sense, from their people.

Every state seeks, in one way or another, to secure the service of competent people for its offices. Even the classic tyrant of Corinth, whose policy was to keep himself secure by killing every citizen of marked ability, still needed dependable spies and executioners. It is the universal practice of governments to advance their public servants in rank from time to time, promotion depending more or less completely upon demonstrated fitness; but, where admission to such service in the first place depends upon arbitrary selection, or is restricted by any kind of class distinction, the fitness of the most able citizens may never be discovered. It is not likely that any government, by the most perfect selection, on the part of the government, of men to be trained for particular service, can accomplish such results as are possible where ambition is given the widest play, and the citizens as a whole are encouraged to train themselves with the prospect of free opportunity. Taking the number of citizens into account,

no modern state has remotely approached ancient Athens in the public achievements of its citizens; and the character of the Athenian government, which required some public service of each citizen and encouraged every citizen to compete for public favor of a wide variety of kinds, must be given a fair share of credit for this record. In spite of the glamour which attaches to the idea of "the office seeking the man," it is still true that the man who wants to do a thing is therefore likely to do it well; that the man who so appreciates the happiness to be derived from public service that he will, on his own initiative, train himself for it, is therefore more likely than one who inherits the opportunity, or has it thrust upon him, to make a good public servant.

The freest opportunity is certainly given to the individual citizens by a democratic government, democratic being used to indicate government by the people as a whole, not by the *demos* as a class. An ideal democratic government must provide the best opportunity for the development of diversified efficiency, personal, social, and political, and at the same time furnish the best opportunity, even if not necessarily the best guaranty, for the achievement of happiness by the people. It certainly gives the people the largest possible measure of freedom. We can conclude, therefore, that an ideal democracy is the best form of government for the performance of all three of the functions of government which at different times or in different places have been regarded as its ultimate aims. And since wisdom will, when necessary, focus efficiency on the means of survival, it is not possible that any government will best serve these aims collectively without, at the same time, furnishing the best prospect of survival.

Difficulties of democracy

The fact that an ideal democracy should accomplish ends which historical democracies have not usually approached has of course its explanation in the fact that historical democracies have not been ideal. Aside from the general fact that an ideal is in its nature in advance

of practice, it is a particular fact that in practice democracies have been very far indeed from ideal. Government of any form ought to improve as experience shows opportunity for improvement; but most democracies have been short-lived. The Athenian government did not compare with that of Sparta in durability. The Swiss republic has lasted well, but as a very qualified democracy. France is republican for the third time in not much more than a century. The Chinese republic is so young and ill-established that the people may doubt its being one. Monarchies and oligarchies have always disliked republican or democratic neighbors, fearing infection from them. So Sparta upset democracies at every opportunity. And the great European monarchies, after the Napoleonic era, imposed a king on France, and forcibly repressed democratic tendencies elsewhere. The outcome of the World War has really been to make democracy safer by making it prevail in the world.

Even the republics which have been in existence for some time mostly fail in large measure to realize the theoretical benefits of their form of government. This is true of the United States of America, and much more so of some of the other American republics. Such efficiency of government as would seem reasonably to be expected has never been realized. And even freedom, the advantage most confidently expected, has repeatedly proved more nominal than real; Mexico and Venezuela have been examples.

Danger of excess

Democracy is no more proof against excess than are other good things. The ideal aimed at is the development and use of the full abilities of the citizens. The excess which experience shows to be dangerous lies in the attempt to entrust the details of government to all of the people without regard to training or particular ability. Fear of authority and mistrust of officials will be discussed in another paragraph, with their origin in history. It is as the pendulum, cutting loose from the past, swings too far,

that the determination of little matters of policy, and the details of administration are made the business of the individual citizens. The possibility of doing this without serious impairment of governmental efficiency is an inverse function of the size and autonomy of the political unit.

Complete democracy possible in small units

A New England village of a few score families, or a country school district, has little and simple business, in which everybody is interested and about which all should be well informed. The town or district meeting keeps up interest and insures information; and discussion of the purchase price of a cord of wood may be worth while. Similar methods are not appropriate in the government of a state with some million voters and a budget running into the hundreds of millions of dollars. But the disposition to prescribe the details of government in these large units is one of the reasons for the inconvenient multitude of laws which hamper administration in every state in the union. The tendency to carry details back to the ultimate source of authority, in the people, is more evidently shown by such schemes as the referendum, the initiative, and the recall, and by measures empowering the legislative branch of government, as more responsive to the popular will than the judicial, to override the latter in determining the constitutionality of legislation. All of these ideas are based on lack of confidence in those chosen to represent the people. The last has not been tried. The others have repeatedly been proved inconvenient and expensive. The recall is likely to require a special election, expensive in money and more so in time; and then it may not carry. The initiative provides for a road which turns out to be altogether impracticable; but the legislature cannot correct the direct expression of the people's will, and reroute it. The referendum suspends needed legislation for a year or so, and is defeated; meanwhile, a minority has held up the state. A foundation of money insures the repeated submission by initiative of a single-tax amendment to the Constitution, which is regularly voted

down, at considerable expense to the state. And in such ways ballots are made so long and confusing that many voters cease to try to understand issues of importance.

Certainly, these "reforms" find a good use also. But it is no less certain that in great political units the people cannot govern effectively except through their representatives. If the authority of these is curtailed, even in favor of the people from whom they receive it, their responsibility suffers at the same time; and their sense of responsibility is the best guaranty of their good service. Government by the people is always likely to be expensive. If it is made unnecessarily expensive, and, besides this, inconvenient and therefore inefficient, democracy can cease to be a blessing, just as surely as other good things turn to evil in excess. The safer cure for the evils which have provoked the measures just discussed is unlimited care in the securing of competent and trustworthy public servants.

Historical conflict between people and government

While government in general has existed because it was good for the people, the people of most states have had good reason to fear their governments, and to be very careful in guarding any individual rights they might be able to establish. Existing and historical republics have all been formed by people who had lived under government of some other form, and as a result of the people's dislike of government as they had previously known it. They do not suddenly outgrow this attitude toward government when they form a new one, as is illustrated by the history and condition of the United States. The American colonists had been brought up under English laws, with English methods of legal procedure. Both the law and the procedure had been developed in England as the outcome of conflict between the government, as represented by the crown and the aristocracy, on the one side, and the body of the English people, on the other. The law itself to some extent, and the methods of applying criminal law to a very large extent, had been devised for the protection of the people against the government,

and were in their history concessions which the people had wrung from the government in the course of centuries. Some of the old law and the essential features of its application still survive in the United States.

When the colonies became free, they establshed a government intending that it should represent the people; but they were unable to realize at once that it was entirely their own, and to rid themselves of the feeling that they needed protection against it. By retaining legal machinery devised for protection against the former government, they have preserved the feeling that the citizen needs such protection; and as long as this feeling endures, the complete sympathy of people and government, which is essential for the full success of a democracy, remains impossible. The remedy for such lack of sympathy, for the lack of the full realization that a republic is really a government by the people and necessarily for the people, will be found in universal and thorough education on this particular point. On the one hand, if the people were effectively educated in this respect, they would promptly do away with governmental machinery which in effect has no function except their defense against themselves. On the other hand, if the machinery of government were revised in this respect, the result should be an improvement in the attitude of the people toward their government. Progress, in this as in other matters, must build upon itself. Considering the time that the United States has had a republican government, and the general appreciation of the fact that American legal procedure is a mischievous misfit where the state really represents its citizens, progress in its reform is surprisingly slow. French procedure is much more rational in its basic principles than American.

Conflict of class interests

A more serious obstacle to the success of democratic government, because its foundation is only partly historical and in part is a constant and chronic development, is the conflict of interest between classes of people. As a state is a great co-operative institution, each of its

elements should contribute to the welfare of every other element. As this ideal is approached, any conflict of interest ceases to be real; but even then, in default of perfect understanding, people may think that the interests of classes conflict. When a republic is organized as a state of considerable size, there are inevitably in the beginning classes or groups of people which either have conflicting interests or have been educated with ideas of class loyalty or at least with the belief that they have conflicting interests. The organization in detail of a republican government is possible only by the adjustment and compromise or harmonization of these real or supposed conflicting interests. If a compromise is incorporated into the organization of the government, it tends to keep alive the feeling of conflict. If neither harmony nor a compromise is accomplished, the conflict between classes may be more acute and may endanger more seriously the stability of the state. More or less definitely, compromises are always made, and incorporated into the laws. Russia's attempt to create a social structure without classes, by the destruction of all classes except one, is, without succeeding, a tyranny, peculiar only in the class which does the exploiting.

The most conspicuous class distinctions are those associated with officially established rank, as that of a ruling class or a nobility, in contrast with the common people. Because the distinction in this case is a clear-cut one, and because such distinction is historical rather than current in its nature, such classes do not present a permanent difficulty to a democracy.

Classes distinguished by wealth

The class distinctions which most embarass democracies and are largely responsible for their imperfections are those due to unequal distribution of property. Distinctions of this kind not only exist at the beginning, but in the history of all democracies are constantly developing. In Plato's ideal republic, all citizens had equal wealth at first, and none could accumulate more than five times this

common measure. In every civilization, the wealthy people have more power individually than do the poor. The poor desire to gain wealth and, envying the rich, isolate them in their minds as a class. So far as they can, the rich use the power which their wealth gives them to strengthen themselves in its possession. Without enmity toward the poor and in the full and natural belief that their course is the only right one, they almost inevitably seek to organize the state in such a manner that wealth itself is established in power and to secure the adoption of laws which in effect recognize wealth as having interests more or less comparable to those of people. Out of the conflicting efforts of the individually stronger rich and the more numerous poor, there grows a legal system designed, as the result of one set of efforts, to protect property rights, and, as the result of the other set of efforts, to protect men against the power which wealth confers.

The socialist doctrine: wealth belongs to society

There is no question that money depends absolutely upon society for its value; and property aside from money is very largely dependent upon society in the same manner. With the wealth which any man could produce by himself without the assistance of other men, and without their recognition of its value, he would be incomparably poorer than the "common man" of any civilized state. For all that we have which we owe to the help of other men, or to our association with other men and to their recognition of its value, we are clearly indebted to society; and as an abstract proposition it is reasonable that we should recognize what we owe to society as the property of society rather than of ourselves as individuals. This is the doctrine of extreme socialism. If it be granted in its entirety there will be no rich and no poor and no classes identifiable by the possession of wealth. The ruthless application of this idea would carry another good idea to an evil extreme. Neither would it do away with conflict; for the beneficiaries and the sufferers from the device would next appear as hostile forces.

Looking at the same problem in another way, we must agree that men are entitled to what they really earn by their own efforts. If one man works industriously and constantly while another is as idle as he can be and live, it would obviously be unfair to deny to the industrious man the fruit of his labor, even though it be society which gives much of its value to this fruit. Men differ also in ability. It has been asserted that men are not to be blamed or praised because of inequality of ability; and it can be argued from this principle that the more able do not by equal effort earn more than the less able. However, we are dealing with practical questions and seeking practical answers. By ignoring actual conditions while we argue theories to conclusions, we may reach conclusions as foolish as those of the mathematician who divides by a masked zero.

Individual industry is entitled to reward

In practice, difference in ability is decidedly difficult to measure. Some men keep busy when others feel unable to do so and let themselves be idle. The man who knows that he is able to work, and therefore does work, is entitled to a reward which is not earned and not properly claimed for the man who underrates or fails to utilize his ability; it is not always possible to distinguish between ability and industry. In practice, moreover, society benefits by the wealth industry produces, however completely it is ever recognized as the property of the producer. We are never without some current illustration of injury to society by curtailment of production because the producers of some article or other feel inadequately rewarded. During a coal strike the curtailment is deliberate and the public may be excited. Far more generally it is not deliberate and no clamor results, as when men cease to raise cattle because beef sells for less than the cost of cattle feed.

Aside from any theoretical relation betwen ability and industry, we must recognize the fact that all progress in this world, both human and pre-human, has been due to the advantage which ability confers and the consequent

selection of the more able. Whenever the attempt to establish an ideally social state is carried to such an extreme that ability confers no advantage on its possessor, progress will very largely cease, and such a state will certainly succumb in competition with other states in which ability continues to be rewarded and selected. Since the ideal state must, before everything else, be able to survive, we must conclude that its organization and laws must recognize the right of industry and ability to a reward, and must therefore permit differences, in at least acquired wealth and opportunity, between some citizens and other citizens. But if we lay it down as a general principle that each citizen is entitled to an opportunity to utilize his own industry and ability and to enjoy their fruits, we must again invoke wisdom to withhold us from an extreme; else the conflict of interest between citizens and their classes will prove that we have again set up an "impractical ideal."

The interests of society and of its components must be harmonized

The democracy which would work toward its proper ideal must therefore harmonize the two conflicting ideas just presented, that wealth owes its existence to society, and that the individual is entitled to the fruit of his own industry and ability. No state has ever yet harmonized or compromised these two ideas in a permanently satisfactory manner, and a permanently satisfactory balance probably never will be possible; for with progress conditions change, and to changing conditions there must be constant adjustment. Up to the present time, it is probable that no state has harmonized them in a manner which even temporarily gave general satisfaction. Possibly because dissatisfaction finds freer expression in a democracy, democracies have probably been less successful in this respect than some other governments; and this is one important reason why democracy has not long since become the prevailing type of state.

The effort of democracies to avoid the formal recognition of class distinctions has made it peculiarly difficult

for them to deal with questions which in practice grow out of the conflict of class interests and to curb the unlimited development of class inequality. It has already been indicated that a class which can be defined and is recognized offers less difficulty, even to the satisfactory conduct of a democracy, than a class which is ill-defined and not clearly recognized. Some forms of government recognize classes due to birth and station, and the power these classes hold gives the government an unmistakable advantage, if it will use it, in controlling, and when necessary in restricting the power of, an undefined but nevertheless real and eventually dangerous class which is due to wealth, or of any class whatever identified or defined by its attitude toward wealth.

Although it is probably true that the difficulty of democracy in dealing with conflict between wealthy classes and poor ones has been to a considerable extent responsible for the shortcomings of democracies, we do not need to conclude that this difficulty necessarily inheres in a democratic form of government. Before doing this, we would better recognize the difficulty frankly, and try to solve it. If there is a practicable solution, it is obviously to be found in a proper determination of the share of wealth which belongs to society as a whole, and of that which may fitly be regarded as individual. In the republics of today, we can find many reasons for believing that society is receiving less than its proper share of the total wealth.

The proper distribution of wealth determined by its use

Before attempting to reach any conclusions as to the methods of improving the present distribution of wealth, we may accept as fundamental principles: First, that the interests of the state are those of its citizens as a whole. Second, that neither money nor other wealth has utility in itself, nor any value, except by virtue of the use men can make of it. Third, that the economic interests of a state are essentially subordinate to the social interests, when these can be distinguished. Except with a view to

its use, wealth is not entitled to consideration by the state. The state must take an interest in its production and conservation for the sake of the use which can be made of it. And individuals are entitled to the use of the wealth produced by their industry and ability.

Private and public uses of wealth

If the last clause be construed strictly, as it reasonably may be, it follows that no individual can claim from a thoroughly enlightened state protection in the possession of wealth which he cannot use. The insurance of its owner's happiness, with due regard to that of other people, is a proper use of wealth. The exceptionally industrious and capable man may expect protection in the use of the wealth he produces for the establishment and maintenance of houses and grounds and the employment of service, for travel, and for the purchase of a great variety of things which contribute to the real and reasonable happiness he gets from life, all of which things may be beyond the reach of less industrious and less capable men. Granting these facts, it still remains the case that many men of superior ability, at least in the acquisition of wealth, accumulate wealth beyond that they can possibly use for the production of normal happiness, and finally, if they get happiness from it at all, do so from its possession rather than from its use. It is also believed that many men accumulate wealth until its possession becomes a care rather than a source of normal happiness. At the same time the state as a whole has always at its disposal less wealth than it might use to good purpose in the interest of the people as a whole and in the general promotion of its proper interests as a state. When, for example, a considerable part of the population of a city enjoys the use of such small incomes that a reasonable proportion of the babies cannot be kept alive through the first year, although great wealth is produced and large fortunes are being built up in it, the inequality in the distribution of wealth is seriously prejudicial to the survival of the community.

Attempts to improve the distribution of wealth

The attempts to secure better distribution of wealth and of the advantages wealth brings have taken three general lines: first, direct efforts to increase the incomes of wage-earners; second, government ownership of public utilities; and, third, taxes on incomes and inheritances.

1. Increased income by the poor

Efforts to increase the incomes of wage-earners, as a class in general poor and needing better support, are naturally initiated by the wage-earners themselves. The usual procedure is the formation of unions and similar societies which, operating on a large scale and presenting a united front, exert more power in dealing with employers and associations of employers than is possible for any number of laborers as individuals. Their weapon is the strike, used or threatened. Organized labor has certainly benefited by its organization; and it is commonly accepted as true that this gain has been in the general interest of society. Even so, the method is bad. The use of force (by striking), the threat of force, and the recognition of the necessity of force, to be exerted by a part of the people against another part, for the accomplishment even of results which the interest of the state clearly demands, are in themselves assertions and admissions of the state's inefficiency.

If a part of the population is getting less than it fairly earns of the use of the total production of wealth, and less than it is in the interest of the whole state that it should receive, it is clearly the proper business of the state as an organization to correct this condition. It is not to be expected that equitable distribution of wealth will ever, unless merely by chance, result from conflict between labor and capital; even if these factions could reach and maintain a fair settlement as concerns themselves, they would hardly observe a fair regard for the interests of the considerable part of the people of every state outside of both classes. The only proper and the only practicable method of solving this problem is by investigation and decision on the part of the state, the sole agency

responsible for the interests of every element of the population. The state, representing the whole people, has unquestionably the right, the authority, and the duty, to ascertain and serve its best interests, and the power, if it will assert it, to execute its decisions. Wage-fixing and price-fixing are features of such a policy. In governments unhampered by theory or constitution, such acts have been common. Thus Kublai would interfere in detail, at his arbitrary will, when abuse was to be corrected. And the old Siamese policy of conserving a four-year supply of rice stabilized the real return of industry, at the same time that it insured the national food supply. In modern western states, such a policy is still somewhat novel, except in the crisis of war; but the tendency toward it is evident. Fixing of a minimum wage is a recognized function of the several states; and the government of the United States does this in certain cases, as that of seamen, and conducts investigations of steadily increasing scope and thoroughness. In the enforcement of decisions, England goes much farther. If progress in this direction is exceedingly careful, it will be real progress.

2. Public ownership of public utilities

The government ownership and operation of public utilities, to a greater or less extent, is the accepted policy of enlightened states, and this practice is constantly extending. Its spread is always resisted by the plea that it interferes with private business. There have been times when the carrying on of war was largely a private enterprise. The collection of taxes has at some time been so regarded in most countries. Although this is now generally regarded as an exclusive function of government, it is not two decades since poll taxes were collected for a percentage in some American states, and the "opium farm" in some British colonies was granted to the highest bidder; such practices may not yet be quite extinct. Preservation of domestic order and peace is a government function, and the defense of private right by the private use of force is more restricted year by year. Water has been sold uni-

versally in cities as private business; but the provision of water to the inhabitants by city governments is now very general. Under the common law, the water in streams belongs to the owners of adjacent land; but a number of American states have recently established the public ownership of all water not already in private use. It is not many years since illumination was exclusively a private enterprise; but very many cities now own and operate their lighting plants, and, incidental to the provision of light, furnish heat and power also. And it has become fixed state and national policy, in granting the use of water power to private interests, to limit this grant to some definite period. Transportation used to be entirely private enterprise, and toll bridges and roads have not yet disappeared. But canals and harbors are now almost all public; various governments operate railroad lines; some own steamship lines, while many subsidize them; and many cities own and manage their street-car lines. Communication was once a private function; but now the mails are everywhere public, and many governments operate the related service of the telegraph and telephone.

Examples of socialization of activity

As a rule, the change from private to state ownership and control results in the more universal and complete enjoyment of the utility by the whole people. It is a curious fact, and perhaps the best single illustration of the common inefficiency of democratic government in the past, that progress in government ownership and operation of public utilities has been decidedly slower in republics than in states of other form. This is only partly explained by the fact that a ruling class may have other inducement than public service moving it to place the state in control of industry.

The adoption by additional states of the ownership of utilities already nationalized in others is one phase of progress in this direction. The detailed supervision of utilities left in private ownership is another, not always so recognized. But the most important phase is the steady

change of feeling as to what activities are properly regarded as coming under the head of public service. It has just been pointed out that most of the activities now so regarded were once considered to be matters of purely private enterprise. In many single lines, individual states have gone far beyond the rest of the world, as is illustrated by a camphor monopoly in Japan, a platinum monopoly in Russia, and a match monopoly in France. It may be that the chief incentive to the government in such cases lies at first in prospective revenue; but the fact that the government controls any activity results in the acceptance of the idea that it properly controls it, and in its final acceptance as a "natural" public utility.

Extent of socialization

One cannot foresee how far this tendency will go in the reasonably near future. There has so far been a general disposition to leave all retail business in private hands, and with this the directly associated wholesale business, and, still more, the productive industries. In accordance with this, there has been little nationalization of the activities which provide food and clothing. However, every European government engaged in the World War assumed charge of the supply of food; and Denmark, at least, among states not at war, took control of clothing. In peace times a number of Oriental states habitually buy and sell rice on a sufficient scale to insure a supply and regulate the price. As food and clothing are the most basic and universal necessities of all people, and the general welfare depends fundamentally upon an adequate supply and decent quality, it is unquestionably the proper business of the state to interfere and assume charge of the industries which supply these necessities whenever interference is really needed.

The control of foodstuffs is intimately related to the control of the land which produces them. In this direction, the Dominions in the Antipodes have gone farthest; but there is, the world over, a large number of people who have come to the conclusion that the land itself should

be regarded as the wealth of the state rather than of the individual—an idea which seems to have been general in the world at the dawn of history. This idea finds most familiar present expression in the single-tax theory. The city of Pittsburgh levies a tax on land disproportionate to that on improvements. As is true of other good things, progress in the direction of nationalization of industry and of the means of industry may go too far. It is very difficult while a great movement is in progress to determine its proper limitations or to arrest it before it goes to excess. This is especially true because no judgment in these matters is permanently right; it was in the general interest that individual enterprise should enjoy more freedom in America a century ago than would be tolerable now.

Nationalization of land

One tendency with regard to the limitation of government ownership is to restrict it to activities which demand the use of capital in publicly desired work but in quantities greater than are available in private hands. Great irrigation works in India, the Sudan, and the United States, and the Panama Canal are examples. Activities demanded by the public weal, but likely to be unprofitable financially, are expected to be public; for example, railroads built for strategic purposes. Because the state has normally better credit than citizens or groups of citizens, it can reclaim land and expect settlers on it to pay for the reclamation where this would be impossible if they had to pay a higher rate of interest on the cost of the work. It is obviously reasonable that private enterprise abstain from enterprises which promise no returns to the investors. But it is equally clear that the state ought not to be expected to enter upon undertakings which do not attract private enterprise, build them up until they become profitable, and then withdraw. If it is in the interest of the people as a whole that the state control any particular activity, it should do this irrespective of the probability of financial profit. Whether it should make a profit or

should furnish its output or service at cost or at a loss must be decided upon the merits of the individual case.

Inefficiency in public management

Aside from the usual prejudice in favor of the existing order, which protests against almost every step toward the nationalization of activities that the proposed change will interfere with private enterprise, and aside from the facts that enterprise is a private function as well as a public one and that socialization may go too far and very probably will go too far while the trend is in that direction, the chief practical objection to the governmental operation of large enterprises is that the state operates them less efficiently than private enterprise could do it. As a general rule it is probable that private enterprise is more efficient than state operation. Sometimes the difference in favor of private efficiency is flagrant. Against these extreme cases can be balanced those in which private monopoly has worked public hardship. A large measure of inefficiency in the operation of a public ice plant is preferable to a high death rate because ice is too expensive for the poor while private enterprise profits from its sale.

Aside from the newness of state operation of most utilities, there are two general reasons for their frequent failure to be efficient. One of these is that with changes in administration, or in evident public opinion, their plans are subject to change, and the maintenance of a policy, even long enough to justify itself, is sometimes difficult. This is a difficulty in detail and not of principle, which can be overcome in various ways. A more widely feared difficulty with public operation of great enterprises is the supposed impossibility of calling to their management the same executive and administrative ability which large private capital is able to command. Considering the frequent instances in which men suffer financial loss to enter the public service and remain in it in spite of great financial inducement to leave, this danger seems to be limited. Private enterprise does offer to men of conspicuous business ability greater reward in money than the

public service presents or should present. But the state rewards its worthy servants otherwise than with money, both by prestige and by the happiness which comes from the consciousness of good work, and the best public servants appreciate these rewards. Moreover, ability of some kinds is unduly rewarded in private business, and the prevention of these undue rewards is one phase of what must be done to secure a better distribution of the returns from industry.

We turn now to the simplest and most direct method of accomplishing this end.

3. Taxation of property and income

It is a sound and accepted principle that individuals should contribute to the support of the state in the measure of their ability to do so. The income of the state comes essentially from taxation, and the most universal direct tax is that on property. Such a tax, levied equally on all property, will be paid in large part by the wealthy. Property below some minimum value, and of the kinds most necessary for the support of life, is sometimes exempted from taxation, whereby those least able to pay are spared. On the other hand, such property as the poor have cannot be concealed, while much of the wealth of the very rich can escape in this way.

However, the tax on property is not the one best calculated to secure revenue in proportion to ability to pay, and is very far from being the tax most likely to secure a disposition of the fruits of industry which will improve the status of the poor as compared with the rich. For these purposes inheritance taxes and income taxes are in their nature especially effective. The income tax is very old. In the form of a tithe, typically and by name one-tenth of the gross produce, it was in use by the most of our fairly remote ancestors. The resistance to it in recent years is due to the fact that our system of law a comparatively few centuries ago was essentially class legislation in favor of the rich and powerful and that our opinions have incompletely outgrown this epoch. Taxes

on net income are now general and are a favorite resource when a state has to meet extraordinary needs.

Functions of taxation

The primary function of taxation is the financial support of the state. The majority of people probably believe in theory that its use for any other purpose is improper; and while this is the accepted doctrine, legislation should conform to it. Still, the state has ultimate functions which may not permanently be sacrificed for the observance of subordinate principles. Whenever the people of a state desire to promote some particular phase of their collective welfare, such as the most perfect possible distribution of the fruit of industry, there is no fundamental impropriety in their accomplishing this by any just means upon which they may agree. Potentially, taxation is such a means; and its restriction of purpose to financial support is only a convention, which will cease to be binding whenever the people collectively decide that they wish to use it for some other purpose. The time is probably not far away when the recognition of its proper use for other purposes will become general and avowed.

In practice, taxation already has other uses. It is almost universally used for the prevention or restriction of vice. Where traffic in alcoholic liquor is legal, it is burdened by taxes intended to restrict it as well as to provide revenue. Municipalities protect their resident merchants by prohibitive taxes on peddlers and fly-by-night shops. Conversely, taxation is withheld to encourage reforestation and the planting of permanent crops. Its use for the specific purpose of improving the distribution of wealth will be just as proper as these, whenever the people feel that their common welfare will really be promoted by such use. In view of the present trend of the science and art of politics, it seems not unlikely that our descendants during the near future will be familiar with income taxes which would now seem outrageous and which will make such private fortunes as the largest in the world today absolutely impossible.

Demonstrated effect of excessive taxation

The income tax idea can of course be carried to an extreme. In its nature, it places a premium on unproductive property. Recent American experience demonstrates, as was *à priori* to be expected, that such a tax intended to produce revenue may fail even in this respect by being too high, great fortunes escaping taxation by finding less productive but safer investment. But every state must encourage production. This basic fact must not be ignored, whatever purpose may be served by an income tax. If an attempt is made to limit incomes by taxation, the effect may well be to injure the poor, unless there be particular care that production does not suffer.

Following Plato's suggestion of a limit on wealth, let us assume a limit on income, say one hundred thousand dollars a year, and note one important consequence. Such a limitation would be placed by levying a practically confiscatory income tax at this point. There are very many men with incomes greater than this. As a group or class, these are the men of greatest business ability; in so far as this is not the case, it would be made so by an inheritance tax before an income tax of this kind would be levied. The men with incomes greater than this actually have such incomes not so much because they really need them, or at any rate felt that they needed them before they accumulated their wealth, as because they have the capable man's instinct for activity and in the gratification of this instinct direct their ability along the lines which are most customary under existing social conditions and which promise the greatest return in power, prestige, and social honor. In a state socialized to the extent suggested, the opportunity for great distinction by the accumulation of private wealth would be removed; and at the same time the opportuniy for distinction and for the enjoyment of the same real rewards of ability and industry—that is, for power, prestige, and social honor—in the service of the state would be very much enhanced. The effect would apparently be that after accumulating wealth

enough to produce the maximum practicable income the men able to do this would have the strongest natural incentive to devote themselves to public activity. The complaint against the nationalization of industry, that state and municipal operation are less efficient than private, would cease to be reasonable, with the ability of the state to secure the services of the most able citizens. And under such conditions, it would evidently be proper for the state to offer to the citizens able to manage its industries most efficiently inducements, even in money, as great as could be obtained in private business.

Limitations of private rights

The most frequent objection to the socialization of industry is founded on respect for private rights. But this respect for private right is probably less deep-seated than is commonly supposed. The rich man's objection to socialism is less likely to rest on his private right to wealth and opportunity to make the most for himself of his ability than on the belief that the present social system is a satisfactory one, as illustrated by the fact that in the use of his wealth he is already a very valuable member of society. Almost any citizen with enough ability and clearness of vision to enable him to become wealthy will freely grant the paramount right of the state to command his service. What he does not grant is that it would be reasonable for the state to prescribe the nature of this service. He justifies his fortune, as a rule, by its and his value to the state; but he claims the personal right to control the manner of manifestation of this value, as service, and believes that the ability demonstrated by his good use of wealth justifies his claim to the right to decide what he will do and how his wealth should be used.

But if the state has a paramount right over its citizens and over their wealth, it must have the inherent right to determine the lines which their activity shall take. If a state were to ignore the feelings of its individual citizens in deciding what each should do, it would defeat its own ends by a general failure to secure from them the maxi-

mum of effort. Within the bounds of reason, however, the state may properly make such decisions when its people collectively are so disposed; and it will be within these bounds if at such a time it limits the opportunity for private income and makes the reward of public service greater in any or every respect than the possible reward of other kinds of activity.

Eventual results of excessive taxation

Under present conditions, such an income tax as has just been suggested would be a futile outrage. It would be pure class legislation, limiting the opportunity of a class (defined by the legislation, if not now a recognizable class) whose present value to the state no man will deny, and forcing this class to a one-sided service of the rest of the state. No state would profit by such a policy. The object of the equalization of wealth, if it is to be justified really, must be the strengthening of the state as a whole and the general promotion of happiness and welfare. These results will never follow forcing one part of the population to support another part. If the conditions of living of those who now live badly because of poverty were made easy by the restriction of great incomes and the devotion to nationalized industry of the activity of the most capable men, and the effectiveness of the latter were undiminished by such a change, an immediate result under present conditions would be the removal of the chief incentive which now drives the naturally inactive to work. Any state policy which in any way lessens the activity of a considerable part of the population is essentially bad.

Whenever a state seeks to enhance the general welfare by claiming directly for the state the service of its demonstratedly most efficient citizens, it must also exert a similar measure of state control of the service of the rest of the population. In the truly efficient state, every citizen must keep reasonably busy, must be able to do something well, and must do it well and effectively.

In the preceding sentence, the most important phrase,

Education for efficiency and social service

because of the responsibility it throws first upon the state, is the requirement that every citizen be able to do something well. It would be idle for the state to demand service which the individual could not perform. The superior ability of a part of the population is now maintained in considerable part by the training with which this part of the population equips itself. With inferior training, a large part of the population does not realize its handicap until it is too late to remedy it. The first work of a state which would maintain and steadily increase its collective efficiency is to train its citizens for efficiency, individual and social. In this work the disposition to serve is as important in every line of activity as is manual or mental dexterity in particular lines. The training all together, from handiwork through arithmetic and economics to ethics, constitutes education.

Education perfect as to individual efficiency but ignoring the relation of the individual to society is a failure from the standpoint of the state. It follows that the citizen of an enlightened state must be educated in both respects. Education for different activities will of course demand different periods, and will differ in cost. At least a part of the difference in cost should be borne by the state, so that poverty may not, by itself, make any kind of service beyond the reach of any boy or girl. The landowner and the plowman, the engineer, the machinist, and the fireman, the physician, the teacher, the mother, and the statesman must all be educated, each specifically for the particular service to be expected, but all in general and in large part alike in appreciation of responsibility and duty, in qualification for the discriminating pursuit of happiness, and for the realization of happiness in all creditable achievement and especially in social service.

If we have seemed, during a part of this chapter, to go far afield, let it be noted now that the matters discussed were essential to an understanding of our proper subject. We have learned that the ideal government is a democracy,

but that republics actually have not as a rule been successful. The advantage of the ideal republic is in the superior opportunity for service by every citizen. We see now that this can be expected to be accomplished by the reasonable equalization of opportunity and by the most perfect possible training of every citizen for efficient social service and for happiness in such service. The survival of our social and political institutions and of our descendants as the components of these institutions, must ultimately depend upon the realization of some such ideal conditions as we have been discussing.

Perfect education for lives of service is the obvious *sine qua non* of successful democracy. What we have shown is that this is true for the maintenance of a hypothetical democracy, fairly perfect as we picture it; but the world progresses, and the mere maintenance of any good conditions, or even of conditions perfect for the time being, will never be sufficient. It is education, again, to which we must look for progress. It is not enough that our young people understand what was good yesterday, or what seems best today, for they have their parts to play in a future world. Such a democracy as we have tried to sketch does not exist, but our young people should live in a state which approaches it, remotely or nearly. In the measure in which they understand the conditions which must be realized in a democracy before it can approach ideal efficiency, and appreciate the advantages which such a state will bring to every one of its citizens, they will enjoy progress toward such conditions and should be able to facilitate it.

Outside concerns of states

This discussion has dealt almost exclusively with the internal affairs of the state. In its external relations, the fields of politics and ethics have less in common, although even here the distinction is not sharp. If states are approximately co-ordinate, they tend to be similar; the present ease and quickness of transportation and communication make this rule hold even though they be far

apart. The old objection of monarchies to neighboring republics has been mentioned. A socialist state is a nuisance to less socialized neighbors, and *vice versa*. A high tax drives away movable capital. During several years, all sound German money sought investment abroad. A few American states attract corporations from the others by less stringent laws. One state without an inheritance tax can tempt private capital from all the others. If one state grants no divorces, its discontented spouses seek some other. A useful invention or innovation spreads at once over the world. These are all illustrations of the fact that progress has become one problem for all humanity, instead of a local or racial activity. The people of every state have a great and ever increasing concern with the domestic condition of every other people. Thus foreign politics, economics, and ethics have a very real interest in the study of the ethics of each people. Still, the discussion of these subjects would lead too far from the theme in hand.

War

One phase of the outside relations of states may not be left unmentioned: this is, war. The object of conduct is to insure life, and the state has become a universal human institution because of its contribution to survival. In the past, war has been a very common test of the power to survive. Temporarily the struggle between peoples is not just now very acute because science has been increasing the means of subsistence faster than the population could grow. But because it has been possible for more men to live than ever could before, the population of the world has been increasing of late faster than it ever before did. However inaccurate as a basis for specific forecasting, the law of Malthus is valid; population will again overtake and try to outgrow the means of subsistence, and then those will live who can.

In the struggle for the chance to live, other factors have gained in importance as compared with martial power; but humanity is not so reliant upon these, nor so

softened by its period of easy living, nor so inoculated with altruism, nor so frightened by the horrors of war, but that a very respectable part of it will still fight rather than starve or go childless, when these seem to be the alternatives. War is just now the most perfected and futile of human arts. It is more fundamentally ruinous than ever before. In ancient times, the wise ruler sacrificed his poorest human material to win a battle or take a city, as Cyrus did in his last battle and Darius in the taking of Babylon and in the retreat from Scythia. Now, the selective draft offers the best part of the people as the sacrifice, and keeps the incapable safe, to breed a weaker race. War has often cursed the victor as well as the vanquished; when time lets the issue be appraised, France and Russia and England are likely to be found worse sufferers from the World War than conquered Germany. Still, nations will go to war again when they think it expedient.

Avoidance of war

This being true, in spite of the fact that war is in general bad, in more ways than it is worth while to try to enumerate, there are two ways to lessen the danger of it: keep it from seeming to be expedient; and keep it from being expedient. The former is a matter of education, and education for this purpose is very popular while the horrors of war are fresh in mind. Most potential war can be made inexpedient by the mutual agreement of states not to tolerate it. A league of nations or federation of states for this purpose necessarily deprives its members of some of the sovereignty they are used to claiming. But there are already definite and recognized limits to the sovereignty of any state, and there is no state which cannot expect to gain more than it loses, if a joint agreement to prevent war can be made effective.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SCHOOL

Education is the whole basis of civilization. Exception may be taken to this broad statement on the ground that civilization has also a material basis. This is indeed important but is still incidental and secondary. Its chief enduring importance is because it provides some of the material and superior facilities for education. Nothing of material value would hold respect from one generation to the next without education. But education, if it were possible without a material foundation, might create this in hardly more than a generation.

Human history, in more or less completeness and in single lines, reaches back over a period of two thousand to possibly six thousand years. We know very little as to the conditions, even two thousand years ago, of the ancestors of the most of the peoples very active in civilization today. From the fact that we know but little, and from the little that we do know, we are sure that they had then made a very small start on the building of the social structure which our civilization represents.

Civilization is not a blood inheritance

There have been men in the world for more than a quarter of a million years: our own kind of men have lived for probably fifty thousand years, perhaps longer. Two thousand or six thousand years is a moment in the past time of evolution, a period so short that we can be perfectly sure that it has seen no appreciable hereditary change in man. Even if the age of civilization be ten thousand years, it is quite impossible that hereditary changes, taking place alike but independently in a number of races, are to any appreciable extent responsible for the difference in condition of the people of today and of their ancestors a few thousand years ago. The difference is social, not individual. It depends upon education, not upon birth.

Education makes race differences

The intellectual ability of at least the principal races of the northern hemisphere is essentially indistinguishable. This statement is positive and founded on exceptionally wide experience as a teacher with whole classes of round-headed Swiss, Americans of pure British extraction, Filipinos, and occasional students of Chinese, Hindu, Spanish, and other nations and races. Of two students who stood out of thousands in mental brilliancy, one was descended from the "first families of Virginia," and the other came from a village on one of the less progressive islands in the Philippines, where ancestors are an unknown luxury. There are clear enough individual differences, but no race differences of any moment. This is very significant; for it is almost a proof that there has been no considerable mental change in any of these races since the really remote time, far before any beginning of civilization, before their dispersal and the beginning of their racial differentiation.

Like education, beginning in infancy, will produce like adult brains, like mental products such as ideas, and identical civilization in most, if not in all, parts of the human world. The distinctive features of different cultures are functions of differences in education.

Importance of education

Our whole social structure, then, which it is the business of the study of ethics to prepare men to live in and share in and contribute to, is the product of education. Civilization will perish, deteriorate, survive, or progress, according to the badness or goodness of the education of each generation. Education is incomparably the most important function of society.

Every social institution is to some extent an educational agent, and this is of course true of social organization in its entirety. The educational nature of single institutions may be made more or less prominent. This is true of government itself. It is held to be one of the advantages of government exercised by many individuals rather than by few, and by frequently renewed bodies rather than by those chosen for long periods or for life, that the

education of the people is promoted by their participation in state affairs. Examples are provided by Athens and the American administration of the Philippines. Their experience shows that the resulting education is very good as to the technique of government but not in the far more essential element of faithful devotion to the public interest. The welfare and efficiency of society are better promoted by a wisely planned and executed division of activities, leaving the administration of the state to those as skilled as possible in statecraft, and education to agencies specialized for education.

Educational institutions: family, church, and school

The typical educational institutions are the family, the church, and the school. It is fundamentally to its service in education that the family owes its stability; for the length of human infancy is correlated with human capacity to be educated, and it is the long period of helplessness which has made the family anything more than a temporary union. During most of the long past of humanity, all education has been in the family, and its foundation is still laid in the family. With social evolution, it became necessary for each generation to be educated in fitness for social life. For a number of reasons the family is not the best place for this kind of education.

Family education inadequate

One of these reasons is that an important part of education is informal and unconscious, by imitation and adjustment. Too much imitation of the parents, and too much adjustment to their individual peculiarities would interfere with easy adjustment on a larger scale and be prejudicial to easy and effective sharing in community affairs. Another reason is that home education tends to repeat in each generation the education of the parents. This is inimical to social progress, and every community must progress, in modern times, or else finally retrograde and disappear. The most serious objection to education exclusively in the family, even before there was any specialization of state agencies for education, was the natural conflict of interest between family and society.

Each family was once independent, existing for itself, serving its own interests. Society, in its nature, curtailed this independence, and the family resented and resisted the restrictions laid on it by society. It was not in the nature of the case that, in general, family education should give due attention to social interests. The conflict of interest still survives. The girl is useful in the home, and the boy can help to support the family, and every enlightened state in the world has to resort to compulsory attendance in school to prevent injury to itself by the use of children for family service.

Conflict between family and society

In the evolution of society, then, it would have been impossible for the school to come into existence on the initiative of the family. Some social structure had first to develop, and then, acting as an organization, to establish the school, in order to give a social training which the family could not give and could not be expected to give. Training for social life and in the interest of society was the whole original function of the school. The school supported and controlled by the state is still the only place where education of this kind can be trusted to be given. Living in an age, necessarily of limited duration, when life is easy and safe, we may grow blind to this fact, very much as the eyes of an internal parasite atrophy because it can live without seeing; but in the long run social strength determines human survival, and the strength of society depends upon how thoroughly social training supersedes the narrower training for individual and family life and the still older anti-social instincts, such as love of personal freedom.

Primary function of the school

Primitive schools, having the explicit function of preparing the young for service as members of the state, have been known in various parts of the world. The most extreme suppression of the family is known in history in Sparta and in recent times in Bontoc. In Sparta for war and in Bontoc rather for peaceful pursuits, the community claimed the children as its own. In Bontoc

Examples: Sparta and Bontoc

the boys, from the age of three or four until they are married, live in common boys' houses, under the supervision of the elders of the community, and have during these years no family life at all. The girls of each ward are grouped together in another house, from about the time that they cease to nurse until they marry. Bontoc makes no such exclusive demand upon the service of her people as Sparta did; but the method of their education makes it safe for the community to trust its future to them without fear that their selfish interests will hurt their interests in common. In places where competition for survival was exceedingly strenuous, Bontoc and Sparta showed themselves notably able to grow and live on.

These two are extreme cases. Very many known primitive peoples have taken their young, either both sexes or the boys only, out of the families for comparatively brief periods of education in the customs and duties of the community or tribe. Sometimes there has been a succession of such "schools"; in others community training has come at the close of youth as an initiation into manhood. Such instruction is almost always made more impressive and binding by involving it in mysteries, and giving it the form of rites regarded as sacred.

Church and school

These rites and mysteries of each primitive tribe constituted its religious teaching, to all except the priests. The function of teaching fell properly to the priests, as the original aristocracy of knowledge, who insured their tenure of rank by being the teachers of what they chose to teach. The church and school accordingly developed together. As the church everywhere has claimed authority over custom, and custom is taught and fixed in the schools, or should be taught and fixed there, the school has remained in the care of the church during a large part of the social evolution of almost all peoples. During this long time, the church was always an integral part of the state. It was in this capacity that it was entrusted with social education; the state used its church as its teaching

institution. As a remarkable exception to this rule there developed a millenium ago in western Europe a condition in which the church asserted its superiority to the several states and retained under its care such schools as there were.

Education in morals always a state function

Our own culture is largely an outgrowth of that of western Europe during the Dark Ages. Church and state have become formally separate in many of the modern states, and with this separation the school has usually been removed from the formal charge of the church. The result has been beneficial to the school in many respects, giving it unprecedented freedom to develop in a variety of ways and bringing it such support as schools never had before. In this development, however, men have commonly overlooked the facts that it was as an instrument of the state that the church was originally a teaching institution at all, that as the original teacher of morals the church acted as the agent of the state, and that the basic function of the school is social or moral, in distinction to individual, education. Forgetting these things, many men still look exclusively to the church for moral education, and imagine that, because religious dogma is out of place in public schools, it is safe to neglect moral and social education—the two are essentially identical—in them. Social education will be fully as essential in the future as it ever was in the past, and the state which neglects its responsibility for such education will in due time disappear.

Since it is the natural function of the school to prepare the young for life in society and in the state, it should be clearly recognized by all citizens that the primary duty of state-supported schools is thorough, effective training in the tried and approved customs of the people—that is, in morals—and instruction in the basic principles which underlie these customs—that is, in ethics.

Qualifications of the teacher

In view of the supreme importance of education, it is obviously proper that, in the specialization of activity in

social life, those who are entrusted with the function of education should be in every sense the best of their race. Beside being the best that nature has selected, they should have a keen appreciation of their responsibility, as those to whom the future of the race is primarily entrusted. They must realize fully that the business of the present is to prepare for the future, remembering that in ourselves we live for but a day but that we look for the immortality of our race in the lives of our children and descendants. Accordingly, of all people, they should devote themselves most completely to their work, holding themselves as models of conduct, and, so far as is in their power, of achievement also. They must understand that the apology for shortcomings, which others may find in past or present custom, is hardly valid for those whose chosen and appointed function it is to plan and establish the customs and civilization of better generations to come. Society's agent in the work of education is the teacher.

Character

Without attempting to define perfection, some of the characteristics of the worthy teacher may be noted. It is self-evident that he must be trained in the specific subjects he is to teach. It is always recognized, as a sort of formal proposition, that the teacher must be a man (or woman) of superior character, but this recognition should be not merely formal. The ability to train young people for lives of happiness and efficiency cannot be rated easily in percentages, but is more important than most of the qualifications of a good teacher which are so rated. It is inherited, and is also the product of the best training.

Reputation

As the teacher is certain to be a model for his students, he must make and guard himself as a good model, not only a worthy exponent of the best present practice but a model for the rising generation. His efficiency depends upon his reputation as well as upon his character. The man who pays attention first to satisfying himself that he is right and cares comparatively little what others may

think of him so long as he is at peace with his own conscience, is everywhere admired. There is, however, a primitive element in this standard, and excess of self-sufficiency is prejudicial to a teacher's success. The desire for approval is instinctive and still good, and should not be sacrificed to personal pride. Partly because the judgment of many, even though less informed, may be better than one's own judgment, partly because conformity is good in itself, and partly because the teacher depends to some extent upon the support of the parents for the accomplishment of successful work with the children, it is essential that he be a worthy model in reputation as well as in his opinion of himself or in his own real character.

Leadership

Ability to enlist the devotion as well as the respect of students is a characteristic of almost all conspicuously successful and effective teachers. Devotion to the teacher makes the student strive harder to imitate him and earn his approval. There is always such imitation, even though it be unconscious; but the ability to command devotion has, beside the fact that imitation is naturally more perfect, the further advantage that it begets enthusiasm in other things than imitation. Good and bad attributes of the teacher are absorbed alike by students in general. Therefore, a lazy, or insincere, or irascible, or slovenly teacher is intolerable. Since it is only fair that the most responsible job should be the most difficult, as this picture of the teacher's qualifications must make it clear that his is, fairness demands further that the occupation of the teacher should be also the most honored in the community. The teacher's fair claim to this post of honor increases his responsibility. Whether the effort is pleasant or disagreeable, easy or hard, the teacher must strive to measure up to his full duties.

There are some great teachers who do not enlist the devotion or affection of their great students, but if these men had such power they would be greater teachers still. The indisposition of many men to seek to establish the

bonds of devotion is associated with bashfulness, which, in distinction to proper modesty, well-trained men should outgrow. Since his effectiveness is always enhanced by the devotion of the students, it is entirely proper that the teacher should endeavor, deliberately and by every proper and effective means, to establish a relation of this kind.

Sympathy

A personal trait which is peculiarly necessary in the good teacher is sympathy. The grown man does not establish intimate or sympathetic relations with his students by being a boy himself or by acting like one. But he must understand boys, not as a psychologist merely, but as one who remembers the joy of boyhood so intimately that he can realize it still in memory, apply a man's wisdom to understanding it, and analyze its conditions with such sympathy that the charm of youth survives the operation. Whatever we associate with happiness, we like. Also, we do our best when happy. It is the teacher who teaches the boy at his happiest, and who brings out in the boy the traits which make the boy happy—gets rid of the traits which provoke unhappiness—and who does these things unconsciously because he is trained to promote happiness instinctively or by habit, who most endears himself to his students and serves them most effectively. We need not impair our understanding of this fact with the heart as well as with the brain if we recall here that the foundations of happiness are themselves by nature good; so that the teacher who promotes the proper happiness of his students, and so, whether deliberately or unconsciously, endears himself to them, is never obliged to compromise his principles nor to sanction things which ought to be discouraged.

Public teaching must be professional

Second only to the fact that education must be for social life, and be given by the state to insure this end, the great general advantage of public education is that it makes possible the specialization of the teacher, which is not possible to any similar extent in the family. This advantage of public education must be very carefully

maintained. Beside the general training of a citizen, the teacher requires additional training in the subjects he is to teach and professional training in fitness for the profession of a teacher. As a matter of general propriety the length of this training for the profession of teaching must be a function of the wealth of the state. However the cost of the training be divided between the state and the prospective teacher, it takes longer in a wealthy than in a poor state. This is true of general training and of that for all professions. The fair expectation of duration of life is another factor, influencing the proper length of all training. With the increase in the average length of life, it is obviously reasonable to devote more time to preparation for it. The importance of the profession and the difficulty of preparation are other factors. On the basis of importance, teaching is clearly worthy of as thorough preparation as is engineering or law.

Preparation for teaching

The time required in preparation, as demanded by difficulty, varies widely according to what is to be taught. The teacher in the grade schools requires only a *good* citizen's education, plus technical training for teaching. The university teacher needs university education, plus the thorough mastery of the subject of specialization, plus training to teach; the last of these qualifications is usually overlooked, with the natural results. For the general training of citizens, it is more important that teachers be broadly educated than that they be specialists in teaching single subjects. It is more important that each generation as a whole be well trained for social life in general than it is that the individuals be highly specialized for particular work. As to the teachers, specialization is too frequently associated with narrowness of interest. And as to the citizens, technical proficiency at the sacrifice of fundamental general social efficiency is decidedly not in the permanent interest of any state. Vocational education has of course a necessary place in public instruction, when the period of compulsory attendance is prolonged

enough to interfere with the learning of a trade by apprenticeship or in the family. But the enthusiasm natural in the development of new work can easily do mischief by letting the new work displace what long experience has proved good.

Teaching should be life-work

Wisdom is clearly the supremely important attribute of the best teachers; this is too manifest to require argument. Remembering that wisdom is the product of the careful digestion of instruction and experience, it is easy to see that it is a product of gradual development, and that a good equipment of it can be built up only in the course of the years. As interest compounds, so wisdom grows with increasing scope and reliability while life lasts. Since the teacher more than any other citizen, except perhaps the statesman, is called upon to use wisdom in the service of society, and since real wisdom is necessarily the product of many well-spent years and the worthy attribute of age, it follows clearly that teaching, more than any other profession except possibly politics, should be the definitely established life-work of those who engage in it.

It is, for this reason, a fundamental weakness of our social organization that good teachers are on the whole ill-paid public servants, in money and otherwise. Under existing conditions, it is common for young people to teach school, either because the beginning teacher is better paid than the beginner in other professions, or because it is possible to begin to teach without enough financial support to undertake anything else, and to use a few years of teaching as a stepping-stone to business or housekeeping. The result of this common practice is that probably the majority of our children receive their instruction from those who, because of their own youth, are without the most fundamentally essential attribute of the good teacher. The effect upon education is equally natural and obvious.

The fact that teaching often serves as a stepping-stone to other professions strengthens the common opinion that

other professions are more worthy. In this way the other professions come really to be more highly esteemed, and the teacher loses effectiveness by the loss of prestige. This not only interferes with the school work of the individual teacher but also tends to make the most able citizens, who, properly encouraged, might make the best teachers, avoid this profession, to the positive loss of society, both present and future. A low estimate of the teaching profession also operates to deprive those who do teach, and teach well, of a part of the proper reward of their service, in that they do not enjoy, as they should be able to do, the full esteem of their fellow-citizens. While salaries have improved, conditions in these other respects have been growing worse in the United States for half a century or longer. And the evil of the conditions is cumulative, feeding upon itself, as teaching comes to be tolerated as a life-work of the incompetent or unambitious, and so tends to earn the lack of esteem from which it suffers.

Even within the profession, there are practices which operate to lower the respect for teaching itself. The best teachers are regularly rewarded by being made principals or superintendents, while the contact with those being educated is left to the less competent. At the pinnacle of the profession, in the universities, the most valuable professor is made a dean. Too often, the work which then falls to these best old teachers could as well be done by a good clerk. At best, the administrative positions almost always call for a different kind of ability. The proper reward for high teaching ability and efficiency should be greater reward, in money and reputation, as a teacher.

Means of improvement

To some extent, these conditions may be remedied from without; this is partly done by increasing salaries, making it possible for the teacher to look something like the model citizen he should be expected to be. Mostly, however, the remedy must come from within the teaching profession,

or be directly due to its own efforts. Teachers, like other good citizens, are likely to be taken at their own valuation. The teacher who teaches because he likes to teach, who expects to remain a teacher because he values his work, who appreciates its value and is content to get a reasonable part of the reward of his efforts from this appreciation, may expect to be appreciated correspondingly by his community. Every teacher who does this has a powerful influence in making his own profession esteemed and desirable, and so attracts other worthy men to enter it.

Professional advantage of the teacher

Moreover, the effective teacher has an opportunity which does not similarly fall to the successful member of other professions, that of drawing into it desirable accessions and successors. If his students consciously make him their model, they are moved to follow him in his profession as well as in other matters. Only in the measure in which his grip on them is a weak one are they likely to be attracted to other occupations as they outgrow his influence. Unlike the member of any other profession, he has the whole body of the youth go through his hands, and has the opportunity deliberately to select among them those whom he will endeavor to train as colleagues or followers. The use of this opportunity is an important element in the success of the one group of teachers which retains fairly unimpaired the full esteem of the public, the faculty of the university or college.

Except in prestige, and appreciation of his own position, which ought to be somewhat independent of prestige, the position of the teacher is not essentially very different, whether he be in a university or in a grade school. The professor has finally a higher salary, but he earns this first by years of expensive preparation and hard work, and must spend it in meeting social demands, which grow in variety and insistency at least as fast as his salary does. The good grade teacher could make more money in some other calling; so could the highest salaried member of almost any college faculty. There are several reasons

for the greater stability of the college faculty, but the best and strongest is that college teachers take and profess more pride in their work.

Pride in teaching

The whole teaching profession needs to develop *esprit de corps,* a pride in itself well enough developed so that the beginner will share in it, and the ambitious youth be encouraged to seek to share it. *Esprit de corps* consists largely, in its external expression, in enthusiasm. The enthusiasm of too many teachers is as hard to see as the germ of scarlet fever; and yet, turn it loose, and it is equally contagious. Let the old teacher rejoice flagrantly in his work. If he has at first any doubt about his profession of pride, he will lose it. Such a process will do him real good; and it will do much more good by releasing the suppressed disposition to grow enthusiastic on the part of those who catch the infection.

Summary: wisdom

Each line of argument leads finally to the subject of wisdom. In concluding this discussion of the teacher, we recall that this generation lives for the next one, and that the teacher is society's chosen agent for the next generation's preparation. The future will be an outgrowth of the present. To prepare for the future, the teaching profession must have an idea of what the future can be, should be, and will be. To frame such ideas soundly, the teachers must understand the real nature of present conditions and the factors by which they are modified and will be made different. So far as science teaches us, the evolution in past ages, to which we owe our bodies and our minds, worked blindly, selecting in each generation those who were able to endure, selecting the attributes presented by heredity, with the constant slight modifications presented by variation, the direction of which depended upon chance alone. Early social evolution may have been equally blind. So far as evolution depends upon the power to survive, these conditions may not have been changed and may never change.

In the presentation of the material to be selected, how-

ever, social evolution has far outgrown the stage of helpless blindness. The incomparably rapid development of civilization in recent times is with each decade more and more a function of the deliberate creation of social institutions, as candidates for selection and survival. In the world today, change has become so rapid that adjustment to existing conditions is ceasing to be possible. Conditions change more rapidly than it is possible to meet them as they present themselves, by adjustment, even with the most perfect social machinery. They have now to be foreseen, or they cannot be met properly. The survival of states and cultures in the past has been a function of their ability to meet conditions as they arose, and this has sooner or later proved too difficult for the most of them. In the future, survival will be a result of their ability to anticipate and prepare for conditions. We can prepare most confidently for conditions which we will ourselves knowingly create. The safest future state will be that which is most able deliberately to develop a succession of improved conditions; and this will be accomplished by the wisest forecast of the conditions which the constant succession of future periods will prove to be possible and best.

As it is the teacher who must prepare the succession of generations, and needs more than other men to forecast the conditions for which he is preparing them, and has more than other men the power to make these conditions what he will, so it is the teacher who has the best prospect of enduring achievement, and who, before all others, must find his happiness and his duty in making and keeping himself wise.

The ethics of student life

We turn now from the teacher to the larger element in the school, the students, and undertake to apply to the particular conditions of youth the general principles which have been reached in preceding chapters. To determine the proper ethics of the student, we must regard youth in its true nature, as an opportunity for growth and prepa-

ration for life; and, in a civilized state, as in particular an opportunity to prepare for life in society.

Concessions to youth

In the judgment of conduct and in the direction of conduct, as in the giving of all tasks, certain concessions to youth are entirely proper. However, it is a widespread custom, the result in large part of conditions under which life is made easy by civilization, to concede to youth more than is convenient for society and more than is good for youth itself. Youth is regarded as a time of happiness. Older people look back to boyhood often as a time of happiness passed. Most frequently, this is because memory has been kind, and the mist, which obscures distant time like distant places, is a rosy one through which a natural if involuntary choice reveals most clearly what we like best to recall.

Youth is indeed a proper time of happiness; so is middle age; and various seers, when their time came for experience with this also, have told us that old age is the best of all. As happiness should be a mental habit, it is particularly proper that youth should be a happy time, in order that the habit may be firmly fixed. But youth is primarily an opportunity for preparation, and it is essentially for the purpose of preparing in the best way for happiness in later years that youth should be made as happy as it can. Concessions which interfere with preparation for happiness under the conditions which will follow youth are ill-judged and improper.

Responsibilities of youth

Concessions are also made to youth as a period of irresponsibility. Relatively, youth is of course irresponsible, as wisdom and judgment are the very qualities in preparation for which youth has been provided. But for the meeting of its own conditions and its own emergencies youth is responsible just as fairly as maturity brings responsibility for conduct under more complicated conditions. There is no proper time for real foolishness, which in youth as well as at other times has always its consequences. Nature would punish foolishness in youth,

and by punishment would teach; and nature is a better teacher than the too indulgent parent or pedagogue.

Definition of youth

The equipment of youth is both physical and mental. In both, the equipment is at first merely a basis for development, and the characteristic of youth in distinction to maturity is this aspect of the equipment. Youth and student life may be considered to endure, while growth and development are the chief functions of the individual. Development of course continues while active life endures; but at some time, which we may conveniently recognize as the individual's "commencement," one ceases to be primarily a student or apprentice, and assumes as his general function the use of the powers which hitherto he has been developing.

Physical training

In treating youth as a student, we emphatically do not restrict attention to his mental development and exclude his physical development from interest. There are historical examples of very notable mental achievement by men with very infirm bodies. These illustrate man's fortunate power to make the best of bad conditions and are valuable for the encouragement of those who need encouragement of this kind. As man's left arm becomes stronger if he loses his right arm and has to develop his left to do the work of both, there is perhaps a general power to strengthen any organ of the whole man by making exceptional demands upon it and cultivating it with undivided attention. But men do not sacrifice the right arm for the sake of the left. A symmetrical whole man is stronger and better than one who is weak in any part; and the general experience of mankind clearly teaches us that bodily health, if the method of its acquisition does not interfere with proper attention to mental activity and development, is a substantial foundation and support for mental health. The Latin proverb, *mens sana in corpore sano,* is unquestionably good.

Bodily health is a basic good

But, in a practical study of ethics, it must be understood that physical health should be cultivated for the sake of

the body itself. Bodily health and strength are obviously favorable to personal success and to efficiency in contribution to social and political welfare. They help one to earn a living and properly to support a family. In emergencies which grow less frequent with civilization but never cease to be possible, a strong and active body will save one's life or that of others. Bodily strength lengthens the possible hours of labor, mental as well as physical. The physical beauty commonly associated with bodily health and vigor is a personal and social asset. It makes friends for its possessor, and thus assures his immediate safety, the likelihood of success in earning his living, the securing of a desired mate, and the rearing of attractive and successful children.

Unhappiness is nature's usual penalty for physical weakness, and unhappiness is contagious; thus, personally and socially, happiness is jeopardized by physical weakness or bad health. Bodily weakness makes what should be proper conduct impossible, and jeopardizes the results of proper conduct, and is therefore, in the most fundamentally proper use of the word, unethical.

Hygienic practice is good conduct

The discussion of rules of hygiene and physical culture would be beyond the proper field of ethics. But, as a matter of pure ethics, we should understand clearly and certainly that every kind of hygienic practice and all sound physical culture have a great and unmistakable ethical value. Boys who eat foolishly or drink foolishly, and boys who neglect the exercise which would make them strong and who thus become weaklings and eventually invalids, eventually interfering with the happiness of others, or at least being unable to contribute as they should to the welfare of society, and requiring greater support from society than the return they yield, are in the results of their conduct just as bad as those who shirk, those who do direct injury, even those who rob.

Competition in games

The games of students are natural to youth and should be encouraged. While competition should not be neces-

sary to make boys play, the competitive nature of games is good, both because it makes play keener in a natural way and because it furnishes training in competition and for proper conduct in competition which will be useful later in competition of other kinds. Excess in exercise and in keenness of competition is of course bad, like other excess.

Instincts of youth

The mental equipment of youth consists at first of instincts and of the power to learn. This equipment is maintained in kind as long as youth properly can be considered to endure; but it changes in detail as instincts are outgrown, modified, or replaced, and as ideas are acquired and applied or used as the basis for further learning.

With regard to the instincts, it has already been explained that they are an inheritance from an ancestry which had less knowledge than the men of today and lived under conditions very different from our own. Some of them are peculiar to childhood and youth and are naturally outgrown as their usefulness passes. Some were serviceable under conditions which no longer exist and should now be suppressed. A few are useful in social life and have grown more important with the development of civilization. Instincts characteristic of youth, such as that of play, should be given free rein both as to expression and as to later desuetude, but should be directed in such a way that the play will be good preparation for the life to follow. The anti-social instincts, such as hatred and fear, should be repressed as completely as possible. So far as it occasionally remains desirable in society to accomplish the ends which these instincts were evolved to serve, this may best be trusted to a well-developed intelligence. Bashfulness is a related instinct which in moderation is proper to youth, but should be replaced, with years, by modesty, as an intellectual attribute.

Appropriate education of social instincts

On the other hand, the social instincts, such as liking for one's own kind, the love of approbation, and the love of honor and of the truth, all of which and especially the

latter are weak as instincts, should be encouraged and developed. Teachers can instruct, encourage, and guide in this development, but real progress in it can be made only in the students' own minds, and cannot be as active and effective as it should be unless their own personal efforts are made the chief factor in such development.

Control of sexual instincts imperative

In a discussion of the instincts influencing the lives of older students, those associated with sex demand particular attention. The earliest of these in their appearance are bashfulness, lack of ease, and even a measure of antipathy between the sexes, all of these having been evolved to keep boys and girls apart until the natural time of mating. Up to this time of life, social life has presented no essentially new conditions, and the wearing down of bashfulness by coeducation is perhaps harmless. But the development of complex civilization and the consequent necessary prolongation of the period of preparation for active and independent life have presented new conditions, to meet which instincts have not been evolved and which demand the strict suppression for a number of years of the instincts inherited from ancestors who assumed the status of men and women a number of years earlier than this can be done in our time.

As has already been explained in the discussion of the family, this difficulty is overcome in some types of civilization by the prolonged separate education of boys and girls and by not permitting them to associate before marriage. Since youth is for the preparation for social life in which men and women will mingle, it is obviously best, if practicable, that the period of youth include, as a part of the training, as free association as possible. Where such an opportunity is given, it becomes necessary for youth to assume a considerable measure of responsibility for the results. Boys who understand that they are training themselves to be honorable men by conducting themselves now as honorable boys will recognize this responsibility and live up to it.

This is the most serious responsibility of older boys which is peculiar to civilized peoples, and by failing to meet it they can most effectively destroy their own characters and make misery for others. Under direction and then voluntarily, they must school themselves to appreciate these facts, and try to make the appreciation so completely a part of their mental equipment that they can safely be given society's confidence. A savage is not expected to be continent beyond the age of about fifteen; a civilized boy must; it is one of the prices of civilization. Boys have not elected to be members of society, but they have inherited a place in it which they cannot resign. When its interests and their selfish instincts or desires are in conflict, they cannot gratify the selfish motive and use it as an excuse. Even as a mere matter of selfishness, they can be absolutely sure that in the long run they will get happiness from the proper suppression of selfish desires and will insure themselves lasting regret if they fail to wait until these and the interests of society can be satisfied together.

For the sake of safety in this particular respect, and for the general sake of cleanness, temptation must be avoided. This care is demanded not only in the avoidance of physical temptation but still more in the scrupulous cultivation of clean habits of mind.

Habits of study

In the choice of subjects to be studied, young students are not given much responsibility. It is of course right that they should consider the value of the subjects they study and the methods used in presenting them. It is not proper, though, that the student's attitude should be a critical one. They should rather trust those who are responsible, that is, their teachers and those who prescribe the course of study. The materials taught have, as a rule, the sanction of usage, which is a safer guide than the personal choice of the students would be. The time comes for the older students to choose their future work and to be instructed in specific preparation for it. For

this choice, they or their parents, but not the school authorities, are responsible. The choice should be made with care but finally with confidence and permanently.

Emphasis has been laid repeatedly on the importance of habits as guides to conduct, and as easy and effective substitutes for intelligence and volition in matters of routine. It is in youth that boys fix the habits which will determine a large part of their conduct through life. The importance of regularity in all things and of work by all men has already been brought home. Students are particularly charged with one kind of work, study. At the beginning of school life and again at the end of every long vacation, it is necessary for most students to acquire this habit anew. Practically all of them approach it alike; neither study nor other work is steadily enjoyable after too long a rest. There is no student who cannot form the habit of studying, and no foolishness in student life is more manifest than failure to do this.

The penalty of not making study a real habit accumulates rapidly. The boy who lets study remain disagreeable gets less of it done and does not grow properly in ability to do it. The work of a class is adjusted to the ability of the class, and more is required as this class ability increases. Thus those who fall behind because of lack of steady effort presently find the work really too difficult and fail. There is no such difference in the natural ability of students that one out of one hundred is likely to be unable to do fairly well what is required of a class, if he tries steadily and from the start; but not many students are so exceptionally bright that they can do satisfactory work, year in and year out, in one subject and another, unless they make the daily accomplishment of each day's work a habit. Most students clearly cannot be exceptionally bright; but all students can, if they will, form a habit of working steadily, which will be more valuable than brightness usually proves in later life.

Cleanness

The habit of cleanness is hardly less important than

that of work. How truly cleanness is a habit can be realized by giving thought to one's acquaintances. With equal opportunity, some are scrupulously clean as regularly as others fail to be so. The relation of cleanness to personal and civic health should be understood by everybody. Personal cleanness is valuable also in securing the esteem and approval of one's fellows. The most untidy boy cleans up as well as the bad habit permits him to do when he wants especially to make a good impression. The frog who would a-wooing go takes a bath before he starts. The approval of one's fellows is worth working for at all times, not merely under the spell of wooing.

Mental cleanness

Cleanness is an attribute of the mind as well as of the body. As dirt leaves its marks on the hands, dirty thoughts leave theirs on the mind, where they are much harder to wash off. If we detest uncleanness in our minds, we will avoid it and avoid the suggestion of it. Dirty language and dirty thoughts are inseparable; we cannot even listen to dirty language without some corrosion. Young boys do not invent dirty talk, but they learn it from older boys and from men. An older boy or man who uses vile language should be shunned as carefully and as plainly as the feet should be kept out of a sewer.

Social training

As the school is a distinctly social institution, so student life is particularly an opportunity for social study. "The proper study of mankind is man." Boys learn to deal with men, as they must do when grown, by dealing with one another while boys. Men probably exaggerate when they say, as is often heard, that the most they got out of college was the friendships and associations formed there. If learning to associate and make friends is coupled with the associations and friends made, the exaggeration is not great, either as to school or college life. There is a more general training in the associations of youth than there is in the mastery of any books. Young people should certainly use their student years for the making of firm friendships and of many friends.

Collective student activities

For the sake of more formal social practice, students should take as active a part as they can in the organized activities of the school, and these activities should have the widest practicable scope. The Chancellor of Stanford University once made a list of thirty-seven graduates conspicuous for achievement after graduation, and pointed out that all but four of the thirty-seven had been conspicuous as undergraduates because of their activity in student organizations and student enterprises. The activities of college students provide opportunity for practice in almost any occupation a student may contemplate taking up later, and such opportunities are being carried down into the high schools to a great extent.

Social clubs

The social clubs of students are worthy of encouragement for the same general reason, providing opportunity for intimate friendships and an incentive to mutual helpfulness. When the fellowship and mutual help are pursued to excess, so that clubs attract attention by their exclusiveness, we have another example of too much of a thing good in moderation. Society on a larger scale usually finds an effective way of showing its disapproval, and the would-be select are given a lesson. Youth is the proper time for lessons, but this particular one ought not to have to be learned by personal experience.

Manners

Manners are social conventions as to deportment, training in which is usually given in the family; but bad manners are discreditable to one's associates and school as well as to the family. The school provides opportunity for practice in manners, and for their eventual correction and improvement, where affection does not enter into the disposition to please to such an extent as in the family. Roughness of manner does not make a boy be or seem manly, and will handicap him seriously when he becomes a man.

Self-training in responsibility

In conclusion, the fact requires emphasis that, although youth is a time of relative freedom from responsibility, yet it is, before all else, proper training in and for respon-

sibility for which youth is the opportunity, and for which it is fairly held responsible. This training is essentially individual. Each boy's ability to assume responsibility, now and in the future, and to perform well his part as a man, is chiefly dependent upon the training which he gives himself. The teacher can instruct him, and may put him in a position to gain experience. The experience itself, in its effects entirely and even in its acquisition largely, lies in his own mind. The teacher may drive him to accumulate information; but in the use of this information, as food for reflection, as raw material for wisdom, as proper material for the control of his own conduct, each student can do more for himself than the best of teachers can possibly do for him.

Effort of this kind, although personal and individual in its nature, is still contagious. From time to time, there are groups of boys who get this infection in early life, and develop into groups of notable men. The stimulus of the new institution worked in this way on the first college generation of students at Cornell, at Stanford, and at the Philippine college of agriculture. In classic Athens, an infection of this kind was epidemic. People sometimes wonder how such groups of strong young men happen to meet. The really significant thing is not their meeting but their making the most of it. To a very considerable extent, it is possible for any group of boys to discard the reserve which holds them apart, and devote themselves to the pursuit of things worth while; and in due time people will wonder in their case too what chance brought together men of such ability.

Strength in union

The latent power of men is almost never realized, and this failure has always its roots in the failure of youth to prepare as it might for efficiency in age. Individually, boys study, but they do not think enough. Socially, they fail to get really next to one another. Correct the second defect, and the first will usually disappear. In youth fully as truly as in manhood, in union there is strength.

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